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Abstract 
The aim of this dissertation is twofold: first, to evaluate how governments influence 
firms in which they invest (chapters one and two), and second, to examine arbitrage in 
the crude oil market by investigating the relationship between crude oil inventories, 
physical prices, and financial prices (chapter three). In the first chapter (The Wealth 
Effects of Government Investment in Publicly Traded Firms), I study how government 
share ownership affects shareholder wealth. I find that government investments with 
higher likelihood of political interference have a negative influence on shareholder 
wealth, while the opposite is true for government investments with economic 
objectives. In the second chapter (Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: 
Evidence form Government Investment in Publicly Traded Firms), I investigate how 
government share ownership affects the cost of debt of publicly traded firms. I find 
that government ownership generally leads to a higher cost of debt, except for times of 
economic and firm distress, when the value of the implicit government guarantee is 
associated with a reduction in the cost of debt. In the third chapter (Financial Trading, 
Spot Oil Prices, and Inventory: Evidence from the U.S. Crude Oil Market), I confirm 
the existence of an active cash and carry market in crude oil in Cushing, OK, the main 
U.S. crude oil futures settlement location. In other words, crude oil inventories in 
Cushing, but not in any other U.S. crude oil storage locations, are explained by the 
spread between the financial and the physical price of oil in addition to operational 
factors.
1 
Chapter 1: The Wealth Effects of Government Investment in Publicly 
Traded Firms 
Since the early 1980s, governments around the world have received US$3.1 
trillion from the sale of business assets through privatizations, but they have also 
simultaneously invested US$2.9 trillion, as they acquired stakes in private sector 
firms.
1
 While governments are becoming an increasing important class of investors, 
little is known about different types of government investors. Prior literature has 
focused on privatizations and, as those are mainly administered by central 
governments, has not studied how other government owners, such as local 
governments, government financial institutions and state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
influence firms under their control. This paper provides a first look at foreign and 
domestic investments by various government entities in publicly traded companies and 
assesses the shareholder announcement reaction to these acquisitions. 
Government investment vehicles might be affected by political pressures, thus 
leading them to pursue goals other than wealth-maximization. The imposition of those 
other goals on firms is likely to reduce profitability.
2
 That is, governments might 
actively impact the companies in which they invest, but have goals that differ from 
those of other shareholders: governments don’t simply go for ‘shareholder value 
maximization’, but might want to maximize employment, favor domestic investments, 
acquire foreign technologies and, as Shleifer (1998) suggests, pursue political goals 
                                                 
1
 Government investment and divestment totals are from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum M&A 
database.  Since 1988 it documents 18,494 government investments worth over $2.9 trillion and 2,088 
of these deals worth $892 billion are government investments in publicly traded firms. 
 
2
 Related evidence can be found in the stakeholder literature (Jensen, 2002) which finds that shareholder 
value suffers when multiple, possibly conflicting goals are imposed on corporations. 
2 
and increase government officials’ personal income. An interesting legalistic analysis 
is put forth by Kahan and Rock (2010): governments can impose their own goals on a 
firm more easily than private controlling shareholders; in their words “when the 
Treasury is the controlling shareholder, the legal basis for challenging conduct that 
would normally constitute a clear breach of the duty of loyalty or care is very weak.”3 
Such negative effects of government ownership should lead to a negative reaction to 
announcements of government investment. I will refer to this effect as the ‘political 
interference hypothesis.’ 
Alternatively, government investments can lead to ‘preferential access’ to 
financing, state contracts, and regulatory lobbying. I will refer to this as the 
‘preferential access hypothesis.’ Several studies show that firms benefit from political 
connection. Faccio (2006) shows that firm stock prices react around announcements 
that their officers or large shareholders are entering politics. Examples of ‘preferential 
access’ to financing are provided by Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson (2012), 
who show that firms with government ownership enjoy a lower cost of debt during 
distress times; Kotter and Lel (2011), who note that governments often act as lenders 
of last resort;  Faccio, Masulis, and McConnel (2006) and Duchin and Sosyura (2012), 
who show that politically connected firms are more likely to receive funding and 
bailouts; and Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma (2011), who confirm that US firms’ 
political connections reduce borrowing costs and increase firm value.  
                                                 
3
 Kahan and Rock (2010) cite a recent clear-cut case in which government priorities trump shareholder-
wealth concerns: “The Treasury’s political considerations have led it to block profitable actions by 
controlled firms. For example, at Fannie Mae, the Treasury vetoed a sale of $3 billion in tax credits to 
Goldman Sachs and Berkshire Hathaway. Although these tax credits were worthless to Fannie Mae, the 
Treasury would have lost tax revenues had they been sold to an entity that could use the credits to offset 
its taxes.” 
3 
Examples of ‘preferential access’ to contracts, with no otherwise planned 
changes to firms’ infrastructure, management or even head office locations, are 
illustrated by two recent investments by Chinese state-owned enterprises.
4
 China’s 
Bright Foods Group, after the May 2012 acquisition of the U.K. cereal maker 
Weetabix, intends to offer Weetabix products in China, thus providing access to a 
large and difficult-to enter market. Similarly, after being acquired by China’s National 
Offshore Oil Corporation in July 2012, the Canadian energy firm Nexen was allowed 
access to China’s untouched shale reserves. These effects along with cheaper 
financing should be associated with an increase in shareholder wealth and a positive 
announcement reaction around government investments. 
Between the negative impact of ‘political interference’ and the positive effect 
of ‘preferential access’, the net impact of government ownership on shareholder value 
is a matter of empirical investigation. I examine this impact around the government 
investment announcements in order to evaluate changes in shareholder wealth. I study 
government investments in 68 countries, involving 1,809 transactions in 1,477 unique 
target firms between 1988 and 2011. Using event-study methodology, I find that 
overall stock price reactions to government investments are positive around the 
acquisition announcement. However, the results are largely dependent on the 
perceived level of political interference from government-owned investors. In my tests 
I evaluate situations where the influence of either the negative political interference or 
the beneficial effect of government ownership is more likely. In particular, I 
differentiate first between domestic and foreign government investments, second 
                                                 
4
 Burkitt, Laurie “Chinese Food Company Eats English Breakfast.” Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2012 
  “Canucks, meet CNOOC,” The Economist, July 28, 2012 
4 
between investments by political, economic and financial arms of governments, third 
between investments from government with varying levels of economic freedom and 
finally between majority and minority government investments. 
First, I distinguish between domestic and foreign government investments. 
Extant literature suggests that foreign investors are less likely to impose conflicting 
goals on a firm and more likely to increase shareholder wealth (Djankov and Murrell, 
2002; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda and Svejnar, 2009). 
However, domestic government investors could also benefit target shareholders, by 
providing better financing terms and, possibly, by favorably altering domestic 
regulation and taxation. I find that stock price reactions are positive for foreign 
government investments but negative for domestic ones, after controlling for firm and 
deal characteristics. This is consistent with the notion that foreign government 
investors provide access to foreign markets, while domestic government investors tend 
to impose political priorities. 
Second, I classify government entities according to their main objectives – 
political (for example, national and local governments), financial (government 
financial institutions and sovereign wealth funds) and economic (state owned 
enterprises, SOE). In a multivariate regression setting, I document negative stock 
reactions to investments by political arms of government and positive stock reactions 
to investments by governments’ economic arms, while reactions to the government’s 
financial arms are not significant. 
Third, I examine economic freedom characteristics of investing governments 
by considering their likelihood of expropriation, as well as their left- or right-wing 
5 
political orientation. Governments with lower levels of economic freedom, such as 
government with higher likelihood of expropriation and left-wing governments, are 
associated with higher levels of political interference and therefore I expect their 
purchases to have a more negative effect on shareholder wealth. I find that markets 
react negatively to purchases by governments where the expropriation risk is high and 
by left-wing governments, while markets react positively where the opposite is true, in 
other words, to purchases by governments where the expropriation risk is low and by 
right-wing governments. 
Finally, I distinguish between government minority and majority stake 
purchases, where the expectations regarding political interference are mixed. Extant 
research shows that large institutional investors improve shareholder wealth through 
activism. Similarly, large government investments could benefit equity holders, as 
governments could actively distribute a larger volume of contracts, provide cheaper 
financing and favorably affect regulation for firms in which they have high ownership. 
These positive effects of large government holdings could be reversed by higher levels 
of political interference, as government investors pursue political goals and majority 
ownership would allow them to impose such objectives. I find that majority stake 
purchases by governments are associated with a positive stock price reaction, while 
minority stake purchases are associated with a negative stock price reaction.  The 
results are robust to the inclusion of the offer premium and evaluation of majority 
purchases between 50% and 10% and minority purchases of below 10%.  
In summary, the above results suggest that government investments associated 
with higher levels of political interference have a negative influence on shareholder 
6 
wealth, while the opposite is true for government investments which are motivated by 
economic objectives. These empirical findings are closely related to the theoretical 
predictions found in the literature on government policy uncertainty and stock prices. 
Pastor and Veronesi (2011, 2012) develop a general equilibrium model of government 
policy choice and model stock price response to political news. The authors note that 
governments are motivated by two sets of objectives – economic objectives, such as 
maximizing investors’ welfare, and noneconomic objectives, such as maximizing 
political benefits for the government. In their model the government policy choice is 
uncertain, as investors do not know which policy governments will choose to adopt. 
The main source of this uncertainly is political cost.
5
 Pastor and Veronesi (2011, 2012) 
theorize that stock prices should rise at the announcement of government policy 
change which is perceived to benefit profitability; I show that firms react positively to 
government investment that is more likely to benefit firm profitability. Also, Pastor 
and Veronesi (2011, 2012) predict a stock prices decline for government policy 
changes accompanied by higher levels of uncertainty related to profitability, due to 
political cost. This is similar to my finding that firms react negatively to government 
investment associated with higher likelihood of political interference, which conflicts 
with shareholder profit maximization goals.  
Extant evidence from the privatization literature points to the superiority of 
private ownership, motivated by profit maximization goals, over government 
ownership. Numerous studies have documented positive effects of privatizations on 
                                                 
5
 Pastor and Veronesi (2011) show that stock prices respond to policy change and are impacted by 
economic and political shocks and despite being unrelated to each other (orthogonal) political shocks 
command a political risk premium. When governments step in and provide a type of put protection or 
implied guarantee, especially during weak economic climate, such protection reduces the equity risk 
premium. On the other hand, political uncertainty and political costs increase the equity risk premium. 
7 
firm profitability, efficiency, dividend payout, leverage, and better alignment of 
shareholder and manager goals.
6
 Yet, the differences between various government 
investors and their effects on shareholder wealth have not been fully examined in 
extant literature.
7
 The privatization literature is unable to disentangle the difference 
between government entities, as privatizations are mainly directed by central 
governments. The privatization literature further suffers from the innate disadvantage 
of studying wealth effects at very peculiar times, as firms are often reorganized and 
legal systems are contemporaneously restructured, thus obfuscating the impact of a 
simply ownership change.
8
 However, the ability to compare different types of 
government investors is important, as past research documents significant investment 
style and shareholder value differences among institutional investors (Chen, Harford, 
and Li, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). My findings reveal that governmental 
investors, just like other institutional investors, differ in terms of their objectives and 
influence their investment targets in fundamentally different ways. 
                                                 
6
 Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994), Eckel, Eckel, and Singal (1997), D’Souza and Megginson 
(1999),  Megginson and Netter (2001), Gupta (2005), Estrin, Hanousek, Kocenda, and  Svejnar (2009), 
Brown, Earle, and Telegdy (2010), Dinç and Gupta (2011), Boubakri, Cosset, Guedhami, and Saffar 
(2011), Julio and Yook (2012). 
 
7
 Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson (2012) examine the influence of various government 
entities on the cost of debt of firms in which they own a stake. My study is different as it evaluates the 
impact of different government investors on shareholder wealth. 
 
8
 Dinç and Gupta (2011) show that profitable firms are more likely to be privatized early and Dewenter 
and Malatesta (2001) indicate that governments effectively restructure some of the firms before 
privatization and find little evidence of later profitability enhancements. It warrants to be noted that 
both government divestment and investment could suffer from selection biases. While governments 
privatize more profitable, ‘healthier’ and ‘easier’ firms (Megginson and Netter, 2011; Dinç and Gupta, 
2011), governments might also be likely to purchase failing enterprises in nations’ vital industries. 
These rescues could obscure the true relationship between government ownership and shareholder 
wealth. Accordingly I perform my tests controlling for the firm’s prior performance, as well as 
differentiate between crises periods, when government rescues are more likely, and non-crises. I plan to 
introduce a two-stage selection and instrumental variables models to ensure the robustness of my 
results. 
8 
My study unifies and puts into perspective the findings of the segmented 
government investment literature (sovereign wealth funds are examined by Bortolotti, 
Fotak, and Megginson, 2012; Kotter and Lel, 2011; Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta, 
2010; government cross-border deals are studied in Karolyi and Liao, 2010). 
Boardman, Freedman and Eckel (1986) is one of first studies of government 
investment and examines a single nationalization event – the 1981 takeover of 
Domtar, a private Canadian corporation, into government ownership – the authors 
document a 25% loss in shareholder value due to the anticipated pursuit of non-profit 
objectives. Karolyi and Liao (2010) examine general reactions only to cross-border 
government acquisitions and show that targets react positively to the news of 
government acquisitions, as do targets of private sector cross-border share 
acquisitions. These findings differ from those of Boardman, Freedman and Eckel 
(1986). Additionally, Karolyi and Liao (2010) document that foreign sovereign wealth 
fund (SWF) purchases earn significantly lower target reactions than do purchases by 
other types of foreign government acquirers, though studies of SWF investments 
(Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson, 2012; Kotter and Lel, 2011; Dewenter, Han, and 
Malatesta 2010) generally document significant positive short term target reactions. 
All these conflicting results highlight a need, addressed by this paper, to separately 
consider the effects of government investments involving different types of 
government investors and different levels of ownership, as well as, to pay special 
attention to the nature and legal context of acquiring governments – in particular 
whether they are domestic or foreign and whether these governments have high or low 
levels of involvement in the economy. 
9 
This study also extends the literature examining the relationship between 
shareholder wealth and political connections (Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis, and 
McConnel, 2006; Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Houston, Jiang, Lin, and Ma, 2011; 
Chansog, Christos, and Jung, 2012). This paper contributes to the broader economic 
debate on the role of governments in the spirit of Friedman, Stiglitz and Shleifer. It 
also adds to the stream of corporate governance literature dealing with government 
ownership of business assets and control of economic activity. Moreover, the study 
adds to the literature on ownership and blockholding that highlights the importance of 
understanding the difference between various investor classes (Ferreira and Matos, 
2008; Woitdke, 2002; Giannetti and Laeven, 2009; Klein and Zur, 2009; Chen, 
Harford and Li, 2007) by evaluating governments as an investor class and uncovering 
the influence of government investors according to their perceived levels of political 
interference.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1 outlines the empirical 
design. Section 2 describes event study results, Section 3 provides regression results, 
and Section 4 includes robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. Empirical Design 
1.1.  Dataset 
I collect all announcements of government purchases from the Thomson 
Reuters Securities Data Company (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database 
with buyside government involvement over the 1981-2011 period. This includes 
transactions where either the ‘acquirer’ or the ‘acquirer immediate parent’ or the 
10 
‘acquirer ultimate parent,’ are identified with a ‘government’ status. According to 
SDC, ‘government’ status identifies all firms and institutions in which a government 
owns, directly or indirectly, at least a 50% stake. ‘Parents’ and ‘ultimate parents’ are 
shareholders who own 50% or more in a firm. I do not include transactions where a 
government entity is a part of an investor group. I restrict the sample to completed and 
withdrawn deals, thus excluding rumors, and only to publicly traded targets. These 
filters lead to a sample of 2,088 acquisitions worth about US$893 billion. 
I use SDC to collect additional information about the deal, including the 
announcement date, the proportion of shares acquired and held by the acquirer after 
the deal, the status of the deal (completed or withdrawn), and the associated payment 
method (stock, cash or mixed). I also gather SDC information about the acquirer, 
acquirer parent and the target, including names, nations, ‘Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC)’ codes, other ‘macro’ and ‘industry’ level SDC classifications and 
‘public status’ (government, publicly traded, privately held, subsidiary, joint venture) 
and ‘SWF flag’. Daily total return indices, adjusted for dividends and splits, in US$, 
along with their related total return local market indexes are obtained from 
Datastream. I exclude securities with a large number of missing, zero or extreme 
returns around the time windows of interest. I further restrict the sample to cover the 
1988-2011 period due to a small number of government purchases and irregularities in 
Datastream prior to 1988. Contemporaneous investments involving the target on the 
same day are removed from the sample.  I further require all sample firms to be 
present in Worldscope, which is the source of accounting data for my sample. 
Economic freedom variables are collected from the WorldBank Database of Political 
11 
Institutions, the Economic Freedom of the World publication, and the PRS Group’s 
ICRG databases. Descriptions of variables and their sources are provided in Table 1. 
All data are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. The final sample used for event 
study analysis consists of 1,809 transactions (133 of which are eventually withdrawn) 
in which a government acquirer purchases an equity stake in 1,474 unique target firms. 
The next sections explain how I categorize different government investments. 
 
1.2. Foreign Versus Domestic 
Foreign governments’ investments could differ from domestic, as foreign 
governments are likely to invest following the goals of profit maximization rather than 
pursuing a political agenda. Ferreira and Matos (2008), Arnold and Javorcik (2009), 
and Aitken and Harrison (1999) point to the superiority of foreign institutional 
investor ownership, as it is associated with higher firm valuation and productivity. 
While no studies examine the difference between overall foreign and domestic 
government investments, several evaluate subsets of such investments. Karolyi and 
Liao (2010) examine only government cross-border acquisitions, but not government 
domestic purchases. They show that targets react positively to the news of foreign 
government investment. Dewenter, Han, and Malatesta (2010), Kotter and Lel (2011) 
and Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson (2012) examine SWFs – government entities 
that tend to invest in cross-border deals – and find positive target stock reactions to 
SWF acquisition announcements. All these studies suggest that foreign government 
investors are more likely to benefit target shareholders as they are more likely to 
follow profit maximization goals and not impose political agenda. 
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On the other hand, Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson (2012) also show 
that acquisitions by foreign governments are associated with a higher cost of debt, 
while those by domestic governments are associated with a lower cost of debt. 
Therefore, it is also possible that domestic government investors have a more positive 
influence on target’s shareholder wealth, as they are more likely to provide cheaper 
financing. In order to examine these effects, government investments are classified as 
foreign, if the nation of the acquiring government is different from the nation of 
target’s headquarter location, and as domestic otherwise. The acquirers are evaluated 
at the ‘parent’ level, as the ultimate parent owns 51% or more of the acquirer. 
Accordingly, the nation of the acquirer ultimate parent is considered the nation of the 
acquiring government. 
 
1.3. Political, Financial and Economic Investors 
In order to further examine the effects of political interference I differentiate 
between various government investors – financial, economic and political. Within the 
political group I include national entities (governments, the Treasury, economic and 
finance ministries, the central bank, regulatory boards) and local governments 
(regional, city and municipal branches of government), as well as national pension 
funds. The economic group contains SOEs, which are further broken down into 
industry specializations – energy, materials, industrial, telecom and technology, 
media, and consumer. The financial category includes commercial and development 
banks, real estate, other financial institutions, SWFs and supranationals.  
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These political, financial and economic types of government acquirers pursue 
different objectives and could influence the targets of their investment in different 
ways.  I expect certain government entities, such as the political subgroup, which 
includes national and local governments, to be more likely to pursue political 
objectives which conflict with profit maximization goals and therefore to be more 
deleterious to shareholder wealth. On the other hand, the political group could also 
benefit shareholders as it is also the most capable of offering explicit or implicit 
guarantees, which as Borisova, Fotak, Holland and Megginson (2012) show can lead 
to cheaper financing. Categorizing government investors helps uncover otherwise 
hidden interactions. 
Woidtke (2002) explains the importance of disaggregating investors into 
categories to enhance the evaluation of underlying relationships.  She breaks pension 
funds into private and public and confirms the positive relationship between private 
pension fund ownership and firm value documented in prior literature, but also shows 
that the relationship between firm value and public or government pension funds is 
negative. Giannetti and Laeven (2009) further show, in their evaluation of Swedish 
pension funds, that funds whose objectives are not likely to conflict with shareholder 
value maximization and monitoring are associated with higher firm value. Woidtke 
(2002) suggests that future research pay particular attention to the mix of investor 
groups instead of evaluating them as one monolithic entity. While Karolyi and Liao 
(2012) separate their cross-border investments into two categories, those by SWF and 
those by other government acquirers, Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson 
(2012) differentiate between more than two different types of government entities and 
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find that different government entities vary in their influence on the firms’ cost of 
debt. My paper is different as it evaluates the impact of different government investors 
on shareholder wealth. While my classification is similar to Borisova, Fotak, Holland, 
Megginson (2012), it provides both more generalized results based on the three wide 
categories – political, financial, and economic – and more specific results based on 
various industrial subcategories within the SOE group. 
I follow a combination of SDC ‘public status’ and ‘macro industry’ 
identifications to classify government investors into various government investor type 
categories. Political government investors must be in the ‘Government and Agencies’ 
SDC ‘macro industry’ description on both the acquirer and the acquirer parent level. 
Within the political group I identify political national government investors when both 
the acquirer and the acquirer parent fall into the ‘National Agency’ or ‘National 
Government’ SDC industry categories. All other entities, except for ‘Supranational’ 
under the ‘Government and Agencies’ ‘macro industry’ are classified as political local 
government investors and include city agencies, city governments, public 
administration, regional agencies and regional governments. I complete the political 
group by including government pension funds and identify those by manually 
searching and evaluating the deal and acquirer descriptions for words like ‘social 
security,’ ‘pension fund,’ ‘public employees,’ etc.   
Financial government investors must be in the ‘Financials’ SDC ‘macro 
industry’ on both the acquirer and acquirer parent level.  Additionally, I include all the 
acquirers categorized as real estate investors, SWFs and supranationals into my 
financial government investor group given the financial nature of their investments. I 
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differentiate between government banks and development banks, while both are 
included in the government financial investor category. Development banks are 
identified by searching and evaluating the deal and acquirer descriptions for words 
such as ‘development bank,’ ‘development fund,’ ‘commonwealth development,’ ‘de 
Development,’ ‘development finance,’ etc. The remaining entities in the financial 
government investor category are classified as other financial investors and include 
alternative financial investment firms, asset managers, brokerages, credit institutions, 
diversified financials, insurance and some government sponsored enterprises.  
The final large group includes economic government investors which are 
represented by SOEs in various fields and are predominantly industrial players who 
develop non-financial products and services. SOE_Energy government economic 
investor group contains acquirers or acquirer parents that are a part of the ‘Energy and 
Power’ SDC ‘macro industry’ group and includes alternative energy sources, oil and 
gas, petrochemicals, pipelines, power, as well as water and waste management. 
SOE_Industrial group comprises of all acquirers classified by SDC as ‘Industrials’ and 
includes aerospace and defense, automobiles and components, building construction 
and engineering, machinery, transportation and infrastructure and other industrials. 
SOE_Materials group consists of all acquirers that fall into SDC ‘Materials’ macro 
industry classification and includes chemicals, construction materials, metals and 
mining, paper and forest products and other materials. SOE_TelecomTech group 
includes acquirers from ‘Telecommunications’ and ‘High Technology’ SDC macro 
level industries and contains space and satellites, telecommunication equipment and 
services, computers and peripherals, electronics, internet services, IT consulting, 
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semiconductors and software. SOE_Media group consists of government acquirers 
that belong to the SDC ‘Media and Entertainment’ and ‘Consumer Services’ SDC 
‘macro industry’ groups and includes broadcasting, cable, motion pictures, publishing, 
professional, travel and educational services. Finally, the SOE_Consumer group 
contains government acquirers from the following SDC macro industry groups: 
‘Consumer Staples,’ ‘Healthcare,’ and ‘Retail’ and includes household and personal 
products, textiles and apparel, tobacco, livestock and agriculture products, healthcare 
services, pharmaceuticals, automotive and food/beverage retailing. 
 
1.4. Economic Freedom 
Firm in countries with lower levels of economic freedom, such as those with 
governments that are more autocratic, left-wing, more likely to expropriate, and those 
with low property rights protection, are more likely to experience government 
interference and political goal imposition. Economic freedom factors have been shown 
to affect shareholder wealth (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997, 
1998, 2000). Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, and Cosset (2012) hypothesize that a higher cost of 
equity will be associated with the higher residual government post-privatization 
ownership by left-wing governments, with holdings by more autocratic / less 
democratic governments, with holdings by less stable governments and for countries 
with a higher perceived risk of government expropriation. Therefore, the literature 
points to a positive relationship between high levels of economic freedom and 
shareholder wealth. Accordingly, investments by governments with high levels of 
economic freedom would carry less political interference and would be more likely to 
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increase shareholder wealth. On the other hand, nations with lower levels of economic 
freedom, which accordingly have higher levels of government interference, could be 
more likely to provide favorable regulation and cheaper financing terms which would 
benefit target shareholders.  
In order to evaluate whether economic freedom factors play a role in target 
stock price reaction around government investment announcements I examine the 
levels of expropriation expected of the acquiring government.  The expropriation 
index is provided by the PRS Group’s International Country Risk Guild (ICRG) and is 
based on contract expropriation, profits repatriation, and payment delays. In 
robustness checks I also examine economic freedom factors pertaining to the level of 
the acquiring government’s autocracy / democracy, stability and size. Additionally, I 
examine the influence of the acquiring government’s left-wing or right-wing political 
orientation, as it also proxies for the level of economic freedom. Bortolotti, Fantini, 
Siniscalco (2003) show that left-wing governments are often associated with more 
state intervention. Accordingly, left-wing governments would proxy for lower levels 
of economic freedom. I collect these variables from the World Bank database of 
Political Institutions. 
  
1.5. Minority Versus Majority Ownership 
Borisova and Megginson (2011) show a non-monotonic relationship between 
the size of the stake owned by governments and the cost of debt. In the case of 
government acquisitions, targets can exhibit a positive reaction to large stake 
government purchases in the company if that provides access to new contracts and 
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regulatory easement for the firm. Also, majority government investment could benefit 
target firm shareholders as higher ownership levels could overcome collective action 
problems associated with widely dispersed shareholdings. Alternatively, government 
acquisition targets might react negatively to majority acquisitions, as such acquisitions 
increase the likelihood of managerial changes in favor of government officials and of 
goal deviation from shareholder wealth to other government goals, which in turn 
would lead to higher inefficiency and lower profitability. To uncover target stock price 
reactions to different sizes of government investment I differentiate between majority 
purchases of stakes exceeding 50%, majority purchases between 50% and 10% and 
minority government investments of below 10%. This minority investor definition is 
adopted from Faccio (2006) and Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), who define large 
shareholders as anyone with 10% or more of control rights. 
 
1.6. Descriptive Statistics 
The description of the sample is provided in multiple panels of Table 2, which 
present the overall number and value of deals and various categorizations of the total. 
The number of deals is further broken down by foreign and domestic acquisitions, as 
well as by the economic, political, or financial type of government acquirer. Panel A 
breaks down government purchases by year. The sample of 1,809 government 
purchases has a total value of over US$ 501 billion. About 569 transactions (30% of 
total count) cover the crisis years of 2008-2010, which allows for a comparison of 
government investments during and outside the 2008 financial crisis.  Cross-border 
deals represent a third (659 deals, 36% of the sample) of the sample and on average 
19 
account for about 40% of deals done in any given year, with the exception of the crisis 
years of 2008 and 2009 when the proportion of cross-border deals declines. Different 
types of government acquirers are well represented, with 698 observations (39%) by 
economic, 347 observations (19%) by political and 764 (42%) by financial arms of 
government. 
Panel B breaks down government purchases by ex post ownership stake. 
Governments assume minority stake (<10%) ownership in 521 observations (29% of 
the sample). Their large representation in this category hints to the changing nature of 
government investment, as they switch from ownership block purchases to smaller 
stakes. The tendency to purchase non-controlling stakes is common for both foreign 
and domestic government acquirers, considering their proportional investment. The 
most common government ownership stake in my sample is between 10% and 50% in 
710 deals (39%) worth US$143 billion (29%). Akin to minority deals, the proportion 
of both foreign and domestic government investment for the stake between 10% and 
50% is similar. Interestingly, it is predominantly the economic and financial arms of 
the government that prefer this level of ownership, while political arms favor minority 
investments below 10%. There are 401 observations (22%) worth about US$200 
billion (40%) where governments maintain majority ownership of 51% or higher. 
Government economic acquirers are most active in deals involving majority control 
(219 observations; 55% of majority purchases), followed by government financial 
acquirers (143 observation; 36% of majority purchases) and a very few (39 
observations) majority purchases by government political acquirers. 
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Panel C describes government investment by target nation.  US$ 403 billion 
(80%) is invested by governments in the top 15 target nations, according to investment 
value, led by the investments in the United States (274 observations, 15% of the 
sample by count, for US$83 billion, 17% by value). Overall, the sample contains 68 
target nations. Other countries attracting large government investments include the 
United Kingdom (15% by value), Germany (8%), Switzerland (5%), and Austria (5%). 
Panel D lists government acquirers’ domicile nations. US$ 412 (82%) is spent 
by the governments of the top 15 acquirer nations, out of 69 total, according to 
investment value. China is the largest government acquirer with 387 investments 
(21%) totaling over US$76 billion (15%). It is followed by France (11% by value), 
United Arab Emirates (9%), the United States (8%), and the United Kingdom (7%). It 
is interesting to note that a lot of small value deals occur in China, while a few large 
deals dominate government purchases in the United Kingdom. 
Panel E presents target firms’ industry classifications by 1-digit SIC code. The 
largest number of government acquisitions is in the financial sector (SIC 6) with 575 
observations (32%) worth over US$197 billion (39%). This is followed by 
transportation and utilities (SIC 4), with 347 deals (19%) worth over US$122 billion 
(25%); mining (SIC 1), with 200 deals (11%) worth US$96 (19%); and manufacturing 
(SIC 2 and SIC 3) with 487 deals (27%) worth US$60 billion (12%).   
Finally, Panel F provides a more detailed industry description, based on the 4-
digit SIC code, of the largest government investment. US$ 240 billion (48%) of 
government purchases occur in just three main industries – the financial sector 
(depository institutions), crude oil and natural gas, and electric and telephone services 
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sectors.  The financial sector is further represented by commercial bank (5%), 
investment advisory (4%), life insurance (2%) and personal credit segments (3%). 
 
1.7. Variables 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for continuous variables in Panel A, for 
pre-event target firm performance in Panel B, binary variables in Panel C, and 
correlations between variables in Panel D. Panel A describes government ownership 
and target firm characteristics and lists means, standard deviations, medians and 25
th
 
and 75
th
 percentiles. Government investors purchase a 24% stake on average (12% 
median) and hold on average a 32% stake (18% median) in a firm after the acquisition. 
Economic freedom indicator variables are presented next and I expect government 
investors with low levels of economic freedom and, accordingly, a higher likelihood 
of political interference to have a more negative influence on shareholder wealth and 
thus expect a negative reaction for acquisition announcements involving such 
acquirers. Expropriation measures the likelihood of government expropriation, where 
0 denotes low risk and 12 denotes high risk. Acquiring governments have, on average, 
a low level of expropriation with a 3.35 index average. The following alternative 
economic freedom indicators are evaluated for robustness: Government Size (with a 
mean of 5.47), which measure the degree to which a country relies on markets rather 
than government budgets and where higher values mean lower government 
involvement on a scale from 0 to 10;  Autocracy/Democracy (with a mean of -3.75), 
which measures how autocratic or democratic a government is on a scale from -10 to 
10, where -10 denotes highly democratic and 10 denotes highly autocratic 
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governments; and Government Stability (with a mean of 5.18), measuring the number 
of years the current government has been in power. 
The following standard firm level controls are included in the main regression: 
Size (computed as a natural logarithm of $US current dollar total assets, with a mean 
of 13.5), Leverage (computed as a ratio of debt-to-assets, with a mean of 64%), Return 
on Assets, or ROA (with a mean of 1% and median of 3%); and Tobin’s Q (computed 
as [(market value + total assets – book value of equity)/total assets] and with a mean 
of 1.44). Bates and Lemmon (2003) show that target shareholders gain less when 
target firm is larger. Accordingly, I expect larger firms to have lower gains around the 
news of government investment. I also expect less leveraged and more profitable 
firms, in other words firms with sufficient resources, to evaluate any government 
interference as intruding and to react more negatively to government acquisition 
announcements.  
Measures for firm performance six month and one year periods preceding the 
government’s investment are presented in Panel B, which provides mean and median 
market adjusted buy-and-hold returns. I expect weaker firms to have a more positive 
reaction around government acquisition announcement and therefore expect a negative 
relationship between announcement reactions and prior performance. Prior 
performance should proxy for firm-specific distress, when governments are likely to 
step in and provide bail-outs. Market adjusted buy-and-hold returns of firms in my 
sample are on average positive, with 8% over the six months before and 16% over the 
year before the date of government stock acquisitions, which seems to indicate that 
government are not, in the majority of cases, investing to rescue distressed firms. 
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However, the difference between the mean and median results is indicative of 
skewness, which in turn indicates that a few firms with large positive pre-investment 
performance are present. 
 Panel C presents descriptive statistics for binary variables and provides 
information regarding deal features, consideration offered, and payment made, as well 
as government acquirer information. While it is important to control for the firm’s 
prior performance as a proxy for firm-specific distress, special attention also needs to 
be paid to periods of economic uncertainty, as government ownership could be 
associated with a more pronounced certification effect of firm’s vitality during those 
times. Pastor and Veronesi (2011, 2012) show that stock price reaction to government 
policy changes maybe be different during weak economic climates. Bank Crises (410 
deals, 23%) and 2008 Crisis (492 deals, 27%) are both binary variables that take value 
of 1 during periods of economy-wide distress. While the 2008 Crisis corresponds to 
the 2008-2010 years, Banking Crises is a binary variable equal to one if the investment 
takes place during a year that is identified as a ‘banking crisis’ year for the nation in 
which the target is headquartered. Banking crises are defined by Laeven and Valencia 
(2010). Controls for banking crises and the years associated with the financial crisis 
are present in all regressions. In robustness regressions I also control for capital 
inflows – where the state investor purchases newly-issued shares, resulting in a capital 
infusing for the issuing company – as these are more likely to be provided to firms in 
times of distress and in need of cash.  I identify capital inflows by searching the deal 
synopsis for phrases like ‘capital injection’ and ‘capital inflow’ and also flag all deals 
where the firm issues new shares.  I identify 156 capital inflow deals (9%), though the 
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estimate is conservative, as the data are provided sporadically thus increasing both 
Type 1 and Type 2 errors. 
I evaluate the likelihood of political goal imposition following government 
investment by examining 659 (36%) foreign and 1150 (64%) domestic government 
investments. I acknowledge the transfers of control between different government 
branches with a Government-to-Government (Gov.-to-Gov. Deal) variable, where both 
the acquirer and the target are flagged with a ‘government’ status. While only one 
such deal exists, there are 282 deals (16%) where the government-to-government pairs 
follow a wider SDC definition and besides the target and acquirer also include their 
‘parent’ firms, who according to SDC own at least a 51% of the direct acquirer or 
target. When checking for robustness I also control for deals completed in the same 
industry, as those are more likely to be based on economic goals and not pursuant to 
political agenda. Accordingly, I expect same industry deals to have a more positive 
relationship with target stock price announcement reaction. 629 deals (35%) are done 
within the same 2-digit SIC group between the acquirer and the target, including their 
‘parent’ firm industries.  Further, about 47% of the sample consists of deals in the 
same industry, when considering an even wider industry group classification by 
evaluating deals in the same 1-digit SIC group and including the ‘parent.’  
Panel C shows that the most typical way that governments invest is by buying 
common stock (1587 deals, 88%), but they also attain stakes through warrants (186 
deals, 10%) – which are mainly connected with the 2008 US Troubled Asset 
Repurchase Program (TARP) – and to a much lesser extent through convertible debt 
(31 deals, 2%). Further, I control for factors that have been shown in the literature to 
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affect the acquisition premium and returns. Loughran and Vijh (1997) show that target 
shareholders in stock-merger deals do not earn significantly positive returns, while 
those of cash-mergers do. Bates and Lemmon (2003) show that US target acquisition 
announcement returns are negatively associated with stock deals and withdrawn 
offers. Accordingly, I expect a negative association between target stock reaction to 
the announcement of government investment and withdrawn deals (133 deal, 7%), as 
well as stock deals (1190 deals, 66%). But I expect cash deals (588 deals, 33%) to be 
associated with higher target equity returns around government investment 
announcements. 
Panel C also provides information about government investors. I categorize 
government investors into three major groups based on their nature and objectives – 
political (347 deals, 19%), financial (764 deals, 42%) and economic (698 deals, 39%).  
The political group consists of national governments (264 deals, 15%), local 
governments (58 deals, 3%), and pension funds (25 deals, 1%). The financial group 
consists of banks with government ownership (108 deals, 6%), development banks (49 
deals, 3%), government real estate investment arms (42 deals, 2%), supranationals (23 
deals, 1%), such as the IMF, and SWFs (164 deals, 9%) and finally other financial 
institutions with government ownership (378 deals, 21%).  I also control for the legal 
origin of the acquiring government as LLSV (1997, 2000) show that legal origin 
influences capital market development and dividend payout. 690 deals (38%) are 
completed by acquirers (parents) from common law countries, which offer higher 
investor protection, with the remaining 1,119 coming from civil law origin nations. I 
evaluate the political orientation of the acquiring government, as it proxies for 
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economic freedom and the likelihood of political goal imposition and in about half the 
sample (892 deals, 49%) acquisitions are done by left-wing governments.   
Correlations among variables are presented in Panel D of Table 3. It is 
interesting to note that most government investments that received warrants in the 
sample are from TARP deals, as they are 92% correlated and they were in a large part 
(63% correlation) issued by the political arms of the U.S. federal government. The 
correlation table also confirms that acquirer and acquirer parent nations are typically 
the same and hence are highly correlated on their common law status (84% 
correlation). 
 
2. Event Study Results 
I use a standard event-study methodology to calculate targets’ cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement of government acquisitions. 
Market adjusted returns are described below, while market model returns are only 
presented to confirm consistency with the market adjusted returns. To estimate returns 
I use the Datastream daily country specific U.S. dollar denominated total return index 
which is adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Market model parameters are 
estimated over days (-230,-30), where day (0) is the day of announcement of 
government investment. Only firms with trading data for a minimum of 100 days are 
included.  I evaluate several event windows – (0,+1), (-2,+2), (-5,+5), (-10, +10) – 
around the announcement, as well as pre-event (-30,-10) and post-event (+10,+30) 
windows to check for any information leakages prior to or after the announcement. I 
follow the existing literature which uses international data and pay particular attention 
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to the 5-day event window surrounding the announcement of government investment, 
(-2+2) CAR. 
Table 4 shows targets’ stock price reactions to government investment and 
breaks it down by foreign and domestic government investment. In general, targets 
exhibit a significant positive reaction with a mean (median) of 2.48% (0.46%) for the 
(0,+1) window and 2.81% (0.91%) for the (-2,+2) window. The result is similar for 
both foreign and domestic government investment, but the scale is much larger for 
foreign investments with the significant returns of 5.05% (1.33%) for the (0,+1) 
window and 6.28% (2.25%) for the (-2,+2) window as compared to smaller but still 
significant stock reaction to domestic investments of 1.01% (0.22%) for the (0,+1) 
window and 0.82% (0.30%) for the (-2,+2) window. Target performance shortly after 
the event, for the (+10,+30) window, is significantly negative at -1.60% (-1.26%) for 
all deals and similar for both foreign and domestic acquisitions. Prior to government 
acquisition (-10, -30) the performance of domestic targets is negative at -1.31% (-
0.76%), but it is positive for foreign, at 3.11% (1.13%). Overall, the results in Table 4 
clearly document that targets exhibit a stock reaction to government investment. These 
results also reveal that foreign government investment is met with much more positive 
reaction than domestic government investment. This finding supports the view that 
foreign government investors are less likely to impose political agenda and are more 
likely to benefit their target firms. 
Target equity reactions to investments by different arms of government – 
political, financial and economic – are presented in Table 5 and highlight the 
heterogeneous reactions to investment by these different government entities. For the 
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(-2,+2) and other short term windows the reaction is significantly negative for 
government investors from the political group at -2.92% (-0.64%) but significantly 
positive for those from the financial group at 2.23% (-0.48%), and overwhelmingly so 
for those from the economic group at 6.30% (2.36%). These results suggest that the 
conflict generated by political and profit maximization goals hurts shareholder wealth, 
as investors respond negatively to investments that would increase such conflict – 
such as investments by the political arms of the government. On the other hand, 
shareholders welcome investments by economically oriented groups, in particular the 
economic group that is comprised of SOEs. The reaction to government financial 
investments is positive overall, but this group encompasses diverse government 
investors. Some of these, such as development banks, are more likely to follow 
economic goals, while others, such as other banks with government ownership or 
government real estate investors, might pursue a political agenda. 
Table 6 breaks down target equity reaction according to different economic 
freedom levels of acquirers. In particular it presents acquirers with high or low levels 
of government expropriation, as well as those from left- or right-wing governments. 
When government investors are from countries with low levels of expropriation 
likelihood, target announcement reaction is more positive, at 4.63% (1.74%) for the (-
2,+2) window, as compared to that of high expropriation governments, at 1% (0.22%). 
Target performance shortly after the event, for the (+10,+30) window, is more 
negative for investments by acquirers from nations with high expropriation levels, at -
2.26% (-1.73%), as compared to those with low expropriation levels at -0.85% (-
0.87%). These results show that target shareholders welcome investment that carries 
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low levels of political interference, but are more cautious when investment originates 
from a nation with high expropriation risk and therefore high political interference 
tendencies and low levels of commitment to economic freedom. Table 6 also examines 
if target equity reaction differs between investments from left- and right-wing 
governments. Target pre-event performance in (-30,-10) window differs, with 1.69% 
(0.65%) for left-wing and -1.05% (-0.75%) for right-wing government investments, 
but no other significant difference are found, as the short-term reaction is positive in 
both cases. 
Table 7 disaggregates target equity reaction according majority and minority 
government investment. Following Faccio (2006) and Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), I 
classify minority government ownership as that below 10%. In general, for firms with 
large shareholdings, where several blockholders own over 10%, the majority owner is 
the one with ownership of 51% or larger. Accordingly, I differentiate between 
majority purchases of over 50% and those between 50% and 10%. The target equity 
reaction to majority (over 50%) government investments is significantly positive at 
5.87% (2.84%) for the (-2,+2) window and keeps growing to 8.14% (5.5%) for the (-
10,+10) window. Opposite results are documented for minority government purchases, 
as the target equity reaction is negative and keeps getting more negative till -2.94% (-
1.65%) for (-10,+10) window. Differences also exist in target performance shortly 
before the event in window (-30,-10) as government majority investments exhibit a 
positive performance of 0.69% (0.68%), but those of government minority 
investments produce a negative return of -1.59% (-1.59%). Also, while shortly after 
the performance in window (+10,+30), the performance of government minority 
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investments remains negative, that of government majority investments is positive, 
though insignificant. Overall, Table 7 indicates that minority government investment 
destroys target shareholder wealth, perhaps by exacerbating the conflict between 
political and profit maximization goals without the beneficial effects of government 
ownership – such as cheaper financing and favorable regulation – which  reveal 
themselves only at higher levels of ownership. 
Finally, Table 8 provides target reactions to the news of increased government 
ownership during and outside of periods of economic uncertainty, by examining 
banking crises and the 2008 financial crisis. The average target equity reaction to 
government investment during banking crises is significantly negative: starting at -
1.76% for the (-2,+2) window and declining to -4.82% (-2.49%) for the (-10,+10) 
window. On the other hand, the reaction to government investment outside of banking 
crises is positive, at 4.15% (1.15%) for the (-2,+2) window. In the case of banking 
crises, target firm investors seem to worry that governments are likely to impose the 
same ideas that put the country into a banking crisis onto them and to reduce 
shareholder wealth through tunneling. On the other hand, the average target equity 
reactions to government investment during the 2008-2010 financial crisis is 
significantly positive at 1.37% (1.04%) for the (-2,+2) window. Though it is still 
smaller than the stock reaction to government investment for periods outside of the 
2008-2010 crisis, when the average target reaction is 3.48% (0.84%) for the (-2,+2) 
window. Therefore, the certification effect and other benefits provided by government 
ownership during the 2008-2010 financial crisis must have outweighed other negative 
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effects. Overall, Table 8 results signify the importance of controlling for periods of 
economy-wide distress. 
Event study results suggest that in general stock price reactions of government 
investment targets are positive around the acquisition announcement. But while stock 
price reactions are positive for investments by foreign governments, by those 
governments’ economic and financial arms, and those for majority control, they are 
negative for investments by domestic governments, by government political arms and 
for minority stake purchases. Also, firms react more positively to purchases by 
governments where the expropriation risk is low. These results indicate that 
government investment associated with a higher level of political interference, that is 
likely to exacerbate the conflict between political and profit maximization goals, has a 
negative influence on shareholder wealth, while the opposite is true for government 
investment where this conflict is outweighed by benefits such as preferential access to 
financing and contracts. The panel regressions in the next section allow for a closer 
examination of government investor attributes and their perceived political goal 
imposition by examining target stock reaction around acquisition announcements 
while controlling for firms and deal characteristics. 
  
3. Regression Results 
I further examine the relationship between government investment and target 
stock price announcement reaction in multivariate Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression analysis where I control for target- and deal-specific characteristics and 
include year fixed effects. All regressions employ controls for industry of the target 
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firm and for the nations of the target and the acquirer parent. I employ Newey-West 
standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. In all the 
regressions my dependent variable is the market adjusted target stock reaction over a 
five-day window (-2,+2) around the government investment announcement. My 
variables of interest aim to uncover the circumstances under which governments are 
more likely to hurt target shareholders by the imposition of political goals and those 
under which governments are more likely to benefit the targets of their investment 
through preferential access to financing, additional contracts or regulatory lobbying. 
These variables of interest examine foreign and domestic government investment, 
investment by political, financial and economic arms of government, investment by 
governments with different levels of economic freedom, proxied by expropriation 
likelihood and the left- or right-wing nature of the investing government, and also 
investments for minority and majority stakes. 
 Results for the influence of foreign and domestic government investors 
on target equity announcement returns are presented in Table 9. Model 1 includes all 
deals in the sample; Model 2 pertains only to foreign, and Model 3 only to domestic 
deals. Model 1 shows that foreign government investments are associated with 
significant target shareholder gains. The effect is economically significant, as target 
shareholders gain 3.09% when the government investor is foreign. Model 1 reveals 
other factors that influence target equity reactions to government investment, in 
particular, a strong positive relationship with overall government ownership both 
regarding the shares acquired and previously owned. Further, as expected, deals 
involving stock payments, primarily by publically listed SOEs reduce target 
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shareholder wealth by -3.78% , compared to mixed stock-and-cash payment deals. 
Finally, larger and more valuable (in terms of Tobin’s Q) firms react more negatively 
to the news of government investment.  
 Since Model 1 shows that target equity reaction differs between foreign 
and domestic government investors, I further investigate this difference by separately 
evaluating foreign and domestic government acquirers in Models 2 and 3 in Table 9 
respectively. Target shareholder reaction is positively related to the size of the stake 
acquired for both foreign and domestic government investments. Several significant 
differences between foreign and domestic government investments also emerge. First, 
the average target equity announcement reaction is significantly negative for stock-
swap mergers (-9.36%), but only for foreign government investments.  However, only 
in the case of domestic government investments are target equity announcement 
returns a significant negative function of target size (-0.67%) and value (-0.58%), 
meaning that larger, more profitable firms suffer from the escalated negative political 
interference the most. Larger firms are typically diversified and already carry a 
diversification discount due to the multitude of intra firm goals (Laeven and Levine, 
2007). Large firm shareholders are likely to have a more adverse reaction to domestic 
government investment as they anticipate the imposition of additional political goals, 
which could create conflict with profit maximization objectives and possibly make the 
difference amount existing goals more apparent. A negative relationship (-4.48%) 
between target equity announcement returns and domestic eventually-withdrawn deals 
suggests that either domestic withdrawals are somewhat expected, possibly due the 
higher media coverage involving controversial government investments that require 
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regulatory approval, or that governments are more likely to withdraw their domestic 
investments if the initial reaction is negative. Finally, only for domestic investments 
government-to-government deals command a higher premium (by 2.53%), perhaps 
because governments within the same country tend to overpay for their investments in 
other government entities or maybe  the imposition of a political agenda is not going 
to increase given that an target firm is already influenced by government. 
 Overall, Table 9 results suggest that foreign government investors are 
more likely to be associated with the beneficial effects of government investment 
rather than the conflict amplified by a political agenda, as target shareholders earn a 
3.09% return in deals involving foreign government investors.  Also, foreign and 
domestic government investments differ in terms of other important factors that 
influence target announcement reactions. 
 Results for different government investing entities are presented in 
Table 10 where the binary variables for political and financial government investors 
are included in the main regressions and contrasted with the economic government 
investor groups. Model 1 includes all deals. Models 2 and 3 include only foreign and 
only domestic deals respectively. Model 4 includes only investments by political arms 
of government; Model 5 by financial and Model 6 by economic arms of government. 
Political government investors are associated with significant negative target equity 
announcement returns of -3.02% overall. Moreover, this relationship is only 
significant for domestic political government investors, as they are linked with a -
3.64% loss in target shareholder wealth. It is important to notice that political 
government investors are associated with target shareholder losses even after 
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controlling for domestic government investors. These results highlight the deleterious 
effect of government investment when a conflict between political and profit 
maximization goals is created. Political arms of government, as expected, are more 
likely than other government investors to impose a political agenda on target firms, 
which conflicts with profit maximization and destroys shareholder wealth.  
 Models 4-6 allow target stock announcement reactions to vary given a 
political, financial or economic government investor. Target announcement reactions 
are negatively associated with the higher percentage of shares purchased by political 
arms of government (-0.14%), but it is positively linked to higher share purchases by 
financial (0.14%) and economic (0.10%) arms of government. Several similarities 
exist between different government investors, as all of the deals paid for with stock are 
associated with a negative target reaction and also larger firms react more negatively 
to the news of investment by political and economic arms of government. Intriguingly, 
government-to-government deals earn a 8.79% higher target stock announcement 
reaction only for purchases by government political investors. This again could be due 
either to with-in system overpayment or a lower expectation of political goal 
imposition due to already existing government involvement in the target firm. Another 
interesting relationship is a positive (negative) association between political 
(economic) government investors and eventually-withdrawn deals. Government 
economic arms might be more likely to withdraw deals with a negative announcement 
reaction. Alternatively, shareholders might have better information on the likelihood 
of eventual withdrawal of controversial government investments with high media 
coverage and welcome the eventual withdrawal of government investors who impose a 
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political agenda but lament the loss of beneficial effects of government investment 
from economic arms of government. 
To further examine the influence of political, financial and economic 
government investors on target equity announcement reactions I evaluate subgroups 
that make up each government investor category in Table 11. Subgroup descriptions 
are provided in section 1.1.2. Since there are three main government investor groups – 
political, financial and economic – I can evaluate any two of them against one left out 
group.  I choose to always include the subgroup members of the political group, while 
I alternate the financial and economic groups as the left out category, in order to 
present results for all three groups. Accordingly, Model 1(a) includes political and 
financial government investors and Model 1(b)   political and economic government 
investors. Models 2(a, b) replicate Models 1 (a, b) respectively but considering only 
foreign government investors. Similarly, Models 3 (a, b) replicate Models 1 (a, b) 
respectively but considering only domestic government investors. Results for political 
government investors echo those of Table 11, as branches included in the political 
category are associated with a decline in shareholder wealth. More specifically, targets 
react most negatively to pension funds (-4.57%), followed by national government (-
3.46%). A further breakdown into foreign and domestic deals shows that while foreign 
target shareholders are not significantly affected by any government investors, 
domestic shareholders tend to lose the most from an investment by national 
governments (-4.41%, average of 3(a,b)), followed by local governments (-4.13%, 
average of 3(a,b)) and finally by pension funds (-3.58%). Results for groups that 
37 
comprise the financial and economic government investors differ by group but are not 
significant. 
Results for the economic freedom of the acquiring government are presented in 
Table 12 and 13. The variable of interest in Table 12 is Gov. Expropriation, and in 
Table 13 Left. Model 1 includes all deals; Models 2  and 3 show foreign and domestic 
deals; Model 4 presents investments by political arms of government; Model 5 by 
financial and Model 6 by economic arms of government. Higher levels of government 
expropriation and left-wing governments are associated with increased levels of 
political interference, which intensifies the conflict with profit maximization.  
Table 12 shows that investments from governments with higher levels of 
expropriation are met with negative target shareholder announcement reaction of -
0.54%. This relationship is significant only for domestic deals as target shareholders 
are likely to expect lower levels of interference in their operations by foreign 
governments, regardless of the economic freedom policy of these investors. This 
highlights higher benefits associated with foreign government investors who strive to 
avoid the imposition of conflicting political goals to their foreign investors, while they 
still create this conflict in their domestic investments. While target shareholders 
exhibit a -0.82% more negative reaction to investments by economic arms of 
government that are more likely to expropriate assets, target shareholders, 
interestingly, exhibit a 0.85% more positive reaction to investment by governments 
with high levels of expropriation when the investment is completed by the political 
arms of government. Perhaps the latter reaction could be explained by shareholders 
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being glad to receive at least some compensation in a situation where an outright asset 
expropriation is likely.  
Likewise, Table 13 shows that investments by left-wing governments are met 
with negative target shareholder announcement reaction of -2.14%. While target 
reaction is negative to left-wing government investment in both foreign and domestic 
deals, the relationship is only significant is case of domestic deals (-2.5%). A further 
breakdown into government investor types shows that the significance of this 
relationship is primarily driven by political arms of government, as targets have a -
6.31% negative reaction to the news of investment by the political arms of left-wing 
governments. Overall, both Tables 12 and 13 show that higher likelihood of the 
negative political interference is met with a more negative target shareholder equity 
reaction. When this conflict is proxied by measures of economic freedom of the 
acquiring government, this negative reaction is again specific to domestic deals.  
I further examine how the political-profit maximization goal conflict 
influences shareholder wealth given not only different types of government investors 
but also considering whether they purchased majority or minority stakes in the target 
firm. These results are presented in Table 14. Faccio (2006) and Bortolotti and Faccio 
(2009) treat government ownership in excess of 10% as majority ownership. 
Accordingly, I differentiate between majority ownership above 50%, ownership 
between 50%-10% and minority ownership lower than 10%. Model 1 includes all 
deals and the main variables of interest in it are: Majority Ownership (>50%) and 
Majority Ownership (50%-10%), while the left out group is Minority Ownership 
(<10%). Models 2 only includes deals where government ownership represents a 
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majority control holding of 50% or more, while Model 3 includes those with majority 
ownership between 50% and 10%, and Model 4 contains deals involving minority 
purchases lower than 10%. Overall, target equity announcement reaction is positively 
related to government investment above 50% (7.27%) and also between 10% and 50% 
(2.20%).  While governments may impose political agenda which conflicts with profit 
maximization at all levels of ownership, at the higher levels of ownership benefits 
associated with government investment outweigh the negative effects of political 
agenda.  
Model 1 in Table 14 also points to the deleterious effects of political investors 
on shareholder wealth, as target equity announcement reaction associated with that 
type of investors is a negative -4.04%. But the classification of government 
investments according to the ex-post ownership in Models 2-4 reveals several 
important relationships. First, that political investors have a negative influence of -
5.91% on shareholder wealth for acquisitions of 50% to 10% interest and only 
domestically, as foreign government investment is linked with a 5.05% positive 
shareholder reaction at that investment level. This supports prior results which linked 
foreign government ownership to a positive target shareholder reaction. Second, the 
disaggregated results reveal that target shareholders exhibit a -3.37% negative stock 
reaction to the news of minority (below 10%) foreign government investment. 
Interestingly, this negative reaction is mitigated through investments by foreign 
political and financial arms of government, as target shareholders respond with a 
3.57% and 2.69% positive reaction respectively. Target shareholder wealth increases 
when foreign political and financial arms of government acquire minority stakes of 
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below 10% by 6.94% and 6.06% respectively. Third, Model 2 indicates that target 
shareholders react positively to majority government investments regardless of the 
government investor-type or foreign and domestic nature of government investment, 
as neither the foreign deal nor the political or financial investor indicators are 
significant.  
 
4. Robustness Checks 
In this section I check the robustness of the results from the prior sections to 
alternative specifications. These alternatives include controlling for offer premium and 
estimating models over periods of economic distress and outside of it.  All models are 
also robust to the inclusion of additional controls for same industry deals, deals where 
the direct acquirer, as opposed to both the acquirer and its parent, has a ‘government’ 
status, and capital inflow controls (these results are not presented but available upon 
request). The results involving alternative specifications confirm the hypothesis that 
the imposition of political goals, which conflict with profit maximization goals, is 
detrimental to shareholder wealth.  
The inclusion of the offer premium is especially important in addressing 
concerns dealing with overpayment and surrounding majority purchases. While it is 
typical in M&A studies to examine both target and bidder announcement reactions in 
order to trace overpayment, this is not possible for government investors, as most of 
them are not publically traded. I am able to calculate government investor 
announcement reactions for 46 out of 1,809 deals and they are not significant (these 
results are not presented but available upon request). However, the inclusion of the 
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offer premium is a direct way to address concerns about results being driven by 
payment amounts. Offer premium is the ‘PREM4WK’ variable from the SDC 
Platinum database, which they define as a “premium of offer price to target closing 
stock price 4 weeks prior to the original announcement date, expressed as a 
percentage.” The variable is scarcely populated and due to this reason is presented 
only as a robustness check.  
The inclusion of the offer premium also helps address concerns that findings 
for majority purchases are driven by the premium offered and not by the beneficial 
effects of government investors at the higher levels of ownership. Generally, 
acquisitions of majority control are done at a premium and therefore associated with a 
positive target reaction. However, government investors are different from other 
acquirer and can choose to offer a premium when they increase their ownership above 
50% or pay a suboptimal price as they expropriate the firm from private control. Vivid 
examples are presented by the recent 2012 re-expropriation by President Kirchner of 
the Argentina’s oil firm YPF from Spanish Repsol and by President Putin’s depletion 
of shareholder wealth during the scandalous renationalization of Russian Yukos in 
2003. Also, the concern that target equity reaction to majority government investment 
is driven by premium is partially addressed by examining two types of majority 
government investments – those above 50% and those between 10% and 50% - and 
showing that target equity reaction is positively associated with both. But a more 
direct test that the inclusion of the offer premium allows is justified. 
Besides including offer premium, the relationship between government 
investment with various levels of political interference and target equity reaction is 
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examined during and outside of periods of financial distress. Financial distress is 
proxied by banking crises and the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Pastor and Veronesi 
(2011) model the relationship between political uncertainty during policy changes and 
equity risk premium. They conclude that government policy changes should have a 
positive effect on stock prices in a weak economy, as new policy changes are 
perceived to be profitability enhancing when compared to the policy being replaced, 
but during more typical conditions stock prices should fall at government policy 
change announcements. Given the importance of economic distress when evaluating 
the effects of political uncertainty, I examine the relationship between government 
investment with various levels of political interference and target equity reaction 
during and outside of periods of economic uncertainty.  
Robustness checks are presented in Table 15. The main variables of interest are 
those that define a government investor type, foreign or domestic nature of 
government investment and the percentage acquired by governments. In general, the 
setting of Table 15 is similar to that of Table 10 but additional specifications are 
considered. Model 1 controls for the offer premium, while Models 2 includes deal that 
do not have data on offer premium in order to examine the robustness of the 
relationship between political interference and shareholder wealth around government 
investment announcement. Models 3 and 4 present results during and outside of the 
banking crises. Similarly, Model 5 estimates for the 2008-2009 financial crisis and 
Model 6 for the period outside of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. 
Model 1 in Table 15 shows that even after controlling for offer premium 
investment by the political arms of government is associated with a negative 
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shareholder reaction of -6.63%. Investments by the financial arms of government are 
linked to a negative reaction of -3.31%. Foreign government investments are 
associated with a positive target reaction but insignificantly. Also, target equity 
reaction remains a positive significant function of the amount of shares acquired. In 
other words, when governments purchase larger stakes in companies, target 
shareholders react positively, even after controlling for the offer premium. Model 1 
involves all deals, but the results (unreported but available on request) also hold for 
regressions with offer premium when separately considering foreign and domestic 
government investments, investments by those governments’ political, financial and 
economic arms, investments by left wing governments and government majority and 
minority investments. Model 1 also confirms that deals financed with stock are 
associated with a -8.97% negative target equity reaction. The relationship between 
shareholder equity reaction and the announcement of government-to-government 
investment remains positive even after controlling for the offer premium, perhaps 
emphasizing the synergies gained through such deals. Another interesting result 
presented in Model 1 is that target shareholders react negatively (-3.74%) to 
government investment during banking crises. It is possible that during banking crises 
firms are particularly worried about governments imposing political agenda and 
disregarding shareholder interests. 
The relationship between political government investors and shareholder 
reactions during the investment announcement remains negative (-2.44%) for deals 
that do not have data on the offer premium in Model 2. Model 2 also shows that target 
equity reaction to government investment is a positive function of shares acquired. 
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Foreign government investments are associated with a positive reaction of 2.3% as 
they are less likely to impose political agenda. Target equity reaction is 0.1% higher 
for each additional % increase in government stake investment. Additionally, larger 
and more profitable firms, as measured by ROA and Tobin’s Q, react negatively to the 
news of government investment. In general, Models 1 and 2 from Table 15 confirm 
the findings that political agenda imposition by government investors has negative 
consequences for shareholder wealth, as investments by the political arms of 
government are met with a negative reaction even after controlling for the offer 
premium. 
Models 3-6 estimate during and outside of periods of financial distress and 
consider banking crises and the 2008-2009 financial crisis. Their results echo the 
findings from other tables. Model 3 shows that during banking crises target 
shareholders exhibit a -4.99% negative reaction to the news of investment by 
government political arms and, interestingly, there is no significant relationship 
between the percentage of shares acquired by governments and target equity reaction. 
Also, larger and less leveraged firms react negatively to the news of government 
investment during banking crises. These results show that during banking crises firms 
are especially worried about the imposition of political goals that government 
investment may inflict. This political agenda imposition is specific to domestic 
government investments, as target shareholders welcome foreign government 
investment (4.34%) during banking crises.  Model 4 presents results outside of 
banking crises and they largely parallel those during the banking crises, except that the 
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relationship between target equity reactions and the percentage of government 
investment becomes positive and significant, as it is in all models, except Model 3. 
Results for the 2008-2009 financial crisis, presented in Model 5, show that this 
period of financial distress is different from other crises, as governments stepped up to 
rescue a variety of firms, especially those in the financial industry, and provided them 
with financing to meet their obligations. Target equity reaction to the investment by 
government’s political and financial arms during the 2008-2009 financial crisis is still 
negative, but not significant. Also, prior year performance is negatively (-2.71%) 
related to target stock reaction, meaning that firms with worse performance in the 
prior year had a more positive reaction to government investment during the crisis, 
highlighting the government’s role as a lender of last resort. Like for the banking 
crises, larger and more profitable firms had negative reactions to government 
investment during the financial crisis, probably fearing the divergence of their firms 
resources to support political agenda. Also, because most government invested 
domestically during the 2008-2009 financial crisis, in order to support their local 
economy, foreign government investment has no significant relation with target equity 
reaction over that period. Model 6 presents results outside of the 2008-2009 financial 
crisis and shows that target shareholders react negatively to the investment by political 
(-3.82%) and financial (-2.16%) arms of government but target equity reaction is 
positive for foreign government investment (2.51%) and increases by 0.13% for each 
additional percentage of government investment. 
In general, the finding that government investment influences shareholder 
wealth and that the imposition of political goals associated with government 
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investment hurts target shareholders is robust to the inclusion of the offer premium 
and when estimating models during and outside of periods of financial distress. 
  
5. Conclusions 
Despite common misperceptions, governments are a large and growing class of 
investors. I examine government investment in publicly traded companies in order to 
evaluate target shareholders’ reactions to different types of government investors. 
Government investment could benefit the target firm through ‘preferential access’ to 
financing, additional contracts and regulatory lobbying. On the other hand, as the 
privatization literature points out, government ownership is likely to lead to lower 
profitability and efficiency due to the conflict between political and profit 
maximization goals. I show that not all government investors are alike. Government 
investors with high perceived levels of political interference, in particular those that 
are political, domestic, left-wing and those more likely to expropriate are associated 
with a negative target stock price announcement reactions. But other government 
investors, in particular foreign, those from economic arms of the government, those 
from right-wing governments and those less likely to expropriate, benefit their target 
firms, as the positive effects of their ownership outweigh any additional conflict 
between the goals of politics and profit maximization.  I also show that the benefits 
associated with government investment are more likely to reveal themselves at higher 
ownership levels, while the negative effects of political arms of government on 
shareholder wealth are stronger with minority stake investments. 
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Investments by various government entities have not been previously 
examined in the literature and this paper provides a first look at them. The paper aims 
to uncover the likelihood of political goal imposition by these different government 
investors and the related shareholder wealth effects are examined around government 
investment announcements. It leaves a multitude of unanswered questions dealing 
with government investment for future research involving not only identification but 
also the evaluation of long term effects of government investments and the 
comparison of shareholder wealth effects between government and public 
investments. It would be particularly interesting to identify not only why governments 
invest in general and whether they invest around specific events, such as elections, but 
also to provide a more careful identification of the political interference channel that is 
associated with government investment. 
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Chapter 2: Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: Evidence 
from Government Investment in Publicly Traded Firms
9
 
Contrary to public perceptions and despite the worldwide success of state 
privatizations, over the past decade governments have acquired more assets through 
stock purchases (US$ 969 billion) than they have sold through share issue 
privatizations and direct sales (US$ 765 billion).
10
 In fact, governments and state-
owned entities have been such active stock-market investors that they now own 
approximately one-fifth of global stock-market capitalization (The Economist, 2010). 
We investigate the impact of this novel and growing form of government ownership 
on the cost of publicly traded debt of the firms in which governments invest.   
The rise in “state capitalism” that this phenomenon of government stock 
purchases both reflects and encompasses has been deeply controversial, especially 
when it involves share purchases by foreign state-owned investors such as sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs – see Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson, 2010; Dewenter, Han, 
and Malatesta, 2010; Kotter and Lel, 2009) or state-owned enterprises (SOEs – see 
Karolyi and Liao, 2010; Karolyi and Taboada, 2011).
11
 In addition, the mass of 
published research examining the effectiveness of governments versus private 
investors as owners of business enterprises points to the superiority of the latter, and 
                                                 
9
 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Ginka Borisova, Veljko Fotak, and William 
Megginson. 
 
10
 Based on data from the Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum M&A database. 
 
11
 Politicians and analysts have often referred to the possibility that foreign governments could gain 
control of vital assets through their investments, thus constituting a security risk. For example, the 
attempted acquisition of six US port-management businesses by Dubai Ports World, a state-owned 
enterprise, was stalled by the US Congress in 2006 on the basis of security concerns. A second often-
cited risk is that of a foreign government acquiring technology which could constitute a threat to 
national security. 
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empirical evidence overwhelmingly documents that when governments privatize 
SOEs, performance tends to improve – often dramatically.12 All this suggests that 
states should be reducing their ownership of corporate equity, rather than increasing it. 
Yet, this evidence is mostly based on an analysis of stock-price and operating 
performance. The effect of government ownership on the value of firm debt is largely 
unexplored.
 
  
Despite governments resembling other large institutional investors, they often 
have different goals. While private investors are generally concerned with wealth 
maximization, several possible rationales for state ownership of listed equity have 
been put forth. Governments can purchase equity stakes to influence companies to 
pursue socially-desirable objectives, such as maintaining high levels of employment, 
or to subsidize industries considered vital to the nation’s political and military goals. 
These motivations suggest that governments are reluctant to allow companies in which 
they purchase stock to fail. Accordingly, investors come to expect that governments 
will prevent struggling government-owned firms from defaulting, thus providing a 
form of implicit debt guarantee (Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell, 2006; Brown and 
Dinç, 2011; Borisova and Megginson, 2011). Such a guarantee is likely to lower the 
                                                 
12
 The relative effectiveness of state versus private ownership is examined in Eckel and Vermaelen 
(1986), Boardman and Vining (1989), Kole and Mulherin (1997), Shleifer (1998), Chhibber and 
Majumdar (1999), Shirley and Walsh (2000), La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2001), Sapienza 
(2004), Dinç (2005), Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007), Chen, Firth, Xin, and Xu (2008), Chernykh 
(2008), Lin and Su (2008), Wolf (2009), Firth, Lin, and Zou (2010), Morck, Yavuz, and Yeung (2011), 
and Lin, Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan (2011). Early privatization empirical studies are summarized in 
Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002), while more recent research includes 
Sun and Tong (2003), Megginson, Nash, Netter, and Poulsen (2004), Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami 
(2005), D’Souza, Megginson, and Nash (2005), Gupta (2005), Brown, Earle, Telegdy (2006, 2010), 
Wolf and Pollitt (2008), Estrin, Hanousek, Kočenda, and Svejnar (2009), Boubakri, Cosset, Guedhami, 
and Saffar (2011), and Denisova, Eller, Frye, and Zhuravskaya (2011). 
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perceived risk of default, which in turn reduces the risk premiums required by 
investors and, hence, lowers the cost of debt for the issuing firm.
 
  
On the other hand, Stiglitz, Jaramillo-Vallejo, and Park (1993) warn that this 
reluctance of governments to allow firms (especially financial institutions) to fail can 
increase managerial moral hazard, as shareholders and managers enjoy the benefits of 
strong firm performance, while the government and, ultimately, the taxpayers share 
the costs of insolvency. Such moral hazard can increase the cost of borrowing (Lin, 
Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan, 2011) and is further strengthened by a lower risk of 
managerial replacement, as government-owned firms are less likely to be acquired in a 
takeover or be allowed to go bankrupt. For example, when German skin-care company 
Beiersdorf was targeted by U.S.-based Proctor & Gamble in 2003, the city of 
Hamburg purchased a stake in the company to prevent the takeover and maintain local 
employment. The moral hazard problem is also exacerbated by a monitoring gap 
associated with government ownership, as shown, for example, by Bortolotti, Fotak, 
and Megginson (2010) for SWF investments: governments typically provide lower 
levels of monitoring than other private shareholders, and the implicit guarantees they 
offer remove monitoring incentives for other stakeholders. In addition, the imposition 
of social and political priorities on investment targets, despite the best intentions of 
governments to maintain the firm's viability, could result in deviations from purely 
economic shareholder value maximization. Such deviations could negatively impact 
firm performance and firm value, which in turn leads to a higher probability of default 
and a higher cost of debt. In other words, the implicit debt guarantee has a direct effect 
on the cost of debt – by lowering the perceived risk of default, it lowers the required 
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risk premium – but it also has an indirect effect of increasing moral hazard and agency 
costs, which could lead to a higher risk of default.  
The net effect of government ownership on the firm-level cost of debt is thus a 
matter for empirical investigation. While the potentially countervailing effects of 
government shareholdings need not be mutually exclusive, our analysis aims at 
determining which effect dominates on average and in specific circumstances – for 
example, we recognize that debt guarantees could be stronger in times of economic 
distress. Thus, we examine the link between government ownership and spreads 
(above benchmark yields) on publicly traded corporate bonds issued by firms in which 
governments and other state-owned investors purchase equity ownership stakes. We 
manually collect and extensively verify stock ownership data to identify government 
ownership stakes for a sample of firms for each year between 1991 and 2010, as an 
accurate metric of government ownership is crucial to our study. Our sample consists 
of 5,048 credit spreads from 1,278 bonds issued by 214 companies from 43 countries 
over 1991-2010. The main analysis relies on panel regressions in which we model the 
spread on corporate bonds as a function of government ownership after controlling for 
other factors (both security- and firm-specific) which have been found in previous 
research to affect the cost of debt. Our initial results indicate that, in our overall 
sample, the presence of a government shareholder is linked to an increase in the cost 
of debt, but that the cost of debt decreases in the size of the stake owned by the 
government. A binary variable related to the presence of government investors is 
associated with a 40 basis points (bp) increase in the cost of debt, while each 
percentage point of government ownership is associated with a corresponding 0.6 bp 
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decrease. We conjecture that government shareholding induces moral hazard and 
deviations from shareholder wealth maximization, but implicit government guarantees 
become more credible as government-owned stakes increase.  
We further note that a government guarantee on the debt of investment targets 
is likely to be more valuable during times of economic hardship as defaults are, all 
else equal, more probable during crises or recessions (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; 
Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen, 2011; Santos, 2011). We therefore distinguish between the 
recent financial crisis and previous ‘non-crisis’ years. During non-crisis years, 
controlling for relevant firm and bond characteristics, we find that firms with one or 
more government entities as a shareholder display significantly higher bond spreads, 
with an average increase of 61 bp. During the recent financial crisis, however, 
government presence is associated with lower spreads, by 18 bp, and each percentage 
point increase in government stake ownership translates into a 1 bp decrease in the 
cost of debt. Likewise, government ownership is associated with a lower cost of debt, 
by 9 bp, during banking crises identified by Laeven and Valencia (2010) but with a 
higher cost of debt, by 38 bp, outside of the banking crises. We interpret this as further 
evidence of the value of implicit government guarantees on the cost of debt of 
investment targets as, during times of distress, government ownership in any amount 
is associated with a decrease in the cost of debt. 
We recognize that government investments are not random – rather, 
governments invest selectively, which could lead to a non-causal relation between 
government ownership and cost of debt. For example, during the recent financial 
crisis, governments have acquired stakes in failing institutions, which could obscure 
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the relation between government ownership and cost of debt. Accordingly, we perform 
the majority of our tests with samples that exclude observations related to the 2007-
2008 wave of bailouts. Our results are also not affected by other investment selection 
biases. First, in regression analysis, we use lagged (previous-year) government 
ownership. Further, in two-stage selection models, we control for factors influencing 
the decision of the state to take ownership positions in investment targets and find our 
core results to be robust. Similarly, an instrumental variable approach confirms our 
findings. 
The above results gathered from economy-wide distress periods suggest that, 
as expected, government guarantees are more valuable, the more likely the firm is to 
default. In additional analysis, we focus on firm-specific measures of distress by 
investigating the effect of government ownership on the cost of debt for a sample of 
firms issuing high-risk (non-investment-grade) bonds and for a sample of high-
leverage firms. In the sample of non-investment-grade bonds, we observe patterns 
similar to our main results – government ownership during crisis (non-crisis) years is 
associated with a lower (higher) cost of debt. We find the same relation when looking 
at firm-years with leverage values above the median. For highly-levered firms during 
non-crisis years, government ownership is linked to a 50 bp increase in the cost of 
debt, while during the recent financial crisis, government ownership is linked to an 89 
bp decrease (or to a 2 bp decrease for each percentage point of ownership). Generally, 
we document that credit spread reductions are stronger when considering firm distress, 
consistent with the heightened value of state guarantees.  
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Past research has also documented that not all institutional investors are good 
monitors and that the monitoring is mostly – perhaps uniquely – provided by 
independent, long-term investors (Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, and Parrino, 
2006; Chen, Harford, and Li, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, 
and Thomas, 2008; Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009; Klein and Zur, 2009; Aggarwal, 
Erel, Ferreira, and Matos, 2011; Chung and Zhang, 2011). Similarly, different 
government-owned entities vary in terms of objectives and modus operandi. For 
example, government entities such as SOEs are often more closely involved in the 
management of investment targets than are pure state actors, such as the central 
government or local/regional governments (Sapienza, 2004; Dinç, 2005; Brown and 
Dinç, 2005; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007). State-owned investment vehicles such as 
pension funds and SWFs monitor target firm management differently than do pure 
government entities or state-owned operating companies (Woidtke, 2002; Giannetti 
and Laeven, 2009; Jiang, Lee, and Yue, 2010). Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson 
(2010) show evidence that SWFs are very poor monitors, especially when the 
investment target is a foreign firm. An activist stance by acquiring state entities could, 
therefore, either mitigate or amplify the adverse impact of government-induced moral 
hazard depending on the goals of the government entity. Further, implicit government 
guarantees should be mainly provided by the central and local governments, as well as 
by central banks and by SOEs in strategic industries – entities that act as ‘protectors’ – 
and not by the more financially-oriented government entities, such as SWFs and 
pension funds. Our study is the first to provide a detailed breakdown of government 
investors into groups – central government, local government, SOEs, mixed SOEs, 
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central/development banks, SWFs, and public pension funds. We find that ownership 
by SWFs and pension funds is associated with an increase in the cost of debt, while 
ownership by central and local governments is linked to a decrease in the cost of debt. 
Fully and partially government-owned SOEs generally lead to an increase in the cost 
of debt outside of crises and a decrease in the cost of debt during the recent financial 
crisis. Overall, our evidence is consistent with the idea that more direct government 
involvement provides the strongest implicit debt guarantees due to political goals 
(often inconsistent with firm default) and ‘deep pockets’, thereby helping lower the 
cost of debt during crisis periods. Conversely, the increase in the cost of debt is 
primarily linked to financial arms of the government (e.g., SWFs, pension funds), 
whose investing objectives are often commercial and, as such, do not lead to a similar 
implied debt guarantee.   
We further note that implicit government guarantees should be strongest for 
domestic targets, as the default of a foreign investment target is less likely to carry the 
political stigma associated with failures of domestic state-owned companies. For 
example, social and political goals are less likely to be imposed on foreign targets, as 
employment maximization is not typically a goal sought by a foreign government 
owner. Additionally, recent empirical studies show that local investors are better able 
to overcome informational asymmetries than are more distant investors (Baik, Kang, 
and Kim, 2010; Almazan, de Motta, Titman, and Uysal, 2010), thus enabling domestic 
owners to exercise more informed monitoring. On the other hand, even more empirical 
evidence points to the superiority of foreign institutional and corporate investors as 
monitors of investee-firm management, which could lead to higher firm valuations and 
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thus a reduced cost of debt (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Brown, Earle, and Telegdy, 
2006 and 2010; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Clearly, we should expect different types 
of government entities to impact the cost of debt of target firms in materially different 
ways. By separately analyzing the effect of domestic and foreign government 
ownership, we find that the implicit debt guarantee documented during the recent 
financial crisis is specific to domestic government presence, and we estimate the effect 
to be of approximately 70 bp. Foreign government ownership over the full twenty-year 
sample period, however, is associated with an increase in the cost of debt of about 56 
bp.  
On balance, these results suggest private investors believe that stock ownership 
by most domestic government categories can improve the creditworthiness of 
corporate bond issuers by providing an implicit debt guarantee that becomes especially 
valuable during a financial crisis. However, a higher cost of debt is associated with 
state ownership during relatively healthier economic times, as well as with holdings of 
foreign government entities and more commercially-oriented state investment 
vehicles. In these scenarios, the negative effects of government ownership (i.e., moral 
hazard, poor monitoring, political goals) outweigh the strong backing provided by 
these state investors.  
Evidence on the impact of government ownership on the cost of debt has been 
investigated recently by Borisova and Megginson (2011). Our research differs in 
several ways, most importantly in that Borisova and Megginson examine residual state 
ownership following privatization – the reduction of state control in firms, often 
concomitant with regulatory changes and firm reorganization – while we look at the 
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government as an investor in publicly traded firms. Our analysis further indicates that 
the relation between government ownership and cost of corporate debt is dramatically 
affected by firm-specific and economy-wide distress, differences between types of 
government acquirers and, finally, by the distinction between domestic and foreign 
government ownership. Our sample spans 43 countries, and includes firms from North 
America and Asia, while Borisova and Megginson (2011) focus solely on domestic 
government ownership of European firms.  
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses. Section 
3 describes data sources, sample construction, and variable definitions and offers 
descriptive statistics and univariate tests. Section 4 discusses the methodology, panel 
regressions, and the associated model estimation results. Section 5 concludes.  
 
1. Hypotheses Development 
 Governments, as acquirers, differ from private entities in multiple ways. Most 
importantly, government ownership carries an implicit guarantee on the debt of the 
firm, as it is not probable that a firm with state ownership will fail. This unwillingness 
of governments to allow firms to default is due to three main reasons. First of all, 
governments pursue political goals, such as low unemployment, which are not 
consistent with the loss of jobs frequently associated with firm default. Second, 
government ownership is often motivated by the desire to maintain key industries 
providing crucial services to the country; accordingly, governments are not keen on 
allowing such strategic holdings to default. Finally, politicians do not wish to be 
associated with a failed investment and would thus pressure or steer the government to 
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rescue an insolvent government-owned firm. Consistent with this reasoning, Faccio, 
Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find that politically connected firms are more often 
the recipients of government bailouts, while Brown and Dinç (2005) show evidence 
that defaults of government-owned banks are less common than defaults of privately-
owned banks. Consequently, debt holders could perceive a reduced probability of 
default as governments would either back the debt of the defaulting firm or prevent the 
default altogether. Therefore, we expect that state ownership would lower the debt 
pricing for target firms.
13
  
However, Borisova and Megginson (2011) show that state influence on debt 
pricing can be non-monotonic, and several factors resulting from state presence could 
raise the firms’ cost of debt financing. First, as discussed by Stiglitz, Jaramillo-
Vallejo, and Park (1993), the implicit government guarantee allows shareholders and 
managers to benefit from strong firm performance, while public funds are used to keep 
firms afloat during difficult periods. Consequently – as Gropp, Hakenes, and Schnabel 
(2011) find for state-owned banks – we expect managers to increase levels of risk 
taking, which in turn will increase the cost of debt of the government-owned firm.  
Second, the moral hazard problem can be reinforced by a monitoring gap that 
occurs because the government is unable, or unwilling, to supervise management. 
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 The implicit assumption in our model, based on the cited literature, is that government ownership 
affects the probability of default of the firm itself. Another possible channel of state influence on credit 
spreads lies in the impact of government backing on bondholder recovery rates in the case of default. 
This relation could be found in cases where explicit state guarantees exist for corporate bonds. In our 
sample, however, the instances of direct government guarantees on firm debt are rare and affect 0.71% 
of the total number of observations. In particular, we find the following bond collateral types, controlled 
for in our regression analysis, that imply a direct government guarantee: “FDIC Guaranteed” (2 obs), 
“Govt Guaranteed” (2 obs), and “Govt Liquid Guaranteed” (32 obs). Accordingly, we focus on the 
effect implicit government guarantees can have on the probability of default, rather than on recovery 
rates.  
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Since debtholders expect governments to monitor and rescue distressed firms, their 
own incentives to supervise the actions of management decrease (OECD, 1998). 
However, government employees could simply not have the skills or technical 
knowledge necessary for proper monitoring, due to political appointments and other 
inefficiencies in the government employment sector. Borisova, Brockman, Salas, and 
Zagorchev (2012) find a lower quality of corporate governance in publicly traded 
firms partially owned by the government when compared to firms free from state 
ownership. Governments could be reluctant to actively impact the governance of firms 
in which they invest for fear of public opposition and backlash by media and 
regulators, especially if the investment target is located abroad. Bortolotti, Fotak, and 
Megginson (2010) propose the “Constrained Foreign Government Investor 
Hypothesis” and show evidence that SWFs create a ‘governance gap’ that leads to 
value destruction, largely due to their desire not to stir opposition. Eckel and 
Vermaelen (1986) also point to the fact that government ownership can decrease the 
probability of a takeover, hence reducing the disciplining effect associated with the 
market for corporate control. 
Third, government investment vehicles may pursue goals other than wealth 
maximization. State entities could want to maximize employment, favor domestic 
investments, or acquire foreign technologies. Well-known cases of government 
ownership directing the benefits to their political supporters or simply appeasing the 
groups that have power to overthrow the existing government highlight inefficiencies 
60 
in state ownership.
14
 Outside of the state’s goal to keep its investment targets in 
operation, the above-mentioned political factors could lower the risk-adjusted 
performance of government-owned firms, and as Crabbe and Fabozzi (2002) 
document, firm profitability is closely linked to the firm’s ability to repay borrowed 
funds.  
Between implicit debt guarantees, moral hazard, ineffective monitoring, and 
political goals linked to state owners, the net impact of government ownership on the 
cost of debt of target firms is a matter of empirical investigation. While we recognize 
that government ownership could impact the cost of debt in multiple ways, our focus 
is on the net effect. First, we believe that the overall effect is of ultimate interest to the 
debate on optimal government ownership; second, we realize the empirical difficulty 
in measuring the relative contribution of the different effects. Therefore, we simply 
hypothesize that government ownership has an influence on the cost of debt of 
investment targets, positing: 
H1: Government ownership impacts the cost of debt of investment targets. 
We test the above hypothesis by investigating whether the cost of debt of firms 
with government entities amongst their shareholders is different from the cost of debt 
of a sample containing the same firms during years without government ownership. 
We further note that the impact that government ownership has on firm behavior could 
plausibly be conditioned by the size of the government-owned stake. Governments 
could be more protective of firms in which they own larger stakes, thus reinforcing the 
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 Refer to Shleifer (1998) for examples. Some instances include post-World War II British government 
sponsoring of coal mines due to the miners' union power to overthrow the current government and the 
Philippines running a state-owned power utility that stops providing electricity to some parts of the 
nation for seven hours a day. 
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implicit debt guarantee previously mentioned. Similarly, state owners can have a 
stronger effect on the governance and behavior of firms in which they hold larger 
stakes, in virtue of greater control and the ability to influence board-of-director 
appointments, for example. Therefore, we also examine the relation between firms’ 
cost of debt and the size of the stake owned by government investors.  
The value of a government guarantee is roughly equal to the perceived 
probability of distress times the perceived probability of government intervention (in 
case of distress). In normal economic times, the probability of default of a firm could 
be viewed by bondholders as remote, so that the probability of government bailout or 
other intervention would not have a meaningful impact on the cost of debt. As 
economic conditions deteriorate and the probability of default increases, the value of a 
government guarantee increases, possibly leading to a substantial effect on the cost of 
debt. Hence, we hypothesize that: 
H2: The effect of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment 
targets differs during recessions and periods of market-wide financial distress. 
As a first test of the above hypothesis, we make use of the recent financial 
crisis (spanning the years 2008, 2009, and 2010). This event, engulfing as it has 
virtually the entire global economy, is an appropriate testing ground as it constitutes 
an exogenous shock in most domestic economies. Using both interaction variables and 
data subsets, we investigate whether the impact of government ownership on the cost 
of firms’ debt differs during this financial crisis. For robustness, we replicate our 
analysis by focusing on a broader set of financial crises – the banking crises described 
by Laeven and Valencia (2010).  
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Using similar reasoning, we investigate whether government guarantees would 
also be more valuable in the presence of firm-specific distress. We thus examine the 
influence of government ownership on the cost of non-investment-grade bonds and 
highly-levered firms, which we use as proxies for firm-specific distress, and theorize 
the following:  
H3: The effect of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment 
targets differs for high-risk firms. 
Government-owned entities can vary substantially in their goals and 
operations. Some classes of government entities are more likely to be involved in the 
management and monitoring of their acquisition targets. A more active approach to 
corporate governance by government shareholders could help reduce or exacerbate the 
costs of moral hazard associated with state ownership, depending on the government 
entity’s agenda. Similarly, the strength of the implicit debt guarantee differs according 
to the nature of the government entity holding the investment stake, in turn leading to 
different impacts on the cost of debt. SWFs and state-run pension funds have “deep 
pockets” like other government shareholders but are more likely to adjust their 
portfolios than, for example, a local government investing to prevent a foreign 
takeover. Hence, we hypothesize: 
H4: The effect of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment 
targets differs according to the type of government investment vehicle.  
 Accordingly, we investigate whether different classes of government-
owned acquirers (central government, local government, SOEs, mixed SOEs, 
government banks, SWFs, and public pension funds) have different effects on the cost 
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of debt of investment targets. In particular, we expect government acquirers that are 
more closely associated with political goals (such as central governments) to take on 
the role of ‘protectors’ and to provide the strongest debt guarantees. Entities with a 
more independent nature (such as government-owned pension funds and SWFs), 
which we deem ‘investors’, should more closely follow the behavior of other 
institutional investors. They should suffer less from the political distortions that lead 
to government support of distressed firms and be less able to rescue defaulting 
portfolio holdings.  
Government guarantees should be most relevant when governments invest in a 
local target, since foreign state investors will not have the same national concerns. A 
lower cost of debt could be linked to domestic government investments due to greater 
debt guarantees and the greater monitoring role of local governments. Also, active 
foreign government involvement in a domestic target is usually met with significant 
public opposition, so governments sometimes choose to be passive investors, 
especially in their foreign holdings (Bortolotti, Fotak, and Megginson, 2010). This 
reduced monitoring can lead to increased risk taking, reduced firm efficiency and, 
therefore, a higher cost of debt when foreign state holdings predominate. On the other 
hand, government involvement could lead to a higher cost of debt for domestic entities 
as those investments typically pursue not only shareholder value maximization, but 
also other political and social goals. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H5: The effect of government ownership on the cost of debt of investment 
targets differs for domestic firms.  
 
64 
2. Sample Description 
 We collect a sample of government investments from the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) Platinum Mergers and Acquisitions database. As an initial screen, we 
include all investments by entities whose ultimate parent is flagged as ‘government’ 
over the years 1980-2010. This initial search yields 12,112 completed transactions 
worth $1.66 trillion. After restricting the sample to government investments in 
publicly traded firms, so that we can obtain audited accounting data for the investment 
targets, we have 2,512 transactions worth $749 billion in 1,953 unique publically 
target firms. We further rely on SDC to collect additional information about the deals, 
such as completion dates, the proportion of shares acquired for each deal, the 
proportion of shares held by the acquirer after the deal, the nation of the acquirer, and 
the nation and primary SIC code of the target.  
We use the SDC New Issues database to identify target firms based on CUSIP 
identifiers with publicly traded ‘plain vanilla’ bonds outstanding over the period 1991-
2010.
15
 Following Borisova and Megginson (2011), we only use straight bonds with 
fixed coupons as the spreads of debt securities with additional features are more 
sensitive to sovereign bond yield fluctuations (Duffee, 1998). Based on the 1,953 
unique CUSIPs from our government investment sample, SDC returns 7,804 straight 
bonds from 388 issuers. The retrieval of bond spread and rating data requires bond 
ISINs, and SDC provides ISINs for 2,977 bonds. Of the remaining bonds without 
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 Our main sample period starts in 1991, as bond credit spreads are not widely available before this 
time. However, we track government investments starting in 1980 when these data are available, as the 
earlier starting date allows us to capture a greater number of state investments and more accurately 
track government shareholding during the period of interest. 
65 
identifiers, we record ISINs for 945 additional securities manually found in 
Datastream, yielding a combined total of 3,922 bonds.   
Data for these bonds are obtained from Datastream. We retrieve the bond 
spread as the difference between the yield of the corporate bond and the yield of a 
benchmark government bond that is matched by currency and maturity (using linear 
interpolation), as defined by Datastream. We also use this database to retrieve time-
varying Standard and Poor’s (S&P) ratings for the bond issues. Bond yield data and 
historical credit ratings are recorded as of the Wednesday closer to November 15 of 
each year (i.e., the third Wednesday of each November). We use data as of 
Wednesday to avoid end-of-week or beginning-of-week distortions in market data. For 
similar reasons, we use a target date of November 15 to avoid end-of-year effects. We 
retrieve 10,124 bond-year spreads for our sample, and 6,854 of these (from 1,554 
bonds and 278 firms) are found with accompanying yearly S&P ratings. To eliminate 
outliers in the credit spread data, we truncate the top and bottom 1% of spreads. It is 
worth noting that our use of a November sampling point means that spread 
observations for 2008 are all after the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 14, 
and thus after the 2008 financial crisis truly began. 
Crucial to our analysis are accurate, time-varying values of government 
ownership, both in the aggregate and for various categories of state investing entities. 
Therefore, we further augment our dataset by using numerous sources to verify and 
track lagged government ownership over time in the targets. For each of our target 
firms, we manually collect ownership as of each year end between 1990 and 2009. 
SDC provides the starting point for this collection via the investments that form our 
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sample, as well as sales by the same acquirer-target pair in order to capture decreases 
in stakes. We then locate our sample firms in the Thomson ONE Banker ownership 
module, track holdings of all institutional shareholders across our sample period as of 
the end of the calendar year, and classify each reported shareholder into various 
government investing categories (or as a non-government investor). When not 
available in this database, ownership amounts and investor identifications are found 
using company annual reports, filings, and business descriptions. These data are 
provided by Thomson ONE Banker; entities’ websites; press releases; the Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
system (EDGAR); the Canadian Securities Administrators’ System for Electronic 
Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR); Privatization Barometer; the World Bank 
privatization database; and Lexis-Nexis. 
To perform our analysis, historical accounting data for sample firms are also 
required. We search for relevant financial data using Worldscope and track 
acquired/merged firms through the new entity, as in Bortolotti and Faccio (2009) and 
Borisova and Megginson (2011). We are able to collect necessary measures for a final 
dataset of 214 publicly traded firms, which provide the sample bond-years with and 
without the presence of state ownership.
 
These firms are targets of 288 government 
purchases, and have 1,278 sample bonds outstanding that meet our selection criteria, 
thus yielding 5,048 bond-year observations. Description of  variables and their sources 
are provided in Table 16. 
 
67 
2.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Core descriptive information regarding our sample is presented in multiple 
panels in Table 17. Panel A includes observation counts by year for both the entire 
sample, including 5,048 bond-year observations, and for a subset including only 
observations for firm-years with government shareholding greater than zero, including 
3,111 observations. Approximately 1,819 bond-year observations (36% of the total 
count) span the crisis years 2008-2010, allowing for a balanced comparison between 
the recent financial crisis and previous years. For the subsample of firm-years with 
government participation, 1,256 observations (40%) span the crisis years, ensuring 
that the subsample and the overall sample are indeed comparable. 
Panel B presents bond-year observation counts by country of origin of the 
government owner.
 
 In cases where multiple government stakes are present in the same 
target firm-year, we tabulate the country of origin of the largest government 
shareholder. Overall, our sample contains government owners from forty different 
countries, and the top ten investing states include nations from North America, 
Europe, and Asia. Nineteen percent of our sample is represented by bond-years of 
firms purchased by the Canadian government. The list of other government acquirers 
leading our sample includes France (13% of the sample), the United States (10%), the 
United Kingdom (7%), Spain (6%), and Singapore (5%). 
Panel C lists bond-year observations by nation of the sample firms’ 
headquarters. The top nation is the United States, with 1,574 observations (31% of the 
sample). Other well-represented nations include Canada (877 observations, 17% of the 
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sample), the United Kingdom (570 observations, 11% of the sample), and France (459 
observations, 9% of the sample).  
Panel D presents bond-year counts by industrial sector, classified by one-digit 
SIC code of the sample firms. The leading industry is SIC code 6, the financial sector, 
with 2,337 observations (46% of the sample). The sample contains also a large number 
of observations (1,582, or 31% of the sample) related to transportation and utilities 
(SIC code 4). SIC codes 2 and 3, both related to manufacturing, account for 655 
observations (13% of the sample).  
Panel E presents descriptive statistics for our main binary variables.. The 
presence and level of government investment in target firms serve as our primary 
explanatory factors of interest. Govt presence is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if 
there is any government ownership in the firm during a specific calendar year, and 0 
otherwise. We also collect levels of state ownership represented as a percentage of a 
firm’s shares. As presented in Panel E of Table 17, out of a total of 5,048 bond-years, 
3,111 (62%) involve the presence of government. To further explore how government 
involvement can affect debt pricing, we disaggregate state ownership into different 
investing entities. Specifically, government owners are split into seven categories: 
Central govt (comprising 562 bond-year observations and 18% of the sample with 
government ownership), Local/regional govt (69 observations; 2% of the state 
ownership sample), SOE full (894 observations; 29% of the state ownership sample), 
SOE mixed (1,625 observations; 52% of the state ownership sample), Govt bank (212 
observations; 7% of the state ownership sample), SWF (893 observations; 29% of the 
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state ownership sample), and Pension fund (783 observations; 25% of the state 
ownership sample).
 16
   
Our sample also includes transactions related to government bailouts, and we 
account for these rescues in an attempt to isolate their effect on bond spreads. Bailouts 
are identified using SDC deal synopses, as well as reports from the press and company 
financial statements. We identify 480 bond-year observations (9.5% of our sample) 
from 27 firms related to bailouts for the full sample, with almost all of these occurring 
during the 2008-2010 period (472 bond-years of 26 firms). We also account for 
foreign governments investing in our target firms, as this type of state ownership could 
yield different effects on the cost of debt of target firms. Foreign government 
ownership is present in 1,339 observations, which is 27% of the overall sample and 
43% of the sample with state ownership. Since we hypothesize that the presence of 
government shareholders could have a different impact during times of economic 
crisis, we include a financial crisis indicator taking a value of one when credit spreads 
are measured in the period 2008-2010. We also use a binary variable representing 
country-years experiencing banking crises, as identified by Laeven and Valencia 
(2010), and these observations comprise approximately 26% of the sample. 
                                                 
16
 The classification is based on the identity of the government-owned shareholder (the investor). The 
‘central government’ group is comprised of non-independent branches of the central (national) 
government, such as ministries of finance and national treasuries. ‘Local/regional government’ refers to 
non-independent branches of sub-national governments (e.g., municipalities and townships). The ‘SOE 
full’ category includes all enterprises fully owned by the government, while ‘SOE mixed’ includes all 
enterprises in which the government retains partial ownership or some level of control/connectedness 
(for example, through ‘golden shares’). ‘Government banks’ includes financial institutions owned by 
governments and consists primarily of central and development banks. For ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds’ 
we follow the descriptions given by Thomson ONE Banker and the SWF Institute, while ‘Pension 
funds’ refers to government-owned pension funds.  
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Banks and other financial institutions are often treated separately in empirical 
analysis, as their capital structures are typically different from those of other firms. We 
define an indicator variable identifying banking firms based on the firm’s industry 
classification, name, and business description, and we expect this variable to be 
negatively associated with firms’ cost of debt. About one-fourth of all target firm 
observations (1,284 of 5,048 total bond-year observations) relate to investments in 
banks.  
Panel F provides descriptive statistics for our continuous ownership, bond, and 
firm variables, presenting mean, median, standard deviation, 25
th
 and 75
th
 percentiles. 
Our dependent variable – credit spread – has an average value of 216 bp and a median 
value of 136 bp, and as we highlight further in our analysis, these large values are 
driven by the financial crisis period beginning in 2008. The mean government 
ownership stake is 13.5% for the overall sample and 21.9% for the sample of bond-
years in which government is present as a shareholder.  
As a control variable in our main analysis, we include S&P credit ratings 
obtained from Datastream. We form an ordinal scale with the best credit quality 
assigned the highest number, and we use the natural logarithm of credit rating to 
account for possible nonlinearity. The expected sign of the coefficient on the credit 
rating is negative, as we expect a higher rating to be associated with a lower spread. 
Table 17, Panel F, shows that the median credit rating in our sample corresponds to an 
S&P rating of “A-”. The number of days to maturity is also included in our models, 
with an expected positive coefficient due to more uncertainty over the lifetime of the 
bond. Average time to maturity in our sample is about 2829 days, or 7.75 years. We 
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also control for the bond’s age, defined as the number of days between the issue date 
and the date on which the spread was collected; average bond age in our sample is 
1650 days, or approximately 4.5 years. Houweling, Mentink, and Vorst (2005) 
document the age of the bond as one of the most important determinants of bond 
market liquidity. We expect a negative relation between bond age and credit spreads, 
as in Borisova and Megginson (2011), since as the bond’s maturity date approaches 
there is less uncertainty associated with its coupon and par value payments.  
We further include controls for firm leverage (computed as total assets minus 
equity, divided by equity) to serve as a proxy for the probability of default. Including 
firm leverage as a control variable also allows us to account for the impact of 
deleveraging associated with capital injections. We expect firms with higher leverage 
to have a higher cost of debt, as in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and 
Krishnan, Ritchken, and Thomson (2005).  We also include the market-to-book ratio 
(with an average of 1.86) and size (proxied by the natural logarithm of total assets, 
with a mean of 10.9), as Fama and French (1993) show these factors to explain 
variation in bond returns. Market-to-book is generally viewed as a proxy for the 
growth prospects of the company, so we expect higher growth opportunities to be 
associated with more ease of debt repayment, and, hence, a lower cost of debt. Larger 
firms are generally considered safer, at least partially due to increased asset 
diversification, and we expect a negative relation between firm size and cost of debt. 
Finally, we include return-on-equity (with a mean of 7.49%), which Crabbe and 
Fabozzi (2002) document being associated with the ability to meet debt obligations. 
Thus, we expect return-on-equity to be negatively associated with the cost of debt. 
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Further, we obtain collateral/instrument types from Bloomberg, as those could also 
have an impact on bond pricing. We consider twenty-six different 
collateral/instrument types (see Borisova and Megginson, 2011, for examples). 
 
2.2. Differences in Means 
 Before presenting our main, panel-based analysis, we offer a first look at the data 
though tests for differences in means presented in Table 18. Given that each firm in our 
sample can have multiple bond observations, the distribution of spreads is possibly clustered 
at the firm level. As discussed by Petersen (2009), clustering of observations can lead to 
problems in the estimation of standard errors. Accordingly, we employ a standard error 
estimation methodology adjusted for clustering (at the firm level) as described by Skinner, 
Holt, and Smith (1989). We then employ the clustered standard-error estimates to compute 
two-sample t-tests for mean differences between data subsets. 
For the earlier years of the sample period (1991-2007), bond spreads of firms 
with government ownership are significantly higher than those without government 
ownership (168 bp vs. 119 bp). However, during the 2008-2010 financial crisis we 
find significantly lower spreads in bond-years with government presence (with a mean 
spread of 312 bp) than in those without government presence (393 bp). We interpret 
these univariate results as indicative of the importance of the implicit government 
guarantee during times of financial distress.   
When results are broken down by the different types of government investors, 
we find strong heterogeneity across groups. Fully-government-owned SOEs, mixed 
SOEs, and government banks are associated with a significantly lower cost of debt in 
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the crisis period. Government banks, SWFs, and government pension funds are 
associated with a significantly higher cost of debt during non-crisis years.  
Next, we differentiate between foreign and domestic government ownership. 
Target firms are grouped based on whether the majority of their government 
ownership is held by a domestic state entity or a foreign one. Firms with a majority of 
domestic government ownership have a lower mean spread (147 bp) than firms with a 
majority of foreign government ownership (271 bp) over the period 1991-2007. But 
during the 2008-2010 crisis, the cost of debt for firms with domestic government 
ownership (326 bp) is not statistically different from that for firms with foreign 
government ownership (366 bp).  
The univariate analysis suggests that government ownership, while generally 
associated with a higher cost of debt, leads to a reduction in cost of debt during times 
of economic distress (i.e., during the recent financial crisis). These results are 
consistent with the increased value of an implicit government debt guarantee when 
default is unconditionally more likely. Yet, we find substantial heterogeneity across 
different types of government owners, with SOEs most consistently associated with a 
lower cost of debt. State-owned pension funds, SWFs, and foreign government 
ownership, however, are associated with a higher cost of debt. Our panel regressions 
in the next section allow us to further examine the association between government 
ownership and debt pricing and to clarify which economic conditions and state entities 
have the strongest effect on the cost of debt.   
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3. Panel Regressions 
3.1. Methodology 
 We employ regression analysis to test the effect of government ownership on 
a target company’s cost of debt, measured by its bonds’ credit spreads. To control for 
heteroskedasticity and account for time-series dependence, firm-clustered standard 
errors are employed, as suggested by Petersen (2009). Year fixed effects are also used 
in all regressions. Similar to Borisova and Megginson (2011), the preliminary model is 
as follows: 
yit = ς + βXit + γrit + vt + εit, 
where yit represents the credit spread, ς is an intercept term, β is a set of 
coefficients, and Xit is a matrix of right-hand side variables. γ is a scalar coefficient, rit 
is the credit rating, vt  (t = 1...20) represents the yearly fixed effects, and εit is a classical 
error term. The indices i and t refer, respectively, to bonds and years. 
The right-hand side variables include control factors, as described in Section 
2.1, and variables of interest related to government ownership. Depending on the 
specific model being tested, we employ binary variables identifying bond-years with 
government shareholders, continuous variables measuring the size of the stake owned 
by the government (expressed as a percentage), or both variables together. Further, to 
allow for the different effect of government ownership on the cost of debt during times 
of distress, we add interactions between the government-ownership variables and the 
financial crisis or banking crisis variables. In additional specifications, we identify the 
presence or stake owned by specific categories of government shareholders.  
(1) 
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To alleviate endogeneity concerns, we evaluate the cost of debt for the same 
firm in years with and without government ownership, and we also lag government 
ownership values (e.g., December 2006 ownership is matched with bond spreads in 
November 2007), as in Borisova, Brockman, Salas, and Zagorchev (2012). Since 
government rescues could reverse the causality between state ownership and credit 
spreads, we also perform tests with and without the observations associated with 
bailouts. As a more formal method of accounting for endogeneity, Heckman treatment 
effect (Heckman, 1979; Heckman and Robb, 1986) and two-stage least-squares 
instrumental variable models are also used. In the Heckman two-stage models, an 
initial selection equation is fit using probit models describing the characteristics 
associated with firm-years where government ownership is present. The probit models 
include firm-specific variables present in the second-stage outcome equation, as well 
as variables that predict the presence of government ownership and are exogenous to 
the credit spread outcome we intend to model (i.e., Privatized target firm, Govt size, 
and Political leadership: Left, all defined in Table 16). In regards to these instruments, 
we expect firms that were once SOEs and are now privatized to have more 
connections to the state and to be more common targets for government investment 
and ownership. Lower values of the Govt size ranking indicate more pervasive 
government intervention in a given country, and greater state holdings are generally 
predicted in these cases. Finally, left-wing states are often associated with more state 
intervention and share ownership (Bortolotti, Fantini, and Siniscalco, 2003). Results 
from the selection equations are presented in Table 28 and are used to calculate a 
selectivity correction – the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) – included in our credit 
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spread models to account for unobserved factors related to government presence in a 
firm and potentially to the cost of debt. The two-stage least-squares models use the 
same exogenous factors as the treatment effects models to instrument the amount, 
rather than the presence, of government ownership. First-stage results for these 
instrumental variable models are included as Table 29. 
All models in the analysis use an orthogonalized value of credit rating to 
account for the effect that other independent variables could have on its assigned 
value. Liu and Thakor (1984) discuss the residual transformation procedure in depth, 
and it has also been used in more recent work (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel, 1999; 
Klock, Mansi, and Maxwell, 2005; Borisova and Megginson, 2011). The models also 
include fixed effects for bond collateral/instrument type and bond currency to account 
for these security-level characteristics. Firm country fixed effects capture nationwide 
factors that could affect bond spreads and are used in all models except those that 
incorporate the country-level banking crisis variable and those that investigate 
country-level factors expressed as differences between domestic and foreign 
government investors. 
 
3.2. Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt 
We apply the model described in the previous section and present results 
regarding the effect of government ownership on the cost of debt in Table 19. In 
Model 1, our main explanatory variable of interest, government ownership, is 
expressed as a binary variable equal to 1 if a firm has a government or government-
owned entity as a shareholder in that year. We find government ownership to be 
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significantly linked to spreads that are 33 bp higher for the full period, consistent with 
the moral hazard and social/political goals imposed by state owners. In Model 2, the 
explanatory variable of interest is the size of the stake held by all government-owned 
shareholders in a firm at year end. Parameter estimates for the effect of stake size on 
cost of debt are negative but not statistically significant at conventional levels when 
considering the full sample period. In Model 3, we include both the binary variable 
indicating government presence as a shareholder and the continuous variable 
measuring the size of the government-owned stake. The coefficient associated with 
government presence is positive (approximately 40 bp), while the coefficient estimate 
associated with the government stake is negative, indicating a decrease in the cost of 
debt of approximately 0.6 bp for each additional percentage point of government 
shareholding. This model highlights the non-monotonic relation of state ownership to 
credit spreads, as in Borisova and Megginson (2011). Government presence generally 
leads to higher spreads, but at high levels of state ownership, government guarantees 
become strong enough to lower debt pricing. The estimated point of inflection is about 
60% government ownership.  
Since bailouts are widely publicized and often involve other state-imposed 
conditions or guarantees (irrespective of the shares procured by the government), their 
presence could be partially masking the relation between the size of state ownership 
stakes and the cost of debt. We replicate the analyses of the first three models in 
Models 4 through 6 of Table 19 without observations specifically associated with 
government rescues. The results for state presence remain similar, but the effect linked 
to the size of the stake owned by the government becomes larger and gains a higher 
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level of statistical significance in Models 5 and 6. Once we exclude bailouts, 
government ownership leads to a drop in the cost of debt once it exceeds the 40% 
threshold. Since the relation between government ownership and the cost of debt could 
be impacted by other selection biases in government shareholding, we estimate two-
stage models which control for endogeneity in the state ownership decision. Model 7 
reports the second-stage results from a treatment effects model. The coefficient 
estimate for government presence is almost identical (32 bp) to what it is in Model 1, 
as the private information related to state ownership contained in Lambda cannot be 
significantly tied to bond spreads. Model 8 of Table 19 shows the second-stage 
outcome of a two-stage least-squares model where the percentage of government 
ownership is instrumented. The effect of state ownership on debt pricing appears 
strong and statistically significant in this model: each extra percentage point of state 
ownership is linked to a bond spread decrease of roughly 1.6 bp. These endogeneity 
controls suggest that our results are not driven by sample-selection biases. 
 
3.3. Financial Crises 
 In Table 20, we continue to evaluate the data over the full 1991-2010 period and add 
a variable identifying the 2008-2010 financial crisis period. Interactions between this crisis 
binary variable and the government ownership metrics enhance the evaluation of the relation 
between government ownership and spreads across diverse economic periods. By focusing on 
the years 2008-2010, during which most worldwide markets were affected by a global 
financial crisis, we make use of this exogenous shock to firms, allowing us to measure the 
differential impact of government ownership with limited concerns of reverse causality. 
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The results in Model 1 of Table 20 indicate that government ownership 
presence is associated with a 61 bp increase in the cost of debt during non-crisis years 
and an 18 bp decrease in the cost of debt during the financial crisis.
17
 Model 2 shows 
that government ownership stake does not appear to impact the cost of debt in a 
statistically significant manner prior to the 2008 crisis, but each extra percentage point 
of government ownership is related to a 1.3 bp decrease in the cost of debt during the 
financial crisis. Models 3 and 4 repeat the first two models without bailout 
observations, and the results remain very similar. The treatment effects regression in 
Model 5 also echoes the conclusions of Models 1 and 3, without finding a significant 
link between the private information associated with state ownership decisions 
(Lambda) and credit spreads. Coefficient estimates in Model 5 show that government 
presence is associated with a 49 bp increase in the cost of debt outside of the crisis and 
a 33 bp decrease during the crisis. Model 6 shows the results from a two-stage least 
squares model that instruments the level of state ownership. Greater government 
stakes are associated with higher spreads in normal economic periods and lower 
spreads during times of crisis – roughly 8.9 bp lower for each additional percentage 
point of government ownership. The sample-selection controls in Models 5 and 6 
indicate that the estimated value of government guarantees is larger once we account 
for selection biases. These results are consistent with the idea that government 
shareholding increases the cost of debt during regular, non-crisis years but decreases 
the cost of debt of portfolio holdings during the recent financial crisis. This finding is 
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 During the recent financial crisis, government ownership presence is associated with a negative 
estimated coefficient representing 79 bp. Summing this result with the 61 bp increase linked to state 
ownership during the entire period indicates that state ownership during the crisis is associated with a 
decrease in the cost of debt of approximately 18 bp. 
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largely consistent with governments introducing inefficiencies and the pernicious 
effects of moral hazard but offering, at the same time, implicit debt guarantees that 
become extremely valuable during times of distress. 
In Model 7 of Table 20, we adopt a broader definition of ‘crisis’ by focusing 
on a wide sample of banking crises identified by Laeven and Valencia (2010).
18
 The 
authors identify country-years in which banking crises occur across the world from 
1970 to 2009 based on two conditions: “(1) Significant signs of financial distress in 
the banking system (as indicated by significant bank runs, losses in the banking 
system, and bank liquidations); and (2) Significant banking policy intervention 
measures in response to significant losses in the banking system” (Laeven and 
Valencia, 2010). In Model 7, we find that government shareholding is associated with 
a 38 bp increase in the cost of debt of outside of the banking crises and a reduction of 
about 9 bp during the banking crises. In the context of the higher spreads experienced 
by all firms during a banking crisis, we note that the cost of debt for non-government-
owned firms in our sample increases by 57 bp, but the increase for government-owned 
firms during a banking crisis is much lower, about 9 bp. This robustness test using 
banking crises confirms our general findings that government ownership is associated 
with a higher cost of debt during normal economic periods but with a lower cost of 
debt during periods of distress. The two-stage treatment Model 8 confirms our 
findings.  
 
                                                 
18
 Luc Laeven’s dataset identifying banking crises is available at: http://www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm. 
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3.4. Distressed Firms 
 We further investigate the influence of government ownership on the cost of 
debt when firms are in financial distress. Noting that the value of debt guarantees 
should increase as default becomes more likely, we have focused on testing whether 
government ownership affects the cost of debt differently during a financial crisis in 
Section 4.3. We further analyze the effect of government shareholding on the cost of 
debt around firm-specific distress. To identify a sample for which distress is more 
probable, we focus on firms that issue non-investment-grade (junk) bonds.  
Table 21 details the effect of government ownership on the cost of debt of 
firms that issue non-investment-grade bonds. Our main explanatory variable of interest 
– government ownership – is expressed as presence (i.e., a binary variable) in Models 
1, 3, and 5 and as a stake (i.e., a percentage) in Models 2, 4, and 6. Moreover, given 
the importance of financial crises to debt pricing as shown in the previous subsection, 
we investigate whether the influence of government ownership on the cost of debt of 
distressed firms differs during an economy-wide financial crisis. Therefore, besides 
analyzing the influence of government ownership on the cost of debt of distressed 
firms over our full 1991-2010 period (Models 1 and 2), we also examine that influence 
for the pre-crisis period of 1991-2007 (Models 3 and 4) and the 2008-2010 financial 
crisis period (Models 5 and 6). This allows us to evaluate whether the implicit 
government guarantee influences the cost of capital for distressed firms in general and 
also when combined with economy-wide distress. Because of the potentially 
confounding effects of state investments from bailout transactions, we filter out these 
observations whenever performing regression analyses for the crisis period or the full 
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period, as it contains the crisis years. All subsequent tables in the analysis follow this 
general structure. 
Table 21, Models 1 and 2 show that the spreads of non-investment-grade bonds 
are a function of government ownership for the overall 1991-2010 period. 
Government presence is linked to higher spreads, by approximately 81 bp, while the 
variable measuring the size of the stake owned is not statistically significant. Models 3 
and 5 show that the results for state presence are driven by increased debt pricing 
associated with government presence during the pre-crisis years (98 bp). In Model 6, 
we do find a lower cost of debt tied to increased government stakes during the crisis 
period (4 bp decrease for each percentage point increase in state ownership) when 
state guarantees should be most valuable. The magnitude of these effects is stronger 
for junk bond spreads than for our full sample shown in Tables 19 and 20, 
emphasizing the importance of government objectives and guarantees for firms issuing 
these riskier instruments. 
As a robustness check for our distressed firm models in Table 21, Table 22 
features similar tests using a subsample of firm-years with leverage above the sample 
median. Although we show previously that government ownership can help lower the 
cost of debt during the crisis, it could also aid highly-levered firms facing debt 
problems that are more firm-specific than macroeconomic. In this subset, we find that 
the cost of debt is higher for state-owned, highly-levered firms during the pre-crisis 
period (50 bp) but drops significantly for this group during the crisis period by 89 bp. 
The size of the stake owned by governments does not have a statistically significant 
impact during pre-crisis years, but leads to a 2 bp decrease for each percentage point 
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of ownership during the financial crisis. These results comply with our analysis of 
non-investment-grade bond issuers by showing how government guarantees are more 
valuable to firms facing distress. One difference is that during the crisis, the size of the 
state ownership stake is more important for non-investment-grade bond issuers, while 
the mere presence of the government is linked to lower spreads for firms with higher 
leverage levels. This result could emerge from the relatively greater distress of firms 
issuing non-investment-grade bonds (14% of the sample) compared to firms with 
above-median leverage (by definition, about half of the sample). Although we find 
that the mere presence of the state can affect the cost of debt, we expect that more 
distressed firms benefit especially from stronger government guarantees realized as 
the percentage of the firm owned by the state climbs. 
Overall, the results in Tables 21 and 22 support our previous findings, as well 
as our third hypothesis pertaining to government ownership’s influence on the cost of 
debt during firm-specific distress. Our interpretation of these results is that the implicit 
government guarantee is important for the cost of debt capital during a variety of 
distress periods – whether economy-wide or firm-specific.  
 
3.5. Government Ownership and Cost of Debt by Government Investor Categories 
 In this section we consider how different government investing entities 
influence debt pricing. Table 23 presents the effects of government ownership when 
broken down into the following government acquirer types: central governments, local 
and regional governments, fully state-owned enterprises (SOE full), mixed state-
owned enterprises (SOE mixed), government banks, SWFs, and government-owned 
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pension funds. These models allow us to compare firm-years with ownership of each 
government entity to non-government-owned firm-years, while controlling for the 
effects of other government owners. 
Considering the results in all six models of Table 23, we find central 
governments are associated with a lower cost of debt during the crisis years: 
government presence reduces the cost of debt by 77 bp, while the stake owned leads to 
a decrease of 1.5 bp for each additional percentage point of ownership. Over the full 
period, the estimated effect is negative (a lower cost of debt) and statistically 
significant when measured by the size of the stake owned. This result is consistent 
with the powerful government guarantees supplied by this most direct agent of state 
involvement. During the crisis years, local/regional government ownership is 
associated with a significant reduction in credit spreads based on the size of the stake. 
Fully-government-owned SOEs are associated with a higher cost of debt during pre-
crisis years (the estimated impact of their presence is 30 bp) and with a lower cost of 
debt during the crisis (a 3 bp decrease per percentage point of ownership). Mixed 
SOEs yield results similar to those for fully SOEs, but the estimated effect is stronger. 
They lower the cost of debt the most during the crisis period (their presence is 
associated with a 79 bp reduction and stake owned with a 2.7 bp decrease per 
percentage point of ownership), although their presence is also linked to higher 
spreads (40 bp) during the pre-crisis period. This result suggests that, even for state 
entities predisposed to provide guarantees which lower spreads, other factors (such as 
moral hazard) could dominate during normal economic periods. Moreover, central and 
development bank ownership is linked to higher spreads during the full and pre-crisis 
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periods but also during the crisis period, indicating that policy objectives could be 
mitigating the effect of state guarantees. The results are strong from both a statistical 
and economic perspective: the presence variable indicates an increase in the cost of 
debt of 120 bp pre-crisis and 128 bp during the crisis, and the shares owned variable is 
associated with increases of 10 bp pre-crisis and 22 bp during the crisis (per 
percentage point of government ownership). Similarly, shareholdings by SWFs are 
associated with significantly higher spreads, consistent with a monitoring gap 
encouraged by these state investors: each percentage point of ownership by SWFs 
leads to an increase in the cost of debt by 6.2 bp (3.5 bp) during the pre-crisis (crisis) 
years. Finally, the stake owned by government pension funds is associated with a 
lower cost of debt (6.6 bp per percentage point) during the pre-crisis period. During 
the crisis period, however, the cost of debt increases by about 100 bp in the presence 
of government pension funds and by 5.6 bp for each percentage point of their 
ownership. This latter result emphasizes the conflicting effects of different 
government vehicles, and how a more profit-oriented state investing entity, such as a 
pension fund, could govern the target efficiently during normal economic times but 
offer little in the way of government guarantees during a financial crisis. 
Table 24 presents similar models for the subsample of non-investment-grade 
bonds, and the results clearly show, once more, the differences between various types 
of state investors. Regardless of the ownership measure, central governments help 
lower the cost of debt for junk-bond issuers, although results are not statistically 
significant during the crisis. Local government presence emerges as significantly 
linked to lower spreads in both subperiods. Greater shareholdings by fully-owned 
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SOEs are associated with higher spreads during the pre-crisis period and lower spreads 
during the crisis. All other state entities are linked to higher spreads when estimates 
are statistically significant. These results are consistent with the notion that certain 
government actors have more of a 'protector' function, investing primarily to prevent 
firms from defaulting or to keep nationally-important companies viable. Entities of 
this nature, such as central/local governments and SOEs, are those more concerned 
with social and political objectives when investing.  Entities such as SWFs and state-
run pension funds are more similar to pure investing vehicles, less likely to have 
imposing social objectives in their investments but also less equipped to offer the 
implicit state guarantees that seem critical to firms in distress. 
To confirm these conjectures, we aggregate state entities into two categories: 
Govt protector, which consists of central and local governments, fully and mixed 
SOEs, and government banks; and Govt investor, which consists of SWFs and 
government-run pension funds. Results using these state ownership categories are 
presented in Table 25. 
In the overall sample, we find that the size of the stake owned by a Govt 
protector is linked to a statistically significant decrease in the cost of debt, as 
expected, equivalent to approximately 1.1 bp per additional percentage owned. The 
presence of this type of government entity is not significantly associated with credit 
spreads over the full period, yet these results mask important differences across 
subperiods. During the pre-crisis years, we find the presence of a Govt protector 
associated with an increase in the cost of debt (50 bp), while during the crisis years, 
the relation is negative (an 83 bp decrease based on presence or approximately 2.3 bp 
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per each additional percentage of shares owned). On the other hand, the Govt investor 
category is associated with an increase in the cost of debt, and the results are mainly 
driven by the crisis period, with an increase in the cost of debt of 57 bp based on 
presence or 4.3 bp per additional percentage owned.
19
  
Our analysis highlights the significant differences between these two different 
groups of government owners. During more stable economic periods, the overall effect 
of state entities not primarily designed for investment purposes is to increase the cost 
of debt, as moral hazard and non-economic goals interfere with firm operations. But 
during the crisis, these government vehicles provide implicit guarantees that fortify the 
solvency of target firms. In sum, the results of Table 25 are consistent with the 
‘investor’ nature of SWFs and pension funds – motivated by economic objectives in 
their investments – and the ‘protector’ nature of the central/local governments and 
SOEs, more likely to pursue economy-wide stabilization goals, especially during crisis 
times. To further investigate the plausibility of implicit debt guarantees provided by 
different state entities, we investigate distinctions between domestic and foreign 
government ownership in the following section. 
 
3.6. Domestic Versus Foreign Government Ownership 
We hypothesize that domestic and foreign government investments are 
motivated by different sets of priorities. Our expectation is that the desire to maintain 
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 We group central and state development banks into the Govt protector category due to their 
stabilization role, particularly in domestic transactions. In some countries, however, central banks and 
their subsidiaries can be more investment-oriented. If we run the models in Table 25 shifting 
government banks to the Govt investor category, the coefficient estimates have equivalent signs as those 
reported and are slightly larger in magnitude. 
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high levels of employment and political concerns about market failures will strengthen 
the implicit debt guarantees offered by government shareholders on their domestic 
portfolio holdings. We also expect a weaker implicit debt guarantee to be provided by 
foreign government ownership since government influence in foreign markets should 
be more passive. Additionally, investments by foreign governments are more often 
commercially-oriented (i.e., motivated by profit-seeking) and thus are less likely to 
involve the creation of implicit debt guarantees. We expect the domestic government 
guarantee to play a larger and more beneficial role in influencing the cost of debt of 
government-owned firms, especially during the financial crisis.  
Results for the effect of domestic versus foreign government ownership on the 
cost of debt are presented in Table 26. Domestic government shareholders 
significantly decrease the cost of debt by approximately 70 bp during the recent 
financial crisis. We do not find a statistically significant link between the size of the 
stake owned by the domestic government and credit spreads, nor between domestic 
government ownership and credit spreads during the pre-crisis years, although all 
estimated coefficients are negative. Foreign government ownership, on the other hand, 
is strongly linked to an increase in the cost of debt. In the overall sample, foreign 
government presence is significantly positively related to the cost of debt during the 
full period (56 bp), and each percentage point increase in foreign government 
ownership is linked to an increase in the cost of debt by 2.5 bp. The effect is stronger 
during non-crisis years (with the coefficients on government presence and stake being 
74 bp and 3.8 bp, respectively) than during the crisis years (51 bp and 1.6 bp), yet the 
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estimated impact of foreign government ownership is consistently positive and 
statistically significant. 
Finally, Table 27 presents results for the influence of domestic and foreign 
government owners on the cost of debt of firms that issue non-investment-grade 
bonds. Domestic government ownership lowers the cost of debt by approximately 2 bp 
per additional percent owned during the 2008-2010 crisis period. On the other hand, 
the cost of debt is positively and significantly associated with the presence of foreign 
government ownership in all models, with estimates ranging from 164 bp during the 
pre-crisis period (Model 3) to 103 bp during 2008-2010 (Model 5). Further, spreads 
increase in the size of the foreign government stake by 4 bp (2.3 bp) per each 
additional percentage point of ownership during the pre-crisis (crisis) years. 
Overall, the distinction between domestic and foreign government ownership 
and between crisis and non-crisis years reveals that the effect of government 
ownership on the cost of debt can vary and that a pooled analysis risks obfuscating 
important nuances. In particular, our more detailed analysis indicates that domestic 
government ownership decreases the cost of debt of firms during crisis years, while 
foreign government ownership increases the cost of debt during both subperiods. 
Times of distress reveal the dominance of an implicit debt guarantee, especially 
valuable when default is more likely and specifically when the investor is a domestic 
government. Conversely, ownership by foreign governments yields ineffective 
monitoring and creates incentive distortions that prove particularly deleterious.  
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4. Conclusions 
 Our research examines how government ownership affects firms’ cost of debt. 
As documented by Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) and Brown and Dinç 
(2005), governments are generally reluctant to allow state-owned firms to default. 
Consequently, government ownership could provide an implicit debt guarantee 
reducing the chance of default and, hence, the cost of corporate debt. On the other 
hand, the implicit debt guarantee could induce moral hazard for managers, by reducing 
the probability of disciplinary replacement, by eliminating takeover threats, and by 
minimizing the risk of bankruptcy. Such an increase in moral hazard could lead to 
higher risk taking and, thus, to a higher cost of debt. Also, government ownership 
could increase the cost of debt by imposing social and political goals that reduce 
corporate profitability and increase default risk. Given these conflicting (yet not 
mutually exclusive) effects of government ownership on the cost of debt, the resulting 
impact is a matter deserving empirical investigation.  
In panel regressions, we analyze 5,048 yield spreads for a sample of 1,278 
bonds issued by 214 publicly traded firms subject to changes in government share 
ownership from 43 countries over 1991-2010. We initially find that the presence of a 
government shareholder is linked to a higher cost of debt compared to firm-years 
without government ownership, in the range of 30-40 bp, suggesting the investment 
distortions fostered by state owners. We also find that the effect of government 
ownership on cost of debt differs according to the size of the stake acquired. When 
considered together, our results indicate that the presence of a government shareholder 
increases the cost of debt by approximately 40 bp, but that the cost of debt decreases 
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by about 0.6 bp for each additional percentage point of state ownership. We conjecture 
that such a result is explained by the fact that a larger stake indicates a higher level of 
commitment and increases the likelihood of government support for firm-level debt 
issues, eventually outweighing the deleterious effects of state influence. 
We note that a government guarantee on the debt of investment targets can be 
more valuable during times of economic hardship as defaults are, all else equal, more 
likely during recessions. Focusing on the recent financial crisis, we find that 
government ownership affects the cost of debt differently in crisis versus non-crisis 
years. During non-crisis years, firms with the government as a shareholder display a 
61 bp increase in bond spreads. On the other hand, during the recent financial crisis, 
government presence is associated with an 18 bp decrease in spreads. We find similar 
results when adopting a broader definition of ‘financial crisis’ and consider the 
banking crises identified by Laeven and Valencia (2010).  
Since the value of a debt guarantee is greater the higher the likelihood of 
default, we further investigate the effects of government ownership focusing on firm-
specific distress, particularly on firms that issue non-investment-grade bonds and firms 
with high leverage. In both cases, we find results in line with the overall findings, but 
of greater magnitude. Government ownership for both firms issuing non-investment-
grade bonds and for highly-levered firms is associated with a higher cost of debt in 
non-crisis years and with a lower cost of debt during the financial crisis beginning in 
2008.  
To account for the non-random nature of government investments, we control 
for possible sample-selection biases with both two-stage (Heckman) sample-selection 
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models and an instrumental-variable approach. Our core results are robust to these 
endogeneity controls. We also perform tests using lagged values of government 
ownership and excluding ownership stakes linked to bailout transactions to alleviate 
concerns of reverse causality. 
Different government-owned entities vary in terms of objectives and modus 
operandi, and we show that their diverse goals impact the cost of debt differently. 
Generally, we find that government-owned investment entities (i.e., SWFs and state-
run pension funds) are associated with a higher cost of debt, while central and local 
government owners are associated with a lower cost of debt. Results are mixed for 
government-owned SOEs and highlight the problems fostered by state control (i.e., 
moral hazard) but also the value of government guarantees during times of distress. 
Overall, our evidence is consistent with the idea that certain government investors act 
as protectors, favoring political goals (typically inconsistent with firm default) and 
providing the strongest implicit debt guarantees. Increases in the cost of debt are 
mostly specific to financial arms of the government, whose objectives are more similar 
to those of other institutional investors (i.e., often commercial) and, as such, do not 
lead to a similar implied debt guarantee.  
We finally note that government guarantees should be strongest for domestic 
targets. Correspondingly, we find that the implicit debt guarantee documented during 
the recent financial crisis is specific to domestic government presence, which is 
associated with spreads that are 70 bp lower, on average. Conversely, foreign 
government ownership is associated with an increase in the cost of debt of about 56 bp 
for the full sample period. On balance, these results suggest that stock ownership by 
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domestic governments improves the perceived creditworthiness of corporate bond 
issuers by providing an implicit bond payment guarantee. This guarantee becomes 
especially valuable during a financial crisis or in the presence of firm-specific distress 
factors.  
In the aggregate, our results are consistent with the view that government 
ownership influences firm behavior through financial and governance channels, 
including debt guarantees and moral hazard. The magnitude and direction of the 
effects of state ownership depend on market-wide and firm-level distress factors, as 
well as the type of government acquirer and whether it is based locally or in another 
nation. In general, government ownership lowers the cost of debt during periods of 
economy-wide and firm-specific distress and particularly if the state investor is 
domestic or more closely related to the central government. But state ownership 
increases the cost of debt outside of periods of distress and especially if the 
government investor is foreign or more profit-oriented (e.g., SWFs). Our evidence is 
robust and accounts for sample-selection, indicating that government ownership is 
indeed a relevant factor for the cost of debt.  
We do not address the question whether this is a desirable outcome or a 
pernicious market distortion, which is better explored within a macroeconomic 
perspective, as our focus centers on the corporate finance issues. For instance, lower 
debt pricing driven by government stakes in bailed-out firms can come at the expense 
of other stakeholders, such as taxpayers. Also, while we indicate that the impact of 
government ownership is nuanced, depending on economy-wide and firm conditions 
and the type of investing government entity, we do not investigate further whether 
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specific government factors have different effects. We believe our study highlights the 
importance of fully investigating the impact of government ownership on the so far 
largely unexplored pricing of corporate debt, as we indicate that the effect is both 
statistically and economically significant. In broader terms, we contribute to the 
literature on bond pricing and indicate that the identity of shareholders is an important 
factor. 
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Chapter 3: Financial Trading, Spot Oil Prices, and Inventory: 
Evidence from the U.S. Crude Oil Market
20
 
While there has been considerable focus, especially in the aftermath of the 
2007-08 oil price spike, on the role of financial speculators in influencing oil prices,
21
 
a question that lies at the heart of this debate -- how oil futures trading is related to 
spot oil prices – remains unresolved. A financial speculator who expects future oil 
prices to rise and wants to take a speculative position based on this expectation would 
typically go long in financial futures contracts. An index investor who wants to invest 
in oil will take a similar long position in futures contracts, which would be rolled over 
periodically.
22
 If such speculative or investment activity increases the futures price 
sufficiently relative to the prevailing spot price,
23
 a rational market response would be 
for arbitrageurs to step in to buy oil in the spot market and store it while 
simultaneously selling futures.
24
 This “cash and carry” (C&C) arbitrage provides the 
mechanism that links oil futures and spot markets, since the withdrawal of oil from the 
market by arbitrageurs will cause spot prices to also increase.
25
 Accordingly, a number 
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 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Louis Ederington, Chitru Fernando and Thomas 
Lee. 
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 See, for example, U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2006), Masters (2008), 
Einloth (2009), Kaufmann and Ullman (2009), Sornette, Woodard, and Zhou (2009), Phillips and Yu 
(2010), Parsons (2010), and Singleton (2011). 
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 See, for example, Masters (2008). 
 
23
 Singleton (2011) provides evidence of a significant effect of such investor flows on futures prices 
during the 2006-2010 period. 
 
24
 This argument stems from standard financial market theory (reviewed in section 2) -- arbitrageurs 
have an incentive to simultaneously sell futures and buy oil in the spot market and put it in storage 
when the futures price exceeds the spot price by enough to cover net carrying costs (storage plus 
financing costs minus convenience yield), resulting in a riskless profit. 
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of studies argue that if financial speculators or index investors drive up futures prices 
that, in turn, elevates spot oil prices above the level dictated by supply-demand 
fundamentals, such an elevation in the oil price should be accompanied by a build-up 
in oil inventories.
26
  
However, the available evidence of such an inventory build-up during the 
sharp 2007-08 oil price increase is mixed at best. Studies by the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) (2008), International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2008), and Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Working Party on Agricultural 
Policies and Markets (2010) find no evidence of a speculative increase in crude oil 
inventories in 2007-2008. The Interagency Task Force on Commodity Markets 
(ITFCM) (2008) argues that oil inventories were near historical levels in 2006-2008, 
while Hamilton (2009) concludes “in late 2007 and the first half of 2008, when the 
[oil] price increases were most dramatic, inventories were significantly below 
normal.” Krugman (2008) makes the same point regarding the 2008 price run-up but 
does believe speculation contributed to higher prices in 2009 (Krugman, 2009). On the 
other hand, the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations (2006) argues 
that the behavior of inventories was consistent with speculation impacting cash prices 
and Einloth (2009) argues in support of a speculative build-up of inventory that 
accompanied the 2008 increase of oil prices from $100 to $140 a barrel but not during 
the preceding period.  
                                                                                                                                            
25
 Of course, in theory, financial speculators betting on a price run-up could also directly accumulate 
crude oil inventories, which would also increase spot oil prices. In practice, the higher financial 
leverage and lower transactions costs of trading futures relative to physical oil makes it much more 
likely that pure financial speculators will employ futures. 
 
26
 See, for example, ITFCM (2008), IMF (2008), IEA (2008), Krugman (2008), Hamilton (2009), Irwin, 
Sanders, and Merrin (2009), Smith (2009), and Kilian and Murphy (2010). 
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The prerequisite for an inventory build-up as predicted above is a viable and 
active C&C market in crude oil. The existence of such a market cannot be simply 
assumed since there are many limits to arbitrage that would impede the functioning of 
such a market, such as the unavailability of non-operational storage (i.e., storage that 
is not reserved for operating purposes), pipeline and other transportation constraints, 
and financing barriers.
27
 To our knowledge, there has been no in-depth research on the 
existence and functioning of a C&C market in oil, i.e., how oil inventories respond to 
changes in the futures-spot price spread, which should be the mechanism connecting 
financial market speculation and spot oil prices. 
This study focuses on the causal relationships between oil spot prices, futures 
prices and storage, specifically how storage is impacted by contango versus normal 
backwardation in oil futures prices. In other words, the study examines the relation 
between oil inventories and the spread between crude oil futures contracts.
28
 Gaining 
an in-depth knowledge of this relationship is an important topic for academics, energy 
companies and traders, policymakers, regulators, as well as the general public, since it 
can deepen our understanding of the factors that move oil prices. No direct connection 
exists between the financial futures and physical spot prices of crude oil as contracts 
are rarely settled through delivery (Smith, 2009; IEA, 2008). The physical crude oil 
market is a highly competitive market in which prices are set by supply and demand. 
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 See, for example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Etula (2010), and Acharya, Lochstoer, Ramadorai 
(2011). 
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 From here on out when we refer to spread, we mean the spread between two crude oil contracts of 
different maturity. Typically, we will be referring to the spread between the two- and the one-month 
crude future contracts.  The reasoning for this selection is provided in Section 3.2.1. The results of the 
study hold with other spread specifications also; in particular, the spread between the one-month future 
and the spot price, as well as the spread between the three- and one-month crude future contracts. 
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Thus, if crude oil futures trading impacts physical prices, it must do so by impacting 
either the physical supply or the physical demand. This puzzle of showing how 
financial futures influence physical spot prices is highlighted by Hamilton (2009), who 
notes that “The key intellectual challenge for such an explanation [of how future 
prices influence the associated spot commodity] is to reconcile…the price path with 
what is happening to the physical quantities of petroleum demanded and supplied.” 
Thus, the financial futures market influences the physical spot prices by altering either 
the real physical demand or supply of crude oil. This study tests whether this influence 
can be traced through inventories. Smith (2009) advocates that, “The only avenue by 
which speculative trading might raise spot prices is if it incites participants in the 
physical market to hold oil off the market – either by amassing large inventories or by 
shutting in production.” This paper tests if crude oil inventories increase (decrease) 
when the futures spread is positive (negative).  
While the relation between futures spreads and inventory is not his primary 
focus, Singleton (2011) provides preliminary evidence of an active U.S. C&C market 
by graphing the relationship between the spread across two- and four-month futures 
prices and the level of U.S. crude oil inventories, which suggests a tendency 
throughout the 2004-2009 period for inventories to increase when the futures market is 
in contango.
29
 He notes also that this graphical pattern is even stronger when inventory 
levels from Cushing or Petroleum Administration for Defense District 2 (PADD2), the 
district which includes Cushing, are used. However, while he includes inventory 
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 Singleton’s (2011) focus is on explaining returns in crude oil futures markets, which he shows were 
significantly affected by investor flows (specifically index investors and managed-money accounts) into 
the oil futures markets around the time of the 2008 oil price spike. 
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changes as a conditioning variable in his formal analysis, he finds that the explanatory 
power is weak.  
Einloth (2009) evaluates the relationship between spreads and inventories in 
his study of the role of speculation in the 2008 oil price behavior. However, he does 
not use inventories directly but rather the convenience yield as a proxy for inventories, 
derived from the prices of Brent crude oil futures. Additionally, in using the pricing of 
Brent futures to predict U.S. crude oil inventories, Einloth (2009) assumes a 
frictionless global oil market that, as our results suggest, may not be valid even within 
the continental U.S. In contrast, we minimize the effect of basis issues in our study by 
using the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) futures spreads to predict U.S. crude oil 
inventories, while carefully accounting for international oil flows that link the U.S. 
market with the global market. Doing so also minimizes the effect of storage 
measurement errors highlighted by Einloth (2009) and Singleton (2011). Additionally, 
we include controls that impact inventory levels and prices, such as supply and 
demand shocks, and other factors that influence inventories directly. We also perform 
a comprehensive analysis of which futures prices matter and which inventories are 
impacted, and investigate whether inventory levels adjust immediately to predicted 
levels or do so with a time lag. We therefore extend the current literature on 
inventories, spreads and the arbitrage role of inventories. 
We find that over the 2004-2011 period crude oil inventories at Cushing were a 
significant positive function of the spread between the two- and one-month New York 
Mercantile Exchange West Texas Intermediate (NYMEX WTI) crude oil futures with 
a lag. We also find that over the 1992-2004 period (before the Cushing inventories 
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were reported separately), total U.S. non-Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) 
inventories and PADD2 inventories were positive functions of lagged spreads. 
However, over the 2004-2011 period, neither total U.S. non-SPR inventories nor 
PADD2 inventories are significant functions of the spread once Cushing inventories 
are removed. None of the other four PADD inventories are significantly related to the 
spread over either period. Current crude oil inventories appear to be influenced by 
spreads over the last eight weeks or so. Our interpretation of this finding is that current 
spreads likely lead to contracts for forward delivery which do not result in a change in 
actual stock levels until delivery occurs sometime in the future. We observe basically 
the same results whether examining inventory levels or changes, and these results 
remain robust when we use different measures of the spread. We further find evidence 
that total U.S and most individual PADD inventories (but not at Cushing) are a 
negative (positive) function of the change in current (next week) refinery inputs and a 
positive (negative) function of the current (next week) imports. These results indicate 
that storage operators are able to partially anticipate crude oil shortages and surpluses 
and adjust their inventories accordingly. These findings establish, to our knowledge, 
the first tangible evidence documented in the literature of a causal link between oil 
futures and spot markets via inventory changes resulting from arbitrage, and raise 
several important questions for future research. In particular, our findings suggest that 
it would be fruitful for researchers looking to understand the impact of financial 
traders on the spot markets, especially the twin questions of (a) whether financial 
traders exacerbate or attenuate spot price volatility, and (b) whether they 
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systematically affect the spot oil price level, to study the behavior of the C&C market 
over time. 
We review the theoretical foundations of our study and discuss their empirical 
implications in the next section. We discuss our data in Section 2 and specification 
issues in Section 3. We present our estimation of the crude oil inventory adjustment 
lag structure in Section 4. Our main results are presented in Section 5 and our 
robustness checks are in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.  
 
1. The Theoretical Link between Inventories and the Futures-Spot Spread, 
and Empirical Implications 
Inventories are connected to the spread through what is known as cash-and-
carry (C&C) arbitrage. If the current (time t) futures price for delivery at time t+s, 
F(t,t+s), exceeds the current spot price, S(t), by more than the cost of storing oil from t 
to t+s (including transaction costs and net of any convenience yield) plus interest, 
SC(t, t+s), arbitrageurs can make a riskless profit by buying oil in the spot market for 
S(t), simultaneously shorting the futures contract at price F(t,t+s), and storing the oil. 
At time t+s, they can deliver on the futures contract collecting F(t, t+s).
30
 Their time 
t+s profits adjusting for interest costs on the time t expenses are F(t,t+s) – 
[S(t)+SC(t,t+s)](1+r)
s
.
31
 For example, if crude oil spot price is $90, the one month 
futures price is $100 and the cost of storage is $6; it would make sense to sell the 
futures contract, purchase spot crude oil and store it for a month and then deliver on 
                                                 
30
 Due to convergence at maturity, actual delivery on the futures contract is not necessary. Arbitrage 
profits are approximately the same if the arbitrageur longs the futures contract at time t+s and sells in 
the spot market. 
 
31
 This specification assumes the storage costs are paid at time t. 
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their futures contract, at a profit of about $4 per trade. Such arbitrage is profitable and 
oil inventories would be expected to rise at time t and fall at time t+s when 
F(t,t+s) > [S(t)+SC(t,t+s)](1+r)
s
. 
This issue is important because it is the nexus between oil futures trading and 
physical oil prices. If we accept that physical energy prices, e.g., gasoline at the pump 
or oil at the wellhead, are determined by supply and demand, then C&C arbitrage is 
the mechanism through which futures market speculation could impact physical or 
spot prices.
32
 If futures speculation pushes the futures price up enough to set off the 
arbitrage described in the previous paragraph, then the demand for oil and the spot 
price will tend to rise at time t when arbitrageurs buy oil to put into storage, and fall at 
time t+s when the oil comes out of storage thereby increasing the supply on the spot 
market.  
While we have discussed C&C arbitrage from the point of view of a pure 
arbitrageur, a similar relationship holds for oil companies, pipelines, and others in the 
oil industry. When F(t,t+s) > [S(t)+SC(t,t+s)](1+r)
s
, oil companies and others have an 
incentive to store and sell oil forward rather than sell in the spot market. Likewise, if 
F(t,t+s) is far below [S(t)+SC(t,t+s)](1+r)
s
 they have an incentive to draw down 
inventories by selling at time t. As noted above, SC(t, t+s) is net of any convenience 
yield, which is more important for oil firms. Producers, refiners, and marketers hold 
working inventories as buffers against supply interruptions and fluctuations in 
demand. When inventory levels are low, they run the risk of a stop-out or shortage. 
Thus there is an advantage or convenience yield to holding inventory. As inventories 
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 Futures prices could also influence long-run supply by impacting drilling activity today or long-run 
demand by impacting conservation decisions but C&C arbitrage is the main short-run connection. 
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are reduced, the risk of a stop-out rises, raising the convenience yield and lowering 
SC(t,t+s). When inventories increase, the risk of a stop-out falls, lowering the 
convenience yield and raising SC(t,t+s). Thus, as Einloth (2009) and others point out, 
SC(t,t+s) varies positively with the inventory level and an ever-increasing difference 
between the futures price and the cash price is required to induce continued cash-and 
carry arbitrage when F(t,t+s) > [S(t)+SC(t,t+s)](1+r)
s
.
33
  
Speculative inventory levels should be related to past as well as current 
futures-spot price spreads. If the time t futures price for delivery at time t+s, F(t,t+s), 
exceeds the time t futures price for delivery at time t+v, F(t,t+v), where s > v, by more 
than the cost of storage from v to s, SC(t+v, t+s), plus interest, arbitrageurs can make a 
riskless profit by simultaneously (at time t) longing the t+v futures contact at price F(t, 
t+v) and shorting the t+s futures contract at price F(t,t+s). At time t+v, they would 
take delivery on the t+v contract paying F(t, t+v) and store. At time t+s, they would 
deliver on the t+s contract receiving F(t, t+s). Their time t+s profits adjusting for the 
interest or opportunity costs of the time t expenses would be F(t,t+s) – 
[F(t,t+v)+SC(t+v,t+s)](1+r)
s-v
. Thus such arbitrage is profitable and oil inventories 
would be expected to rise at time t+v and fall at time t+s when  
F(t,t+s) > [F(t, t+v)+SC(t+v,t+s)](1+r)
s-v
. 
Note that in this case, there is no immediate change in inventories. Also, in this 
case physical prices tend to be pushed up at future time t+v when the oil is taken off 
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 During prolonged contango markets additional crude storage facilities can be constructed which 
would decrease SC(t,t+s) allowing the futures-spot spread to remain at lower levels in order to achieve 
profitable C&C arbitrage. 
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the market and placed in storage and pushed downward at time t+s when the oil comes 
out of storage and back on the market. 
Considerable anecdotal evidence indicates that C&C arbitrage occurs. For 
instance, several newspaper articles published in 2007 described increasing and 
decreasing levels of inventory at Cushing, OK, the NYMEX delivery point for the 
WTI contract, and related the activity to the C&C type arbitrage.
34
 The time-series 
relation between the futures spread and Cushing inventories is graphed in Figure 1. 
Note that Cushing inventories are positively correlated with the futures spread as 
predicted by C&C arbitrage. Note also the sharp increase in storage capacity between 
2004 and 2011, which some reports tie to building additional capacity for C&C 
arbitrage.
35
 
As noted by the IEA (2008) and others, given the central role that inventories 
play in the futures price - cash price nexus and the significant interest in the question 
of how much, if at all, speculation impacts physical oil prices, it is surprising how 
little research has been done on the relation between the futures-spot spread, F(t,t+s)- 
S(t)(1+r)
s
, or for simplicity F(t,t+s)-S(t), and inventories. While some studies have 
noted simple correlations between inventories and F(t,t+s)-S(t), a careful multivariate 
approach is needed for several reasons. First, without controlling for other factors that 
impact inventories, simple correlations do not establish that inventory levels are 
responding to the futures-spot spread. Suppose, for instance, that demand falls 
unexpectedly. In that case, inventories would rise and S(t) would tend to fall raising 
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 Davis, Ann “Where Has All the Oil Gone?” Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2007. 
 
35
 While we do not have direct data on Cushing, OK storage capacity, the amount of crude oil stored in 
Cushing between April 9, 2004 and April 8, 2011 increased by 259%, from 11,677 to 41,896 thousand 
barrels.  
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F(t,t+s)-S(t). Thus inventory levels and F(t,t+s)-S(t) would move together but not 
because inventories are responding to F(t,t+s)-S(t), and their correlation would not 
constitute evidence that futures speculation impacts cash prices through inventory 
behavior. Studies that carefully examine how oil futures prices impact spot prices 
through inventory and production controlling for other changes in supply and demand 
appear warranted. Second, as explained above, current inventory levels and changes 
should be a function of past, as well as current, futures and spot spreads. Third, most 
crude oil inventories are held for operational purposes, rather than for speculation or 
arbitrage, so controlling for factors that influence operational inventory levels should 
enable better estimates of the impact of the futures spread. 
 
2. Data  
In order to estimate the relationship between the spread and crude oil 
inventories, we obtain weekly ending inventories of crude oil for: 1) U.S., excluding 
the SPR, the five PADD districts, and Cushing from the Energy Information 
Administration (EIA) website from 9/11/1992 (4/09/2004 for Cushing) through 
7/08/2011. We also obtain weekly data on U.S. oil production levels, imports, refinery 
inputs, NYMEX WTI future contracts for the first four months, and Cushing WTI spot 
prices. The variables used are described in Table 30; their descriptive statistics are in 
Table 31, while the correlations between different variables are in Table 32. 
Crude oil is traded on both the spot and the futures market. In the U.S., crude 
oil futures trade primarily on the NYMEX. The main crude oil futures contract is for 
the WTI grade of crude oil and it settles at Cushing, OK. While a variety of spot 
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locations are priced, their prices are typically perceived in terms of the basis to the 
NYMEX WTI crude oil price. A variety of crude oil counterparties, both producers 
and users, need to buy and sell crude oil physically in the spot market. However, if 
they need to hedge their exposure forward they need to participate in the futures 
market. Trading in the WTI crude oil contract ceases on the third business day prior to 
the 25
th
 calendar day of the prior month. For example, trading in the August contract 
ceases near the end of July. Thus traders who do not wish to make or take delivery of 
WTI crude oil at Cushing must reverse their positions prior to this date. If they do not 
reverse, physical delivery of settled crude oil occurs at Cushing, OK, over the full 
length of the contract month, i.e., August in our example.  
Cushing, OK is a special location for crude oil contracts because physical 
settlement of the future market transactions occurs there. The other crude oil districts 
in the U.S., which are the five Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts 
(PADD’s) that the entire U.S. territory is broken into, are equally important especially 
from the standpoint of product supply and distribution.
36
 PADD 1 covers the East 
coast, PADD 2 the Midwest, including Cushing, PADD 3 the Gulf Coast, PADD 4 the 
Rocky Mountains and PADD 5 the West Coast.
37
 Given that the futures crude oil 
contract settles at Cushing, OK, the traders involved in C&C arbitrage have an 
incentive (as discussed below) to locate their storage facilities there. While operational 
drivers of crude oil inventory are important in all PADDs, the spread and its influence 
on inventory via C&C arbitrage should be most observable in Cushing.  
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 The PADD’s were originally created during World War II for gasoline rationing. 
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 PADD 3 is home to the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) which is a large reserve created for 
national security purposes. The data used in this study excludes crude used for SPR inventories due to 
the nature of these reserves. 
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We have contacted several pipeline and storage operators at Cushing, OK, 
concerning common institutional arrangements, such as delivery mechanisms and 
contracts, and speculative strategies. Of the major operators in Cushing, we have 
interviewed representatives from Plains All American Pipeline, Magellan and 
Enterprise. All of the above firms lease out storage to customers mainly via longer-
term full tank leases or capacity leases. The tank leases are typically done for five year 
periods. Capacity leases allow several customers to have common stream crude oil in 
the tank. The main customers for storage leases are refineries, but Exploration and 
Production (E&P) firms, large physical oil trading firms, as well as trading arms of 
different banks also lease storage. The operators also said that crude oil deliveries are 
scheduled months ahead and trading in the spot market occurs in emergency 
situations. This influenced our choice of the spread for this study. 
The data series on crude oil inventory levels exhibit unit roots, which may be 
due in part to persistent time trends in the data. To avoid issues with unit roots in 
crude oil inventory levels, we use changes in inventory (first difference) in all our 
analysis reported here.
38
 
 
3. Specification Issues 
In specifying the model to estimate the relationship between crude oil 
inventories and spread, we face four issues. First, since there are numerous futures 
contracts with different maturities, it is important to address the question of which of 
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 We have replicated the analysis reported in this paper using inventory levels data that is detrended 
and seasonally adjust using a process available from the authors. The results using the detrended levels 
data, which largely support the conclusions from the change data, are available upon request.  
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these contracts should be used to measure the spread -- the nearby contract, the futures 
contact maturing in two months or in three months, etc. Second, what is the 
appropriate lag and lag structure? In other words, does a change in the futures-spot 
spread impact inventory levels quickly or does it take some time? Third, what 
inventory data should we focus on? Fourth, how should spurious correlation or 
endogeneity be controlled for? As described below, unexpected shifts in supply and 
demand should impact both spot oil prices (and hence the futures-spot spread) and oil 
inventory levels. Thus, if not controlled for, the estimation might pick up this spurious 
correlation instead of the impact of the spread on inventories. We next discuss our 
thoughts on and approach to each of these. 
 
3.1. Futures-Spot and Futures-Futures Spreads 
 Most of the time, prices of the nearby futures contract and the Cushing WTI 
spot price are approximately the same except during the roll period; therefore, the 
spread between them is of little use for our analysis. Spreads between the spot price 
and the price of any other futures contract, and between prices of different maturity 
futures, could conceivably set off C&C arbitrage. For example, if the third month 
futures exceeds the spot by more than storage and transaction costs, that could also set 
off C&C arbitrage and an increase in inventory levels. Or if the third month futures 
exceeds the second month futures by more than storage plus transaction costs, 
arbitrageurs could contract to take delivery in the second month and deliver in the 
third, so inventories would increase a month in the future. Similarly, if the two-month 
ahead futures price exceeds the one-month ahead futures price by more than storage 
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plus transaction costs, C&C arbitrage could take place as arbitrageurs contract to take 
delivery in the next month and deliver a month after next. Hence in our view, the 
question of the best spread to use is an empirical one. 
As it turns out the market is normally in continuous backwardation or contango 
over the first few months so that the different spreads are highly correlated. For 
instance, the correlation of the spread between the second month contract and the spot 
and the spread between the third month contract and the spot is 0.982. The correlation 
between the third-month-spot spread and the fourth-month-spot spread is 0.995. Hence 
it makes little difference which spread we use; any one spread tends to pick up the 
effect of all on inventory levels. Storage operators in Cushing explained during our 
conversations that only emergency trading is done in the spot market and most crude 
oil deliveries are scheduled a month ahead. Therefore, we chose to use the spread 
between the two- and the one-month crude oil future contracts. This spread also has 
fewer outliers than the two-month ahead to spot spread while the correlation between 
the two is 0.942. The correlation between the actual spot price and the one-month 
ahead future contract is 0.9999. Therefore, most of the changes in the spot price are 
reflected in the one-month futures with the exception of those that are very temporary 
in nature and are not expected to persist past the current month. Here we report results 
for the spread defined as the difference between the two- and the one-month crude oil 
future contracts but the results are virtually the same using the two-month to spot 
spread, three-month to spot and three-month to one-month spread. 
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3.2. Lag Structure 
 In estimating the relationship between the futures spread and crude oil 
inventories, one issue is what lags to expect between the spread and inventories and 
how to specify the lag structure. As explained earlier, we expect today’s inventory 
levels to depend on past spreads since current changes in inventories may be due to 
contracts signed weeks or months ago. As noted previously, we have also reached out 
to major storage operators at Cushing to ascertain common delivery arrangements and 
representative storage and transaction costs.  
As we see it, if today’s spread is sufficient to set off C&C arbitrage, it may be 
weeks or days before inventories increase since we only observe actual physical 
changes in inventories, not the contracts being executed for future delivery. For 
example, on July 5, 2011 the Cushing spot price was $96.89 and NYMEX futures 
prices were: $96.89 for August 2011, $97.38 for September; and $97.87 for October 
2011. While we are seeking hard data on storage costs, a fairly common rough 
estimate is about $0.40 a barrel per month which would place the July 5 futures price 
structure above the breakeven point for profitable C&C arbitrage. July crude oil 
deliveries were scheduled at the end of June, so if traders want to take non-emergency 
delivery of crude oil they have to purchase the August contract. If we assume for the 
moment that storage and transaction costs for the August contract were about $0.40 
per month so that C&C arbitrage would be profitable, arbitrageurs might purchase oil 
for delivery in August and simultaneously short the September futures. In this case 
inventories would rise over the month of August, meaning anytime between one to 
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eight weeks from today.
39
 The October-September spread is also fairly large so 
another alternative is that today arbitrageurs might long the September contract, while 
shorting the October contract, and subsequently take delivery on the September 
contract in September, and make delivery on the October contract in October. In this 
case, inventories would not rise until September even though the contracts are set in 
July. Thus, lags of several weeks or even months are quite likely, but beyond that it is 
hard to say what the lag relationship is. Our interviews with storage operators suggest 
that in general, the lag could be anywhere from one to nine weeks but do not provide 
more specificity beyond that. Thus we turn to the data to see what the lags look like. 
 
3.3. Choice of Inventory Locations 
 While C&C arbitrage is possible utilizing storage at any location, storage at 
Cushing offers the arbitrageur significant advantages. Suppose that at time t, an 
arbitrageur buys and stores the oil at location X and shorts the futures contract 
maturing at time t+s. At time t+s, she transports the oil to Cushing and delivers on the 
futures contract. In order to be profitable, the futures contract must exceed the location 
spot price by more than the cost of storage plus the cost of transporting the oil. In 
addition to arranging storage the arbitrageur must arrange transportation as well.  
                                                 
39
 Trading in the WTI crude contract ceases on the third business day prior to the 25th calendar day of 
the prior month. For example, August 2011 contract would have stop trading and settled physically on 
July 20, 2011 and then delivery would get scheduled between August 1 and August 31. So, if an August 
2011 crude future is purchased on July 5
th
, it can get delivered anytime between August 1 and August 
31. That implies a waiting time between the trade and actual inventory increase in Cushing of four to 
eight weeks. However, if the August 2011 crude future was purchased on July19, 2011 then the waiting 
time between the trade and actual inventory increase in Cushing would be between one and a half and 
six and a half weeks. 
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Instead of delivering the oil to Cushing, the arbitrageur may buy, store, and sell 
the oil at location X. In this arbitrage, she shorts the futures at the beginning of the 
arbitrage and longs the same futures contract shortly before trading ceases. As long as 
the basis or differential between the price at location X and Cushing is constant, this 
strategy is profitable if and only if the futures-spot or futures-futures spread exceeds 
the cost of storage (at location X). However, if the basis changes over time, then the 
profitability is uncertain. In other words, C&C arbitrage utilizing storage and delivery 
at non-Cushing locations involves a basis risk which is not present if the storage and 
delivery are at Cushing.
40
 For this reason, we focus particular attention on Cushing 
inventories but also examine the impact of the spread on storage away from Cushing. 
 
3.4. Controlling for Spurious Correlation 
 A fourth issue in estimating the relationship between the spread and crude oil 
inventories is how to correct for the spurious correlation caused by unforeseen shifts in 
supply and demand. For instance, if there is an unforeseen increase in demand, this 
would tend to lead to a fall in crude oil inventories and at the same time an increase in 
spot prices, which would mean a fall in the spread. Hence a positive correlation 
between changes in the spread and changes in inventories would be observed but due 
to the impact of the demand shift on both prices and inventories - not to C&C 
arbitrage. Likewise a sudden unforeseen increase in supply would tend to cause a 
simultaneous increase in crude oil inventories and in the spread. To control for this to 
the extent possible, we include the changes over the current week in: 1) U.S. crude oil 
                                                 
40
 On the other hand, storage may be less expensive away from Cushing. 
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production levels, 2) imports (overall net and by PADD), and 3) refinery inputs 
(overall and by PADD) between weeks t-1 and t. Consider the change in refinery 
inputs. The change from the previous week consists of a planned or expected change 
plus the unplanned or unexpected change. If refinery production increases 
unexpectedly, this would lead to an unexpected decline in crude oil inventories. Thus 
to the extent part of the change in refinery inputs is unexpected, we expect it to be 
negatively correlated with the change in crude oil inventories. Similarly, to the extent 
changes in U.S. crude oil production and imports are unexpected, we expect them to 
be positively correlated with changes in crude oil inventories. In addition, we include 
the change in the spot WTI price as an additional variable separate from the spread. If 
an unexpected change in demand or supply is viewed as temporary, it will tend to 
impact the spot price but not the futures price. Thus this variable should have a 
negative coefficient and pick up additional unforeseen shifts in supply and demand 
which impact both the spread and crude oil inventories. Note that if the shift is seen as 
permanent so that both spot and futures prices change, there is no spurious correlation 
problem. 
While including current week changes in refinery inputs, imports, and 
production as independent variables helps control for correlation between changes in 
the spread and changes in inventory induced by unforeseen shifts in supply and 
demand, coefficients of these variables must be interpreted with caution. We cannot 
distinguish between expected and unexpected changes in these variables. By 
definition, if the data is perfect, the change in inventories this week is equal to the 
level of imports plus the level of production minus the level of refinery inputs. Since 
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the levels of imports, production, and refinery inputs are by definition equal to the sum 
of all current and past changes in these variables, there is a small built-in positive 
correlation between current changes in imports and production and the change in 
inventories, and a small built-in negative correlation between change in refinery inputs 
and the change in inventories. Thus positive coefficients for current week changes in 
production and imports and negative coefficients for refinery inputs need not 
necessarily indicate an effect of unforeseen changes in supply and demand on 
inventories.  
We also seek to control for other factors that impact desired inventories at time 
t. Of course, operational inventories are held to bridge any gap or mismatch between 
supply and demand. Specifically, refineries hold inventories to bridge mismatches 
between their crude oil supplies and refinery needs. If refinery draws are expected to 
be larger next week than the combined production and imports supply, then there 
would be a tendency to hold large current inventories in order to “stock up” for next 
week. Likewise, if next week’s production and imports are expected to be higher than 
refinery needs, current inventory levels should be smaller. While we cannot observe 
expected future imports, production, and refinery imports we can observe ex post 
levels and changes. Viewing the actual change as proxies for expected changes, we 
add lead measures of the changes in refinery inputs, U.S. crude oil production and 
imports over the week from t to t+1 to our set of independent variables. Note that the 
expected signs for these lead variables are opposite to those for the current week. We 
expect a negative coefficient for the current week change in refinery inputs and a 
positive coefficient for the change next week. We expect positive coefficients for 
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current week’s changes in imports and production and negative for the changes next 
week. The rationale for the current week variables is to pick up the effect of 
unexpected changes on actual inventories; the rationale for the lead variables is to pick 
up the effect of expected future changes in these variables on desired inventories. 
 
4. Polynomial Distributed Lag Estimation of the Spread on Crude Oil 
Inventory 
 We examine the influence of the change in the spread on the change in 
inventories. Expecting some seasonality in inventory patterns, we control for this with 
dummy independent variables. Since 52 separate weekly dummy variables are neither 
feasible nor appropriate, we assume that any seasonality can be captured by a 
polynomial form. First, we define weekly dummy variables as follows: w1 = 1 if the 
observation is the first week in January and 0 otherwise, w2 = 1 if the observation is 
for the second week in January and 0 otherwise, and so forth through w52 = 1 the last 
week in December and 0 otherwise. We then specify five dummy variables zk where z1 
is a zero-degree polynomial of the wi’s, z2 is a first degree polynomial, z3 is a second 
degree polynomial, z4 is a third degree polynomial, and z5 a fourth degree polynomial. 
The graph of storage pattern from the z variables is presented in Figure 2 for Cushing 
and Figure 3 for the U.S. and the z variables are defined in the following manner: 
1 1 2 3 52
2 1 2 3 52
2 2 2
3 1 2 3 52
3 3 3
4 1 2 3 52
4 4 4
5 1 2 3 52
(picked up by the intercept)
2 3 52
2 3 52
2 3 52
2 3 52
z w w w w
z w w w w
z w w w w
z w w w w
z w w w w
             
           
          
          
            
116 
 
We estimate the impact of the change in spreads up to twelve weeks ago on the 
change in current inventory using the following model:  
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 (1) 
where ∆STOCKi,t is the change in inventories between weeks t-1 and t at one 
of the following locations i: U.S., Cushing, PADD1-PADD5, as well as U.S. without 
Cushing and PADD 2 without Cushing. Zk,t variables control for seasonality and are 
created as described above, ∆SPREAD j,t is the change in the spread between the two- 
and one-month WTI crude oil future contracts and its lags going back twelve weeks, 
and ΔYj,i,t represents other possible factors j impacting inventories in region i, 
including current and lead changes in imports, production, and refinery inputs. In 
addition, but not shown in Equation (1), autoregressive and moving average lagged 
error terms are included as needed to remove autocorrelation in the residuals. 
As discussed above, in the absence of measurement error, the change in 
inventories for the U.S. (including SPR) would equal imports plus production minus 
refinery inputs. Thus including flow levels of these variables would result in built-in 
correlation. Instead of flow levels, we include changes in import, production, and 
refinery input flows in ΔYj,i,t to capture changes in inventories. These variables 
smooth out temporary mismatches between (a) crude oil additions plus production and 
imports, and (b) crude oil withdrawals minus the refinery intake. Not only current but 
also coming week changes in these variables are included. Next week, or lead, 
variables are utilized as proxies for expected changes in crude oil additions and 
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withdrawals. We anticipate that the change in inventories should be a positive function 
of the changes in imports and U.S. production over the current week and a negative 
function of the changes in these two variables over the coming week. The change in 
inventories should be a negative function of the change in refinery inputs this week 
and a positive function of the change in refinery inputs next week.  
In order to impose some structure on the spread coefficients and improve the 
efficiency with which they are estimated, we condense the twelve lagged spread 
variables in Equation (1) to four. Accordingly, we estimate a polynomial distributed 
lag (PDL) model in which the coefficients of the lagged spreads follow a fourth degree 
polynomial. PDLj is a j-1 degree polynomial of the twelve lagged spread. In other 
words, PDL1 is a zero degree polynomial, PDL2 a first degree polynomial, etc. Details 
of the structure are available in Appendix 1. Therefore, our final model is: 
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5. Results 
The weekly change in Cushing inventory is a positive function of the change in 
the current and past spreads but changes in other PADDs’ inventory are not. Changes 
in PADD 2 inventories, which include Cushing, are a significant function of change in 
the spread when the inventory figures include Cushing, but not when Cushing 
inventories are excluded. Similarly, changes in overall U.S. (non-SPR) inventories are 
a positive function of spread 1992-2004 but not for the 2004-2011 period. The 
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implication is that, at least since 2004, C&C arbitrage is largely concentrated at 
Cushing.  
 
5.1. Cushing Results 
 Estimation results for Equation (2) are presented in Tables 33, 34, 35 and 36 
for weekly changes in inventories at Cushing, U.S. non-SPR, PADD 2, and PADDs 1, 
3, 4, 5, respectively. The Cushing equation is estimated from 4/16/2004, when the 
Cushing data is first available, to 7/8/2011. Equations for other areas are estimated 
over various periods including 1992-2011. ΔPDL coefficients shown in Panel A of the 
tables are for the polynomial variables calculated from the spread changes over the 
current and twelve past weeks. Their joint significance is tested with the Wald p-
values shown at the bottom of Panel A of the tables. Panel B of the tables shows the 
implied coefficients for the twelve lagged spread differences calculated from the 
ΔPDL coefficients in the top of the tables. Thus, in Table 33 Panel B, the coefficient 
for the current spread is 282.03, the coefficient for last week’s spread is 324.29, and 
the coefficient for the week before that is 333.20. Above we argued that due to 
delivery arrangements, there may be a considerable delay between the arbitrage trades 
in response to the spread and the actual change in crude oil inventories since we 
observe actual inventories but not contracts for future delivery. The estimated 
coefficient pattern in the bottom part of Table 33 is certainly consistent with this. 
Indeed, coefficients for the spreads two, three and four weeks ago are actually higher 
than the coefficient for the current week. 
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The lag pattern shown in Panel B of Table 33 shows that we observe positive 
inventory changes through at least the first eight weeks. The largest increases are 
observed over the first four weeks or so. Then the increases start declining. Cushing 
results in Table 33 imply that a one- time $0.10 increase in the spread leads to a 
positive change in inventories of about 28,203 barrels the first week, approximately 
153,241 barrels after four weeks, and 211,142 barrels after nine weeks.   
Cushing data is only available from 2004-2011 and the Cushing results 
reported in Table 33 pertain to this period. Model 1 evaluates actual changes in 
Cushing inventories, while Model 2 pertains to a modified version where Cushing 
inventory changes are winsorized at the 1% level to control for outliers. Cushing 
inventory changes are mainly explained by the spread. No operational variables, other 
than U.S. oil production, significantly influence Cushing inventory changes. The 
removal of the PDL spread lags from the regressions drops the adjusted R
2
 for 
Cushing models by 55% from 15% to 7%. However, the same removal for overall 
U.S. (non-SPR), PADD 1, 3, 4, and 5, and PADD2 non-Cushing inventories decreases 
the adjusted R
2
 only slightly, if at all. The overall results are similar when the change 
in Cushing inventories is winsorized. Table 33 also shows evidence of a seasonal 
pattern in Cushing inventories as reflected in the z variable coefficients.  
The graph of the Cushing seasonal pattern in inventories as implied by the z 
variables is presented in Figure 2. The pattern of inventory levels shows a short period 
of crude oil withdrawal from storage at the beginning of the year (weeks 1-3) after 
which inventory additions begin (week 4) and last through May (week 20), at which 
point withdrawals resume and continue through autumn, with additions to storage 
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resuming in late autumn (week 40) and persisting through the end of the year. Figure 
2(a) also shows that inventory levels in Cushing have grown significantly over 2004-
2011 as more storage facilities have been built. The average annual inventory increase 
is shown by the difference in the starting and ending points of the inventory “level” 
series. Figure 2(b) adjusts for this capacity increase by normalizing the graph scale in 
Figure 2(a) to start and end at the same level, and shows the seasonal pattern on this 
adjusted scale.  
 
5.2. Results for Total U.S. Above-Ground, On-Shore Storage 
Results for the U.S. (non-SPR) change in inventories are presented in Table 34. 
In Model 1, we present estimations of Equation (2) for the full 1992-2011 period and, 
in Model 1-winsorized, we use the same data as in Model 1 but winsorize the 
dependent variable—the change in U.S. inventories--at the 1% level. In Table 34 
Model 2 we estimate the equation for the 1992-2004 period, over which separate 
Cushing storage data is unavailable. In Model 3, Equation (2) is estimated over the 
2004-2011 period, including Cushing storage inventories and in Model 4, over 2004-
2011, excluding Cushing. The changes in the spread are significant in explaining U.S. 
inventory changes in Models 1-2 for the 1992-2011 and 1992-2004 periods 
respectively, but not in Models 3-4 which cover the 2004-2011 period. However, over 
2004-2011, the change in spread is the main significant explanatory variable for 
Cushing inventory changes, as shown in Table 33. This indicates that the seeming 
relationship between the U.S. (non-SPR) change in inventories and the spread is 
largely driven by Cushing inventories. 
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As shown in Table 34, the spread is not significant in explaining overall U.S. 
(non-SPR) inventories over 2004-2011, whether or not Cushing inventories are 
included in the total. Consistent with this, as reported in Table 36, none of the PADD 
1, 3, 4 or 5 district inventories appear influenced by the spread. Combined with the 
findings from Table 3 that Cushing inventories are a significant positive function of 
the spread over 2004-2011, this indicates to us that most C&C arbitrage in recent years 
has been confined to Cushing. However, it bears noting that the inventory figures 
include above-ground on-shore inventories only. We cannot rule out C&C arbitrage 
involving off-shore storage in tankers, or producers opting to leave oil in the ground in 
response to the futures spread. 
The insignificant result in Model 3 of Table 34 could be due to the largely 
operational role of inventories outside Cushing since the operating parameters are very 
significant). Model 3 of Table 34 reports U.S. results over 2004-2011 with Cushing 
included but shows that the spread is not significant in explaining inventory. In 
contrast, Model 3 of Table 35 reports PADD2 results over 2004-2011 with Cushing 
included and shows that spread is significant. The implication here is that when 
Cushing is included in overall U.S. numbers, it loses power to explain overall U.S. 
inventory changes especially since the explanatory power of operating variables in all 
other PADDs increases. 
While we found little impact of the operational variables on inventories at 
Cushing, they are important in explaining total U.S. inventories. Moreover, the 
explanatory power of operational variables grows overtime, as the R
2
 over 2004-2011 
(69%) is much higher than the R
2
 over 1992-2004 (21%). As expected, we find a 
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significant positive relation between inventory changes and changes in both imports 
and U.S oil production over the current week and a negative relation between the 
change in inventories and the change in refinery inputs. Also, as expected, the signs 
are reversed for changes in imports, U.S. production, and refinery inputs over the 
coming week, though the coefficient for the coming change in U.S. production is not 
significant. The results for the lead variables indicate that if refinery inputs are 
expected to be higher (lower) next week than imports and production, then storage 
operators tend to increase (decrease) current inventories in anticipation. There is also 
evidence of a seasonal pattern as reflected in the z variable coefficients.  
The graph of the U.S. (non-SPR) seasonal pattern in inventories as implied by 
the z variables is presented in Figure 3. In Figure 3(a) we presents the changes and 
levels of U.S. crude oil inventories as predicted by the z pattern over the 1992-2011 
period; in Figure 3(b) over the 1992-2004 period; and in Figure 3(c) over the 2004-
2011 period. The pattern of crude oil inventory levels shows that crude oil additions to 
storage start in early autumn (around weeks 36-38), followed by a quick period of 
crude oil withdrawals over the last couple of weeks of the year, after which additions 
resume at the start of the new year and continue through May (around week 20). Then 
in May crude oil starts being withdrawn as inventories decrease. Crude oil 
withdrawals last over the summer and early autumn months, till the end of September 
(around week 35). Figure 3(b) shows that overall U.S. crude oil storage capacity did 
not increase significantly over 1992-2004, as the line graphing inventory levels 
converges to its starting point. This differs from Figure 3(c) which shows that capacity 
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increased over the 2004-2011 period. This capacity increase is partially attributed to 
Cushing, as can be seen from Figure 2.
41
  
 
5.3. PADD 2 Results 
 Results for PADD 2 crude oil inventories are presented in Table 35. We 
present PADD2 results separately from other PADD district because it physically 
includes Cushing. In Model 1, we present Equation (2) estimations for the full 1992-
2011 period and, in Model 1-winsorized, we use the same data as in Model 1 but 
winsorize the dependent variable—the change in PADD 2 inventories--at the 1% 
level. In Model 2 we estimate the equation for the 1992-2004 period, over which 
separate Cushing storage data is unavailable. In Model 3, Equation (2) is estimated 
over the 2004-2011 period, including Cushing storage inventories and in Model 4, 
over 2004-2011, excluding Cushing. The changes in the spread are significant in 
explaining inventory changes in Models 1-3 but not in Model 4 which excludes 
Cushing over the 2004-2011 period. So, unlike total U.S. (non-SPR) and PADD 1, 3, 
4, and 5 inventories, PADD 2 inventories are a significant function of the spread over 
2004-2011 until we exclude Cushing. Furthermore, if we remove all spread lags from 
the list of independent regression variables, the adjusted R
2
 declines for PADD 2 
inventory changes when Cushing is included from 17% to 12%, but it remains at 5% 
when Cushing is excluded from PADD 2 inventories. This shows that Cushing 
inventories are driving the explanatory power of spread for PADD 2 inventories. We 
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 While we do not have capacity data, we can partly infer capacity from levels since level will not 
exceed capacity. The overall U.S. (non-SPR) weekly crude levels did not change a lot (unlike Cushing) 
– from around 333,494 (October 30, 1992) to 355,456 (July 8, 2011) thousand barrels. In Cushing there 
was over a 250% increase in levels, which is unlikely to have been accomplished without capacity 
increases.  
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conclude that there is little evidence of above-ground C&C arbitrage in PADD 2 
outside of Cushing. 
Changes in PADD 2 inventories are partially explained by current, but not 
lead, operational variables. PADD 2 inventories are a positive function of current 
week imports and production and a negative function of refinery inputs. This is in line 
with the results for overall U.S. inventories, where the operational variables also 
explain inventory changes, but different from the results for Cushing, where the 
operational variables are insignificant. Evidence of a seasonal pattern, as reflected by 
the z variables, also exists in PADD 2 as in all the other areas. 
 
5.4. Results for Other PADD Districts 
 Results for the other individual PADD districts, excluding PADD 2, are 
presented in Table 36. There is no evidence that changes in the spread impact 
inventory changes in these regions, as the PDL lags of the spread are neither jointly 
nor individually significant. However, inventory changes in most PADD districts are a 
positive function of recent changes in imports and a negative function of imports over 
the coming week. They are a negative function of recent changes in refinery inputs 
and a positive function of the change in refinery inputs over the coming week.  
Overall, our results from Tables 33-36 suggest that over the 2004-2011 period 
the spread is significant in explaining inventories mainly at Cushing indicating that 
above-ground on-shore C&C arbitrage in the U.S. currently takes place largely in 
Cushing. 
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6. Robustness Checks 
 In this section we carry out check of robustness of the results reported in the 
previous section to alternative specifications. In results that are available from the 
authors, we have repeated our analysis where the dependent variables are levels, rather 
than the changes, in inventories. Results largely parallel those in section 5. Several 
alternative specifications for Cushing are presented in Table 37 and for the total U.S. 
(no-SPR) in Table 38, as well as for both in Tables 39-41. These alternatives include 
adding lagged control variables, evaluating the percentage instead of the barrel change 
in inventories and examining the role of cross-PADD imports. We also estimate our 
models without the PDL structure for the spreads and using month dummies instead of 
the z weekly variables to adjust for seasonality. Finally, we present our results using 
two different measures of the spread, instead of the original difference between the 
two- and one-month NYMEX WTI futures, we use the difference between the two-
month future and the spot WTI prices, as well as the difference between the tree- and 
two-month NYMEX WTI futures. 
We include the percentage change in inventories as an alternative specification 
to partially control for the large growth in capacity, especially at Cushing, over the 
evaluation period. We also consider the possibility that Cushing inventories might be 
influenced by the inflows and outflows of crude oil from other PADDs. While imports 
are not significant in explaining the Cushing inventory changes, our imports measure 
does not contain imports from other PADDs. After studying the correlations for 
storage and imports for different PADDs and consulting EIA data we establish that the 
largest exchange of crude oil occurs between PADD 2 and PADD 3. We therefore 
126 
include changes in PADD 3 storage and imports as controls in Cushing regressions. 
These alterations do not change the significant role of the spread in explaining 
Cushing inventories. 
We add lagged control variables for several reasons, of which the first is to 
reduce the influence of asynchronous data reporting for inventories and the above 
mentioned controls. In this case, we expect the signs on the lagged coefficients to be 
the same as for the ones for the current week—negative for refinery inputs and 
positive for production and imports. The second reason to add lagged control terms 
deals with “reaction adjustment” in the following manner: if refinery inputs were 
higher than expected last week, this week there could be a tendency to restock 
inventory and if production and imports were higher than expected last week, this 
week there could be a tendency to “drain down” inventory. In this case, we would 
expect the lagged control coefficients to be of a different sign than the ones for the 
current week—positive for lagged refinery inputs and negative for lagged production 
and imports. However, like the current week imports, production, and refinery input 
variables, the lags of these variables may be correlated with the change in inventories 
due to their correlation with the levels of these variables. This additional specification 
again does not alter our main results.  
We also we want to explore whether our PDL structure for the twelve spread 
lags is responsible for our results, i.e., to see if the main results are robust to including 
the twelve individual spreads. The same issue applies to using the four seasonal z 
variables. We are also interested in whether these specifications result in more 
efficient estimates of the spread and seasonal patterns.  
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Finally, we want to evaluate the relationship between crude oil inventories and 
the spread using different measures of the spread to ensure that our results are not 
driven my our chosen spread measure—the difference between the two- and the one-
month NYMEX WTI futures. We present two alternative spread measures—the 
difference between the two-month future and the spot WTI prices, as well as the 
difference between the three- and one-month WTI futures. The correlation between 
different spread levels is high, over 94%. But we use spread changes, not levels, in our 
models and while the correlation between our main spread measure, the difference 
between the two- and one-month WTI futures, and one of the alternatives, the 
difference between the three- and one-month WTI futures, remains high at 96%. The 
correlation between our main spread measure and another alternative, the difference 
between the two-month futures and the spot WTI prices, is only 64%.  
Alternative models for Cushing over the 2004-2011 period are presented in 
Table 37. In Model 1, we use an alternative dependent variable—instead of the barrel 
change we use the percentage change in inventories. In Model 2, we add lagged 
control variables for crude oil refinery inputs, production and imports. In Model 3, we 
add controls for possible transfers of crude oil from PADD3 into PADD2, where 
Cushing is located. Cushing changes in inventory remain a positive significant 
function of the spread in all specifications in Table 37.  
Model 1 results in Table 37, in which the percentage change in inventories 
replaces the barrel change as the dependent variable, echo the Table 33 results in that 
changes in the Cushing inventory are again a significant positive function of the 
spread. The change in production is the only operational control variable that explains 
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Cushing inventory changes. There is again evidence of a seasonal pattern as reflected 
in the z variable coefficients. 
The implied coefficient pattern for the twelve lags of the change in spread in 
Table 37, Model 1, Panel B is similar to that of Table 3 Panel B, as it again shows that 
spread influences inventories with a lag. Table 37 Panel B shows that inventory 
increases over about the first eight weeks. A one-time $0.10 increase in the spread 
leads to 1.25% increase in Cushing inventories over the first week, approximately 
6.23% increase over four weeks and 8.34% increase after nine weeks.  
Model 2 in Table 37 adds lagged control variables. Cushing inventory changes 
are still a significant positive function of the change in spread. Again none of the 
control variables, except the current production changes and the lagged refinery inputs 
change, are significant in explaining Cushing inventory changes. The lagged refinery 
inputs change is positively related with current Cushing inventory changes. This is 
inconsistent with our non-synchronous data interpretation but in line with but with 
“reaction adjustment” interpretation—if the refinery draws were higher than expected 
last week then there would be a tendency to restock this week.  
Results in Model 3 in Table 37, in which PADD 3 imports and inventories are 
included as explanatory variables for Cushing inventories, are interesting. Changes in 
Cushing inventories are still a significant positive function of the spread. But also 
changes in PADD 3 imports are significant in explaining Cushing inventory changes, 
while PADD 3 inventory changes are not. No other control variables, not even 
production, which exhibited explanatory power in all other models, are significant in 
explaining Cushing inventory changes. PADD 3 imports may matter because a part of 
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crude oil coming into PADD 3, which includes the largest U.S. crude oil port in 
Louisiana, might eventually be destined for PADD 2. However, that crude oil is 
temporarily stored in PADD 3 before transfer to PADD 2, so is not originally reported 
as a PADD 2 import in the data. These results suggest that a future study that takes 
imports between different PADDs into account could be interesting.  
Alternative models for the changes in overall U.S. (non-SPR) inventories are 
presented in Table 38. Models 1 and 3 evaluate the full sample period from 1992-2011 
and Models 2 and 4 evaluate the 2004-2011 period. In Models 1 and 2 we present 
estimations using an alternative dependent variable. Instead of the change in barrels 
we use the percentage change in inventories. In Models 3 and 4 we add lagged control 
variables for crude oil refinery inputs, production and imports. Results are consistent 
with our main results that total U.S. (non-SPR) inventory changes are a positive 
function of the change in spread over the full sample period from 1992-2011 but not 
over the 2004-2011 timeframe. Again the results indicate that since 2004 most on-
shore and above-ground C&C arbitrage apparently occurs at Cushing.  
Models 1 and 2 in Table 38 where we use the percentage change in total U.S. 
(non-SPR) inventories as a dependent variable are very similar to Models 1 and 3 in 
Table 4 where the dependent variable is the barrel change. Otherwise the model 
specifications for models in Tables 38 and 34 are the same. Consistent with the 
previous results, the percentage change in total U.S. (non-SPR) inventories is a 
positive function of the spread in Model 1 from 1992-2011, but the spread is 
insignificant in Model 2 from 2004-2011. Also consistent with the Table 34 results, 
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operational controls and seasonal variables remain significant in explaining U.S. (non-
SPR) inventories in both time periods and in both Models 1 and 2 in Table 38.  
The results from Models 3 and 4 in Table 38 in which we add lagged control 
variables for refinery inputs, production and imports are consistent with the results 
from Models 1 and 2 from Table 38, as well as models in Table 34. As before, the 
change in total U.S. (non-SPR) inventories is a positive function of the change in 
spread over the 1992-2011 period, but not over the 2004-2011 period.   
On the other hand, all operating variables--current, lag, and most lead changes 
are significant in explaining total U.S. (non-SPR) inventory changes. We did not 
include lag control variable changes past one week back because we reasoned that 
longer dated lags would bring our models to an approximate tautology.
42
  
In general, Tables 37 and 38 indicate that results dealing with the influence of 
the spread on Cushing and total U.S. crude oil inventories remain consistent with 
alternative specifications. Spread mainly explains Cushing inventory changes, while 
operational variables largely explain inventory changes in other areas. The influence 
of spread on inventories occurs with a lag. The implied coefficient pattern for the 
twelve lagged spreads calculated from the ΔPDL coefficients in the models again 
confirms that when the spread rises inventories in both Cushing and the overall U.S. 
increase most, not in the current week, but two to four weeks out. In other words 
                                                 
42
 With perfect data, the change in inventories equals imports plus production minus refinery inputs for 
that week. So, a regression of inventory changes on import, production, and refinery input levels would 
be estimating a tautology. Since lagged inventory changes going back many weeks proxy for the current 
inventory levels, models that include long-dated lags of imports, production and refinery inputs estimate 
an approximate tautology. An inclusion of just one lag increases the adjusted R
2
 by 9% between Models 
1 and 3 and by and 15% between Models 2 and 4 in Table 38.   
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spreads two to four weeks out have a stronger influence on the change in inventories 
than the current spreads. 
Table 39 presents regressions for both Cushing and the U.S. using the twelve 
individual spread change lags instead of imposing the PDL structure on the lagged 
spreads and monthly dummy variables instead of using weekly dummy variables 
structured in a polynomial form. In Model 1, we estimate the relations for Cushing 
from 2004-2011, in Model 2, for the U.S. from 1992-2011 and, in Model 3, for the 
U.S. from 2004-2011. Again our results hold using parsimonious specifications. 
Cushing inventory changes are a positive function of the change in spread, as 
confirmed by the Wald test (p-value of 0.000) for the joint significance of all twelve 
spread lags. U.S inventory changes are a positive function of the change in spread over 
1992-2011, but not over 2004-2011. As compared with the PDL specification, the 
coefficient pattern for the lagged spread changes jumps around. Also, the standard 
errors of the coefficients of the lagged spread terms (not shown but available upon 
request) for the non-PDL models are considerably higher, so the PDL specification 
does (as expected) provide more efficient estimations. Standard errors are also higher 
when monthly dummies, instead of the polynomial specification of weekly dummies, 
are used to adjust for seasonality. Therefore, models with polynomial specifications 
have several advantages—they are more efficient and they provide us with a smoother 
coefficient pattern for seasonality and for the influence of the change in spread on 
inventory changes. 
Tables 40 and 41 present regressions for both Cushing and the U.S. using 
alternative measures of the spread. In Model 1, we estimate the relations for Cushing 
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from 2004-2011, in Model 2, for the U.S. from 1992-2011 and, in Model 3, for the 
U.S. from 2004-2011. The main measure of the spread used in the paper is the 
difference between the two- and one-month NYMEX WTI futures and the reasoning 
for this choice is described in section 4.1. In Table 41 we follow Equation (2) but 
regress crude oil inventory changes on the spread defined as the difference between 
the two-month futures and the spot WTI prices, while in Table 41 the spread is defined 
as the difference between the three- and one-month NYMEX WTI futures. Again our 
results hold using different measures of spread. Cushing inventory changes are a 
positive function of the different spread measures over 2004-2011. U.S. inventory 
changes are a positive function of different spread measures over 1992-2011, but not 
over 2004-2011. None of the operational variables, except for production changes, are 
significant in explaining Cushing inventory changes. On the other hand, all current 
and lead operational variables, except lead production, are significant in explaining 
U.S. inventory changes. The patterns of spread coefficients available in Panel B are 
similar to all our other models as they show that spreads influence crude inventories 
with a lag. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 From regressions of crude oil inventory changes on current and lagged 
spreads, we find that crude oil inventories at Cushing are a strong positive function of 
current and lagged futures spreads. We find that current crude oil inventories are 
influenced not only by current spreads but by spreads over the last eight weeks. Indeed 
we find that current inventories are a stronger function of spreads several weeks ago 
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than of current spreads. Our interpretation of this is that current spreads likely lead to 
contracts for forward delivery which do not result in a change in actual stock levels 
until delivery occurs sometime in the future. For instance, if in July the price of the 
September futures contract exceeds the price of the August contract by more than the 
cost of storage, an arbitrageur may long the August futures contract and short the 
September contract. He would then take delivery on the August contract and make 
delivery on the September contract so we would observe inventories rising in August 
and falling in September due to the July spread. Thus, the influence of the spread on 
storage is not immediate. We find no convincing evidence that the futures spread 
materially impacts inventories outside Cushing. Total U.S. inventories and PADD 2 
inventories over the 1992-2004 period, i.e. before Cushing inventories were reported 
separately, are significant positive functions of the spread. However, when Cushing 
inventories are subtracted from PADD 2 figures over the 2004-2011 period, the spread 
terms are insignificant. Similarly, the spread is insignificant in explaining total U.S. 
inventory changes over 2004-2011. The spread variables are also insignificant in 
regressions for all the other PADD districts.  
It has been hypothesized that the futures spread impacts inventories held by 
refiners, pipelines, and other oil companies as well as arbitrageurs. In other words, if 
the spot price is far enough above the futures price, refiners and pipelines will draw 
down current inventories (thus risking a stock-out) and replenish later at lower prices, 
and they will build up inventories when the spot price is low relative to the futures 
price. The fact that we find little evidence that inventories outside Cushing are 
impacted by the futures spread indicates that if this activity occurs at all it is too small 
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for us to detect with aggregate data. However, our inventory data includes above 
ground, on-shore inventories only. We cannot rule out the possibility that the futures 
spread may impact producers’ decisions whether to pump the oil or leave it in the 
ground. Nor can we shed light on the impact of the spread on tanker storage in the 
Gulf or elsewhere. 
We further find evidence that total U.S. and most PADD district inventories, 
except for Cushing, are partially explained by operational variables, particularly 
current and future changes in imports, U.S. oil production, and refinery inputs. These 
results indicate that refiners and storage operators increase inventories when they 
foresee future refinery needs exceeding future imports plus U.S. crude oil production, 
and reduce inventories when they foresee a surplus of imports and domestic 
production over refinery needs. We do not find these variables having much impact on 
Cushing inventories, further indicating that inventories there are mostly held for 
arbitrage (and possibly speculative) purposes.  
To our knowledge, this study provides the first comprehensive analysis of the 
causal relationships between oil spot prices, futures prices and inventories, including 
the C&C arbitrage relation between oil inventories and the futures spread, and how 
inventories are impacted by contango versus normal backwardation in oil futures 
prices. Our findings establish, to our knowledge, the first tangible evidence 
documented in the literature of a causal link between oil futures and spot markets via 
inventory changes resulting from arbitrage. These findings provide an important 
foundation for future research on the impact of financial traders on the spot markets, 
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especially the twin questions of whether financial traders (a) exacerbate or attenuate 
spot price volatility, and (b) whether they systematically affect the spot oil price level. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions, Chapter 1 
Table 1 defines variables used in the analysis in Chapter 1. Deal level data, including ownership, was 
obtained from Thomson Reuters SDC Platinum M&A database. Firm variables, stock prices and local 
indexes are from the Worldscope/DataStream databases. Numbers in parentheses pertain to the actual 
Worldscope data item number. 
 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable 
(-2,+2) MAR Market adjusted abnormal 5 day (-2, +2) return, where 0 is 
government investment announcement day. 
Government Ownership Variables 
Gov. Prior Ownership (%) Government percentage ownership, if any, before the investment 
Gov. Shares Acquired (%) Percentage government investment into a target firm. 
Gov. Ex Post Ownership (%) 
Percentage government ownership after the investment into a 
target firm. 
Government Investor Colors 
Foreign Deal 
Dummy=1 if the target and acquirer parent nations are not the 
same. 
Domestic Deal Dummy=1 if the target and acquirer parent nations are the same. 
Political Gov. Investor 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer has political objectives and is a local or 
a national government, or a government pension fund. 
Financial Gov. Investor 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer has financial objectives and is a SWF, 
government owned bank, development bank, government real 
estate investor, supranational or other financial government 
entity. 
Economic Gov. Investor 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer has economic objectives and is an 
SOE, including energy, consumer, industrial, materials, media 
and telecom-technology SOEs. 
Gov. Expropriation 
Index evaluating contract expropriation, profits repatriation, 
payment delays, ranges from 0 to 12 with the higher values 
meanings higher expropriation risk; obtained from ICRG. 
Left-wing Gov. 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer government is left-winged. Data is 
obtained from the WorldBank database of Political Institutions 
(updated 2010). 
Maj. Own. (>50%) Dummy=1 if the acquirer purchases 51% or more of a firm. 
Maj. Own.(50%-10%) 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer purchases between 50%-10% of a 
firm. 
Min. Own. (<10%) Dummy=1 if the acquirer purchases less than 10% of a firm. 
Deal Variables 
Gov.-to-Gov. Deal 
Dummy=1 when a 'government' flagged entity is involved on the 
acquirer and target side. The acquirer side includes acquirers and 
acquirer parents; the target side targets and target parents. 
Same Industry Deal (2-digit 
SIC) 
Dummy=1 if  either target or target parent and acquirer or 
acquirer parent are within the same 2-digit SIC code. 
Withdrawn Deal Dummy=1 for eventually withdrawn deals. 
Government Acquirer 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer, as opposed to acquirer parent, if 
flagged with government status. 
Cash Deal Dummy=1 if 98% of the payment was in cash. 
Stock Deal Dummy=1 if 98% of the payment was in stock. 
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Table 1(Continued). Variable Definitions, Chapter 1 
Variable Definition 
Mixed Deal 
Dummy=1 if the deal was paid for with a mix of cash and stock 
or the payment was unknown. 
Bank Crises 
Dummy=1 if the deal occurs during banking crises defined by 
Laeven and Valencia (2010). 
2008 Crisis Dummy=1 if deal occurs during the 2008-2009 Financial crisis. 
Capital Inflow 
Dummy=1 if either new shares were issued for the investment or 
SDC deal synopsis specified an investment as a 'capital 
injection.' 
Common Law (acquirer p.) 
Dummy=1 if the acquirer parent nation is common law from 
Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2002): 
“Courts: the Lex Mundi Project,” NBER 8890. 
Firm Variables 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets (# 02999). 
Leverage 
(Total Assets - Book Value of Equity) / Total Assets (# 02999 
and # 03501). 
ROA Net Income / Last Year's Total Asets (# 08326). 
Tobin's Q 
(Market Value + Total Assets - Book Value of Equity) / Total 
Assets (# 08001, # 02999 and # 03501). 
Other Variables 
Last Year Performance 
Target's buy-and-hold abnormal market adjusted return (-250,     
-26). 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 1 
The table summarizes 1809 government investments. The sample covers the 1988-2011 period and presents the number, value and respective proportion of 
government investments, as well as the number of investments by foreign, domestic, political, financial and economic government entities.  Government 
investment is broken down by year of transaction announcement in Panel A, by the percentage of government ownership in Panel B, by country of the target in 
Panel C, by country of acquirer in Panel D, by target's 1 digit SIC in Panel E and full SIC in Panel F. 
 
Panel A.  Government Investment by Transaction Year (announced)           
Year 
Deal 
Count 
Deal Value 
USD (mil) 
Proportion of 
Total (Count) 
Proportion of 
Total (Value) 
Foreign Domestic Political Economic Financial 
1988 4 991 0% 0% 3 1 1 3 0 
1989 15 4,686 1% 1% 11 4 1 8 6 
1990 22 1,751 1% 0% 16 6 3 12 7 
1991 46 3,731 3% 1% 22 24 9 17 20 
1992 39 1,633 2% 0% 15 24 3 12 24 
1993 68 3,529 4% 1% 33 35 8 28 32 
1994 52 6,589 3% 1% 22 30 6 13 33 
1995 37 6,167 2% 1% 11 26 6 10 21 
1996 35 7,571 2% 2% 16 19 3 16 16 
1997 61 7,061 3% 1% 33 28 6 26 29 
1998 45 23,246 2% 5% 20 25 5 21 19 
1999 70 8,888 4% 2% 22 48 11 34 25 
2000 99 16,235 5% 3% 43 56 12 53 34 
2001 61 19,749 3% 4% 25 36 5 26 30 
2002 70 7,915 4% 2% 26 44 1 37 32 
2003 92 6,219 5% 1% 26 66 6 45 41 
2004 88 11,713 5% 2% 28 60 2 40 46 
2005 100 31,801 6% 6% 34 66 8 41 51 
2006 93 12,276 5% 2% 37 56 9 37 47 
2007 116 74,850 6% 15% 46 70 9 49 58 
2008 231 113,695 13% 23% 50 181 113 66 52 
2009 261 102,727 14% 20% 75 186 106 77 78 
2010 77 20,416 4% 4% 32 45 10 17 50 
2011 27 8,438 1% 2% 13 14 4 10 13 
Total 1809 501,876 100% 100% 659 1150 347 698 764 
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Table 2(Continued). Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 1 
Panel B. Government Investment by Percentage Ownership 
  
Stake Acquired 
Deal 
Count 
Deal 
Value 
USD(mil) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Count) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Value) 
Foreign Domestic Political Economic Financial 
  No data 177 75,445 10% 15% 67 110 39 74 64 
  <10% 521 83,164 29% 17% 187 334 181 97 243 
  10%-50% 710 143,204 39% 29% 256 454 88 308 314 
  >50% 401 200,063 22% 40% 149 252 39 219 143 
  Total 1809 501,876 100% 100% 659 1150 347 698 764 
 
Panel C. Government Investment by Target Nation (top 15 by value) 
Rank Target Nation 
Deal 
Count 
Deal 
Value 
USD(mil) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Count) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Value) 
Foreign Domestic Political Economic Financial 
1 United States 274 83,169 15% 17% 68 206 208 43 23 
2 United Kingdom 58 76,313 3% 15% 51 7 11 25 22 
3 Germany 58 40,780 3% 8% 30 28 10 25 23 
4 Switzerland 14 26,008 1% 5% 9 5 2 5 7 
5 Australia 92 23,595 5% 5% 66 26 0 52 40 
6 Spain 45 19,910 2% 4% 22 23 3 26 16 
7 Italy 13 19,699 1% 4% 3 10 0 9 4 
8 Russian Fed 78 17,773 4% 4% 2 76 8 52 18 
9 Canada 89 16,999 5% 3% 34 55 3 31 55 
10 Hong Kong 117 14,813 6% 3% 117 0 2 53 62 
11 Malaysia 81 13,284 4% 3% 15 66 20 19 42 
12 Belgium 23 12,776 1% 3% 9 14 2 12 9 
13 Brazil 29 12,747 2% 3% 13 16 2 14 13 
14 Singapore 24 12,610 1% 3% 10 14 0 6 18 
15 Norway 24 12,118 1% 2% 10 14 2 11 11 
  Total 1019 402,594 56% 80% 459 560 273 383 363 
  Others 790 99,282 44% 20% 200 590 74 315 401 
  Overall 1809 501,876 100% 100% 659 1150 347 698 764 
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Table 2(Continued). Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 1 
Panel D. Government Investment by Acquirer (parent) Nation (top 15 by value) 
Rank Target Nation 
Deal 
Count 
Deal 
Value 
USD(mil) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Count) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Value) 
Foreign Domestic Political Economic Financial 
1 China 387 76,180 21% 15% 175 212 5 236 146 
2 France 173 56,393 10% 11% 82 91 13 79 81 
3 United Arab Em. 48 46,472 3% 9% 46 2 0 7 41 
4 United States 240 38,020 13% 8% 34 206 204 7 29 
5 United Kingdom 13 37,617 1% 7% 6 7 5 2 6 
6 Singapore 99 31,364 5% 6% 85 14 7 3 89 
7 Germany 41 23,778 2% 5% 13 28 11 11 19 
8 Russian Fed 89 19,981 5% 4% 13 76 9 59 21 
9 Qatar 18 15,436 1% 3% 15 3 0 1 17 
10 Switzerland 9 13,934 0% 3% 4 5 2 6 1 
11 Malaysia 76 12,280 4% 2% 10 66 21 20 35 
12 Belgium 20 11,383 1% 2% 6 14 2 12 6 
13 South Korea 29 10,422 2% 2% 4 25 3 7 19 
14 Italy 20 10,162 1% 2% 10 10 0 13 7 
15 Sweden 36 8,768 2% 2% 20 16 0 23 13 
  Total 1298 412,189 72% 82% 523 775 282 486 530 
  Others 511 89,687 28% 18% 136 375 65 212 234 
  Overall 1809 501,876 100% 100% 659 1150 347 698 764 
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Table 2(Continued). Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 1 
Panel E. Government Investment by 1-digit SIC 
SIC 1-
digit 
code 
SIC Category 
Deal 
Count 
Deal 
Value 
USD(mil) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Count) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Value) 
Foreign Domestic Political Economic Financial 
0 
Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing 
17 3,949 1% 1% 6 11 2 4 11 
1 Mining, construction 200 96,133 11% 19% 130 70 8 125 67 
2 
Manufacturing (food, 
fabric, wood, chemical) 
203 20,804 11% 4% 63 140 12 101 90 
3 
Manufacturing (rubber, 
plastic, glass, metal; 
boat, rail, air 
equipment) 
284 39,525 16% 8% 88 196 29 133 122 
4 
Transportation, 
communications, 
electric, gas, and 
sanitary service 
347 122,980 19% 25% 141 206 35 224 88 
5 
Trade (wholesale, 
retail) 
57 4,013 3% 1% 16 41 7 22 28 
6 
Finance, insurance, and 
real estate 
575 197,526 32% 39% 163 412 241 46 288 
7 
Services (hotel, beauty, 
funeral, computer, car 
rental & repair, movie) 
103 9,485 6% 2% 44 59 10 39 54 
8 
Services (doctor's 
offices, legal, schools 
[elementary, 
secondary, colleges], 
religious, accounting) 
23 7,462 1% 1% 8 15 3 4 16 
  Overall 1809 501,876 100% 100% 659 1150 347 698 764 
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Table 2(Continued). Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 1 
Panel F. Government Investment by SIC (top 10 by value) 
Rank SIC Category 
Deal 
Count 
Deal 
Value 
USD(mil) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Count) 
Proportion 
of Total 
(Value) 
Foreign Domestic Political Economic Financial 
1 Depository institutions 153 79,924 8% 16% 58 95 28 5 120 
2 
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas 
69 67,543 4% 13% 42 27 2 51 16 
3 Electric services 119 55,345 7% 11% 35 84 3 99 17 
4 
Telephone 
communications 
51 36,750 3% 7% 27 24 10 30 11 
5 
National commercial 
banks 
112 26,776 6% 5% 2 110 110 0 2 
6 Investment advice 20 18,270 1% 4% 8 12 4 0 16 
7 
Personal credit 
institutions 
9 14,955 0% 3% 2 7 3 0 6 
8 Life insurance 21 11,630 1% 2% 12 9 4 1 16 
9 
Semiconductors and 
related devices 
17 11,560 1% 2% 11 6 0 6 11 
10 
Land subdividers and 
developers 
61 10,163 3% 2% 22 39 6 12 43 
  Total 632 332,916 35% 66% 219 413 170 204 258 
  Others 1177 168,960 65% 34% 440 737 177 494 506 
  Overall 1809 501,876 100% 100% 659 1150 347 698 764 
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Table 3: Description of Variables, Chapter 1 
This table present variables used in the evaluation of government investment. Variables are defined in Table 1. Continuous variables are presented in Panel A 
and the table describes the number, mean, standard deviation, median, 25th and 75th percentile for each. Target firm's prior performance is shown in Panel B. 
Binary variables are presented in Panel C. Variable correlations are available in Panel D. The sample consists of 1,809 government investments in publically 
traded firm form 1988 through 2011. Variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. 
Panel A. Continuous variables             
Continuous Variables Count Mean Std. Dev. Median 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Government Variables             
     Gov. Prior Ownership (%) 1,809 7% 18% 0% 0% 0% 
     Gov. Shares Acquired (%) 1,600 24% 27% 12% 6% 30% 
     Gov. Ex Post Ownership (%) 1,632 32% 31% 18% 8% 50% 
     Gov. Expropriation 1,806 3.35 1.98 3.85 1.33 4.58 
     Gov. Size 1,776 5.47 1.49 5.55 4.50 6.78 
     Gov. Autoc./Democ. 1,807 -3.75 7.43 -9.00 -10.00 7.00 
     Gov. Stability 1,389 5.18 5.13 3.00 2.00 8.00 
Firm Variables             
     Size [ln(Total Assets)] 1,541 13.5 2.32 13.38 11.99 14.91 
     Total Assets 1,541 21,172,870  125,855,521  646,217  161,058  2,982,103  
     Leverage (Debt-to-Assets) 1,524 64% 0.29 66% 46% 89% 
     ROA 1,410 1% 0.15 3% 0% 6% 
     Tobin's Q 1,453 1.44 1.38 1.04 0.92 1.48 
     Market Value 1,482 1,832,383  6,655,736  146,433  12,498  675,911  
     Book Value of Equity 1,525 1,511,096  5,467,537  158,719  47,945  737,107  
     MTBV 1,505 2.27 3.66 1.39 0.81 2.40 
     Debt 1,524 19,902,627  122,159,122  368,051  73,417  2,133,354  
     Cash Over Total Assets 1,049 34% 0.27 27% 13% 50% 
     Long Term Debt-to-Equity 1,494 83% 2.04 29% 1% 93% 
     Debt-to-Equity 1,525 163% 4.25 66% 17% 165% 
     Dividend Yield 1,430 2% 0.03 1% 0% 4% 
     Quick Ratio 1,071 2.61 8.24 0.89 0.55 1.49 
Panel B. Pre-Announcement Performance Using Country Specific Indices (6 and 12 months back) 
Buy-and-Hold Returns N Positive  :  Negative Mean Compound AR Patell Z p-value Median CAR Signed Rank p-value 
     BHAR (-150,-26) 1,754 902:852 8% <.0001 1% 0.013 
     BHAR (-250,-26) 1,694 814:880 16% <.0001 -2% 0.781 
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Table 3 (Continued): Description of Variables, Chapter 1 
Panel C. Binary Variables       
  Count Yes (1) Yes(%) 
Deal Variables 1809     
     Bank Crises   410 23% 
     2008 Crisis   492 27% 
     Capital Inflow   156 9% 
     Foreign   659 36% 
     Gov-to-Gov Deal (direct)   1 0% 
     Gov-to-Gov Deal   282 16% 
     Common Law (Target)   896 50% 
     Same Industry Deal (2-digit SIC) 629 35% 
Consideration Offered Variables 1809     
     Warrants   186 10% 
     Convertible Debt   38 2% 
     Stock   1587 88% 
Variables that influence acquisition 
premium 
1809 
    
     Withdrawn   133 7% 
     Cash Deal   588 33% 
     Stock Deal   31 2% 
     Mixed Deal   1190 66% 
Government Investor Variables 1809     
     Political Gov. Investor   347 19% 
         Political_Gov_National   264 15% 
         Political_Gov_Local   58 3% 
         Political_Pension_Fund   25 1% 
     Financial Gov. Investor   764 42% 
         Financial_Bank   108 6% 
         Financial_Development_Bank 49 3% 
         Financial_Real_Estate   42 2% 
         Fianncial_Supranational   23 1% 
         Financial_SWF   164 9% 
         Financial_Other   378 21% 
     Economic Gov. Investor   698 39% 
         SOE_Energy   269 15% 
         SOE_Industrial   119 7% 
         SOE_Materials   114 6% 
         SOE_TelecomTech   99 5% 
         SOE_Media   40 2% 
         SOE_Consumer   57 3% 
     Government Acquirer (direct)   881 49% 
     Common Law (Acquirer)   796 44% 
     Common Law (Acquirer Parent) 690 38% 
     Left-wing Gov.   892 49% 
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Table 3 (Continued): Description of Variables, Chapter 1 
Panel D: Correlation Table 
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Leverage (debt-to-assets) 1
Dividend Yield 0.05 1
Quick Ratio -0.31 -0.09 1
ROA -0.12 0.24 -0.11 1
Tobin's Q -0.04 -0.15 -0.07 -0.12 1
Size (log total assets) 0.38 0.24 -0.2 0.27 -0.29 1
Foreign Deal -0.15 -0.07 0.1 -0.05 0.04 -0.02 1
Capital Inflow -0.01 -0.08 0.11 -0.11 0.07 -0.01 0.12 1
Same Industry (2-digit SIC) -0.14 0.01 -0.04 0.11 0 0.02 0.13 -0.06 1
Warrants 0.33 0.2 -0.01 -0.04 -0.11 0.13 -0.24 -0.1 -0.24 1
Convertible Debt 0.02 -0.01 0 -0.02 -0.01 0.1 0.07 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 1
Stock -0.31 -0.18 0 0.05 0.1 -0.17 0.19 0.1 0.23 -0.91 -0.39 1
Gov-to-Gov Deal -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.07 -0.03 0.01 -0.08 -0.03 0.17 -0.07 -0.01 0.08 1
Government Acquirer 0.15 0.09 -0.02 0 -0.03 0.13 -0.21 -0.06 -0.3 0.33 -0.01 -0.29 0.13 1
Bank Crises 0.28 0.09 -0.01 0 -0.2 0.27 -0.19 -0.07 -0.18 0.57 -0.04 -0.51 -0.05 0.25 1
2008 Crisis 0.17 0.1 0.15 -0.02 -0.15 0.18 -0.14 0.02 -0.16 0.51 0 -0.48 -0.07 0.18 0.58 1
TARP 0.32 0.19 . 0 -0.12 0.14 -0.24 -0.1 -0.24 0.92 -0.05 -0.83 -0.08 0.33 0.59 0.53 1
Common Law (target) -0.02 0.11 0.15 -0.09 0 -0.09 0.23 0.05 -0.2 0.33 0.03 -0.32 -0.02 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.32 1
Common Law (acquirer) 0.05 0.13 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.22 0.36 -0.01 -0.33 -0.02 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.37 0.73 1
Common Law (acquirer p.) 0.13 0.15 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.27 0.41 0 -0.38 -0.01 0.27 0.2 0.15 0.41 0.65 0.84 1
Gov. Shares Acquired (%) -0.08 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 -0.11 0.03 -0.04 0.26 -0.2 0.02 0.18 0.14 -0.19 -0.14 -0.09 -0.2 -0.08 -0.14 -0.17 1
Gov. Ex Post Ownership (%) -0.09 0.03 -0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.08 0.01 -0.05 0.36 -0.25 0 0.23 0.17 -0.2 -0.16 -0.11 -0.25 -0.13 -0.17 -0.2 0.82 1
Gov.Prior Ownership (%) -0.05 0.04 -0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.24 -0.14 -0.02 0.14 0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.13 -0.11 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 0.51 1
Cash deal 0.01 -0.01 0.06 0 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.01 -0.03 0.13 0.01 -0.13 0 0.03 0 0.07 0.13 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.09 1
Stock deal -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.11 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0 -0.1 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.2 0.18 0.04 -0.09 1
Mixed deal 0.01 -0.01 -0.06 0 0.02 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 0 -0.12 -0.02 0.12 0 -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 -0.18 -0.17 -0.12 -0.08 -0.12 -0.1 -0.96 -0.18 1
Left-wing Gov. -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 -0.17 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.19 -0.07 -0.01 -0.05 -0.14 -0.27 0.04 0 -0.05 0 -0.02 0.01 1
Gov. Exprop. -0.15 -0.07 0.05 0 0.06 -0.05 0.16 0.08 0.07 -0.19 0.06 0.15 -0.04 -0.12 -0.07 0.07 -0.2 -0.08 -0.1 -0.06 0.04 0.1 0.1 -0.04 0 0.04 -0.11 1
Gov. Size 0.08 0.09 0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.14 -0.06 -0.02 -0.19 0.27 0.05 -0.27 0 0.18 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.35 0.5 0.65 -0.14 -0.15 -0.06 0.08 -0.07 -0.06 -0.48 0.18 1
Political Gov. Investor 0.29 0.16 -0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.24 -0.29 -0.05 -0.33 0.63 -0.06 -0.56 0.02 0.48 0.48 0.39 0.67 0.25 0.3 0.35 -0.17 -0.19 -0.08 0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.1 -0.2 0.25 1
Financial  Gov. Investor -0.01 -0.03 0 -0.04 -0.01 0.01 0.08 0.02 -0.16 -0.26 0.11 0.2 -0.03 -0.1 -0.19 -0.2 -0.28 -0.02 0.06 0.1 -0.11 -0.1 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.07 -0.09 0.04 0.12 -0.42 1
Economic  Gov. Investor -0.24 -0.11 0.01 0.02 0.11 -0.2 0.15 0.02 0.43 -0.25 -0.06 0.25 0.02 -0.29 -0.2 -0.12 -0.26 -0.18 -0.3 -0.38 0.24 0.26 0.08 0 0.08 -0.02 0.17 0.12 -0.32 -0.39 -0.68 1
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Table 4: Event Study Results for All, Foreign and Domestic Deals 
Target stock price changes at the announcement of increased government ownership for the entire sample and the subsets of foreign and domestic deals.  
Foreign and domestic deals are defined in Table 1. Market adjusted returns are calculated as the difference between the firm's total return index and the 
corresponding local total return index, as defined by Datastream. Market Model parameters are estimated over days (-230,-30), where day 0 is the day of the 
announcement. Firms with a minimum of 100 daily returns are included in the study. Mean and median returns, as well as the p-values of the associated 
significance tests are presented. P-values at and below the 10% significance level are grayed out. 
 
 
  
All Foreign Domestic
Event 
Window
N
Positive: 
Negative
Mean 
CAR
Patell 
Z p-
value
Median 
CAR
Signed 
Rank p-
value
N
Positive: 
Negativ
e
Mean 
CAR
Patell 
Z p-
value
Median 
CAR
Signed 
Rank p-
value
N
Positive: 
Negative
Mean 
CAR
Patell 
Z p-
value
Median 
CAR
Signed 
Rank p-
value
Market Adjusted  (using country specific indices)
(0,+1) 1809 1024:778 2.48% <.0001 0.46% <.0001 659 407:250 5.05% <.0001 1.33% <.0001 1150 617:528 1.01% <.0001 0.22% <.0001
(-2,+2) 1809 1021:787 2.81% <.0001 0.91% <.0001 659 418:241 6.28% <.0001 2.25% <.0001 1150 603:546 0.82% <.0001 0.30% 0.0009
(-5,+5) 1809 1005:804 2.50% <.0001 1.03% <.0001 659 416:243 6.70% <.0001 2.49% <.0001 1150 589:561 0.09% 0.0079 0.20% 0.1149
(-10,+10) 1809 937:872 1.85% <.0001 0.51% 0.0007 659 385:274 6.73% <.0001 2.22% <.0001 1150 552:598 -0.95% 0.8209 -0.33% 0.6443
(-30,-10) 1809 910:899 0.30% 0.148 0.05% 0.7841 659 371:288 3.11% <.0001 1.13% 0.0001 1150 539:611 -1.31% 0.0351 -0.76% 0.0073
(+10,+30) 1809 786:1023 -1.60% <.0001 -1.26% <.0001 659 288:371 -1.03% 0.0155 -1.15% 0.0038 1150 498:652 -1.93% <.0001 -1.30% <.0001
Market Model  (using country specific indices)
(0,+1) 1809 1061:748 2.55% <.0001 0.55% <.0001 659 421:238 5.18% <.0001 1.36% <.0001 1150 640:510 1.05% <.0001 0.28% <.0001
(-2,+2) 1809 1048:761 2.93% <.0001 0.99% <.0001 659 432:227 6.40% <.0001 2.19% <.0001 1150 616:534 0.94% <.0001 0.43% 0.0003
(-5,+5) 1809 1025:784 3.00% <.0001 1.18% <.0001 659 419:240 7.10% <.0001 2.51% <.0001 1150 606:544 0.65% 0.362 0.47% 0.0109
(-10,+10) 1809 998:811 3.05% 3E-04 1.28% <.0001 659 400:259 7.61% <.0001 3.19% <.0001 1150 598:552 0.44% 0.9823 0.49% 0.0725
(-30,-10) 1809 926:883 1.28% <.0001 0.28% 0.0174 659 368:291 3.85% 0.0101 1.50% <.0001 1150 558:592 -0.19% <.0001 -0.25% 0.4809
(+10,+30) 1809 840:969 -0.74% 0.43 -0.65% 0.0082 659 300:359 -0.29% <.0001 -0.70% 0.1275 1150 540:610 -1.01% <.0001 -0.60% 0.0306
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Table 5: Event Study Results for Different Types of Government Acquirers 
Target stock price changes at the announcement of government investment by political, financial and economic arms. Political, financial and economic 
government investors are defined in Table 1. Market adjusted returns are calculated as the difference between the firm's total return index and the 
corresponding local total return index, as defined by Datastream. Market Model parameters are estimated over days (-230,-30), where day 0 is the day of the 
announcement. Firms with a minimum of 100 daily returns are included in the study. Mean and median returns, as well as the p-values of the associated 
significance tests are presented. P-values at and below the 10% significance level are grayed out. 
 
 
 
  
Event 
Window
N
Positive: 
Negative
Mean 
CAR
Patell 
Z p-
value
Median 
CAR
Signed 
Rank p-
value
N
Positive: 
Negative
Mean 
CAR
Patell 
Z p-
value
Median 
CAR
Signed 
Rank p-
value
N
Positive: 
Negative
Mean 
CAR
Patell Z 
p-value
Median 
CAR
Signed 
Rank p-
value
Market Adjusted  (using country specific indices)
(0,+1) 347 160:187 -1.16% <.0001 -0.31% 0.3162 764 410:349 2.03% <.0001 0.32% <.0001 698 454:242 4.78% <.0001 1.19% <.0001
(-2,+2) 347 161:186 -2.92% <.0001 -0.64% 0.0302 764 413:350 2.23% <.0001 0.48% <.0001 698 447:251 6.30% <.0001 2.36% <.0001
(-5,+5) 347 152:195 -4.36% <.0001 -1.73% 0.0005 764 409:355 2.18% <.0001 0.63% 0.0011 698 444:254 6.26% <.0001 2.76% <.0001
(-10,+10) 347 142:205 -6.43% <.0001 -3.57% <.0001 764 384:380 0.99% 0.0004 0.03% 0.2432 698 411:287 6.90% <.0001 2.97% <.0001
(-30,-10) 347 139:208 -5.60% <.0001 -3.97% <.0001 764 390:374 0.53% 0.4299 0.10% 0.6119 698 381:317 2.98% <.0001 1.24% <.0001
(+10,+30) 347 147:200 -3.61% <.0001 -2.69% 0.0006 764 332:432 -1.36% 0.008 -1.08% 0.0012 698 307:391 -0.86% 0.0652 -1.17% 0.0195
Market Model  (using country specific indices)
(0,+1) 347 173:174 -1.26% <.0001 -0.03% 0.2826 764 430:334 2.18% <.0001 0.45% <.0001 698 458:240 4.87% <.0001 1.08% <.0001
(-2,+2) 347 162:185 -2.99% <.0001 -0.56% 0.0061 764 442:322 2.42% <.0001 0.85% <.0001 698 444:254 6.44% <.0001 2.29% <.0001
(-5,+5) 347 159:188 -3.47% <.0001 -0.89% 0.0039 764 421:343 2.60% <.0001 0.87% <.0001 698 445:253 6.66% <.0001 2.94% <.0001
(-10,+10) 347 153:194 -3.77% <.0001 -1.65% 0.0047 764 408:356 1.82% 0.78 0.77% 0.0179 698 437:261 7.80% <.0001 3.79% <.0001
(-30,-10) 347 147:200 -3.26% 0.019 -2.16% 0.0025 764 398:366 1.12% <.0001 0.40% 0.1498 698 381:317 3.73% 0.7064 1.31% <.0001
(+10,+30) 347 157:190 -2.63% <.0001 -2.11% 0.0167 764 349:415 -0.55% <.0001 -0.63% 0.0526 698 334:364 -0.02% 0.2312 -0.35% 0.6395
Political Financial Economic (SOE)
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Table 6: Event Study Results for Different Levels of Government Expropriation 
This table presents target reaction to the news of increased government ownership. The results are broken down by the level of expropriation risk and left- or 
right-wing nature of the acquirer parent nation government. Market adjusted returns are calculated as the difference between the firm's total return index and 
the corresponding local total return index, as defined by Datastream. Market Model parameters are estimated over days (-230,-30), where day 0 is the day of the 
announcement. Firms with a minimum of 100 daily returns are included in the study. Mean and median returns, as well as the p-values of the associated 
significance tests are presented. P-values at and below the 10% significance level are grayed out. 
 
    Expropriation Risk High         Expropriation Risk Low     
Event 
Window 
N 
Positive: 
Negative 
Mean 
CAR 
Patell Z 
p-value 
Median 
CAR 
Signed 
Rank p-
value 
  N 
Positive: 
Negative 
Mean 
CAR 
Patell Z 
p-value 
Median 
CAR 
Signed 
Rank p-
value 
Market Adjusted  (using country specific indices)                   
(0,+1) 915 491:419 1.59% <.0001 0.18% 0.0004   891 531:358 3.35% <.0001 0.93% <.0001 
(-2,+2) 915 477:437 1.00% <.0001 0.22% 0.0164   891 542:349 4.63% <.0001 1.74% <.0001 
(-5,+5) 915 468:447 0.33% 0.1428 0.16% 0.3449   891 535:356 4.52% <.0001 2.02% <.0001 
(-10,+10) 915 431:484 -0.65% 0.5106 -0.73% 0.2387   891 503:388 4.21% <.0001 2.09% <.0001 
(-30,-10) 915 449:466 -0.32% 0.2523 -0.28% 0.2441   891 460:431 0.93% 0.4325 0.28% 0.1179 
(+10,+30) 915 378:537 -2.26% <.0001 -1.73% <.0001   891 407:484 -0.85% 0.0484 -0.87% 0.0179 
Market Model  (using country specific indices)                   
(0,+1) 915 516:399 1.66% <.0001 0.31% <.0001   891 543:348 3.42% <.0001 0.83% <.0001 
(-2,+2) 915 485:430 1.16% <.0001 0.42% 0.005   891 561:330 4.71% <.0001 1.80% <.0001 
(-5,+5) 915 477:438 1.05% 0.524 0.42% 0.0294   891 546:345 4.79% <.0001 1.81% <.0001 
(-10,+10) 915 461:454 1.06% 0.5883 0.10% 0.2358   891 534:357 4.89% <.0001 2.63% <.0001 
(-30,-10) 915 470:445 0.94% 0.0005 0.31% 0.2591   891 454:437 1.63% <.0001 0.22% 0.0244 
(+10,+30) 915 410:505 -1.44% <.0001 -1.01% 0.0019   891 429:462 0.05% <.0001 -0.41% 0.6034 
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Table 6 (Continued): Event Study Results for Different Levels of Government Expropriation 
 
    Left-Winged Government     Right-Winged (or other) Government   
Market Adjusted  (using country specific indices)                   
(0,+1) 892 515:374 3.01% <.0001 0.53% <.0001   916 508:404 1.96% <.0001 0.42% <.0001 
(-2,+2) 892 520:372 3.75% <.0001 1.15% <.0001   916 500:415 1.90% <.0001 0.70% <.0001 
(-5,+5) 892 524:368 4.21% <.0001 1.65% <.0001   916 481:435 0.85% 0.001 0.47% 0.0245 
(-10,+10) 892 489:403 3.97% <.0001 1.18% <.0001   916 447:469 -0.22% 0.4304 -0.31% 0.9375 
(-30,-10) 892 477:415 1.69% <.0001 0.65% 0.0049   916 433:483 -1.05% 0.0348 -0.75% 0.0144 
(+10,+30) 892 400:492 -0.95% 0.0342 -1.07% 0.0177   916 385:531 -2.24% <.0001 -1.53% <.0001 
Market Model  (using country specific indices)                   
(0,+1) 892 532:360 3.05% <.0001 0.53% <.0001   916 528:388 2.07% <.0001 0.55% <.0001 
(-2,+2) 892 520:372 3.88% <.0001 1.15% <.0001   916 527:389 2.02% <.0001 0.90% <.0001 
(-5,+5) 892 524:368 4.67% <.0001 1.68% <.0001   916 501:415 1.38% <.0001 0.74% 0.0009 
(-10,+10) 892 519:373 5.08% 0.0103 1.82% <.0001   916 478:438 1.08% 0.0092 0.59% 0.0346 
(-30,-10) 892 480:412 2.64% 0.1112 0.92% <.0001   916 446:470 -0.03% <.0001 -0.30% 0.4842 
(+10,+30) 892 428:464 -0.16% 0.0062 -0.36% 0.4292   916 411:505 -1.32% 0.0001 -1.00% 0.0031 
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Table 7: Event Study Results for Different Government Ownership Stakes 
Target stock price changes at the announcement of majority and minority government investment. Market adjusted returns are calculated as the difference 
between the firm's total return index and the corresponding local total return index, as defined by Datastream. Market Model parameters are estimated over 
days (-230,-30), where day 0 is the day of the announcement. Firms with a minimum of 100 daily returns are included in the study. Mean and median returns, 
as well as the p-values of the associated significance tests are presented. P-values at and below the 10% significance level are grayed out. 
 
    Government Ownership 50% or above     Government Ownership below 10%   
Event 
Window 
N 
Positive: 
Negative 
Mean 
CAR 
Patell Z 
p-value 
Median 
CAR 
Signed 
Rank p-
value 
N 
Positive: 
Negative 
Mean 
CAR 
Patell Z 
p-value 
Median 
CAR 
Signed 
Rank p-
value 
Market Adjusted  (using country specific indices)                 
(0,+1) 408 256:149 5.11% <.0001 1.29% <.0001 515 270:245 0.41% 0.021 0.16% 0.1608 
(-2,+2) 408 264:143 5.87% <.0001 2.84% <.0001 515 268:247 -0.02% 0.2627 0.39% 0.3502 
(-5,+5) 408 267:141 7.26% <.0001 3.60% <.0001 515 237:278 -1.41% 0.0034 -0.94% 0.0606 
(-10,+10) 408 263:145 8.14% <.0001 5.50% <.0001 515 224:291 -2.94% <.0001 -1.65% 0.0007 
(-30,-10) 408 220:188 0.69% 0.0496 0.68% 0.1153 515 224:291 -1.59% 0.0408 -1.59% 0.0021 
(+10,+30) 408 192:216 0.15% 0.4339 -0.64% 0.7452 515 198:317 -3.10% <.0001 -2.13% <.0001 
Market Model  (using country specific indices)                 
(0,+1) 408 261:147 5.29% <.0001 1.07% <.0001 515 278:237 0.41% <.0001 0.23% 0.0731 
(-2,+2) 408 273:135 6.27% <.0001 2.70% <.0001 515 268:247 -0.16% <.0001 0.25% 0.7315 
(-5,+5) 408 272:136 7.77% <.0001 4.04% <.0001 515 237:278 -1.29% 0.159 -0.60% 0.074 
(-10,+10) 408 283:125 9.14% <.0001 5.59% <.0001 515 238:277 -2.20% <.0001 -1.24% 0.0107 
(-30,-10) 408 224:184 1.80% <.0001 0.97% 0.0088 515 228:287 -0.85% <.0001 -1.25% 0.0762 
(+10,+30) 408 215:193 1.28% 0.0144 0.45% 0.1942 515 200:315 -3.33% <.0001 -2.59% <.0001 
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Table 8: Event Study Results During Banking and Financial Crises 
Target stock price changes at the announcement of increased government ownership during and outside of banking crises and the 2008-2010 financial crisis. 
Banking crises, as defined by Laeven and Valencia (2010), cover country specific years when those nations are under a banking crisis. The 2008-2010 
Financial Crisis covers deals announced between 2008-2010, while the sample outside of this crisis covers the 1988-2007 period. Market adjusted returns are 
calculated as the difference between the firm's total return index and the corresponding local total return index, as defined by Datastream. Market Model 
parameters are estimated over days (-230,-30), where day 0 is the day of the announcement. Firms with a minimum of 100 daily returns are included in the 
study. Mean and median returns, as well as the p-values of the associated significance tests are presented. P-values at and below the 10% significance level are 
grayed out. 
 
    Banking Crises           Outside of Banking Crises     
Event 
Window 
N 
Positive: 
Negative 
Mean 
CAR 
Patell Z 
p-value 
Median 
CAR 
Signed 
Rank p-
value 
  N 
Positive: 
Negative 
Mean 
CAR 
Patell Z 
p-value 
Median 
CAR 
Signed 
Rank p-
value 
Market Adjusted  (using country specific indices)                   
(0,+1) 410 209:200 -0.03% 0.9712 0.07% 0.3351   1399 815:578 3.22% <.0001 0.54% <.0001 
(-2,+2) 410 208:202 -1.76% <.0001 0.17% 0.7218   1399 813:585 4.15% <.0001 1.15% <.0001 
(-5,+5) 410 198:212 -3.18% <.0001 -0.47% 0.1835   1399 807:592 4.16% <.0001 1.34% <.0001 
(-10,+10) 410 181:229 -4.82% <.0001 -2.49% 0.0019   1399 756:643 3.80% <.0001 0.96% <.0001 
(-30,-10) 410 167:243 -4.30% <.0001 -3.61% <.0001   1399 743:656 1.65% <.0001 0.51% 0.0011 
(+10,+30) 410 163:247 -5.11% <.0001 -2.88% <.0001   1399 623:776 -0.57% 0.0454 -1.02% 0.0017 
Market Model (using country specific indices)                   
(0,+1) 410 226:184 0.03% 0.6481 0.26% 0.2938   1399 835:564 3.30% <.0001 0.62% <.0001 
(-2,+2) 410 214:196 -1.65% <.0001 0.37% 0.5679   1399 834:565 4.28% <.0001 1.19% <.0001 
(-5,+5) 410 209:201 -2.03% <.0001 0.22% 0.6653   1399 816:583 4.47% <.0001 1.42% <.0001 
(-10,+10) 410 200:210 -1.74% <.0001 -0.69% 0.5907   1399 798:601 4.46% <.0001 1.55% <.0001 
(-30,-10) 410 182:228 -1.50% 0.0013 -1.67% 0.0615   1399 744:655 2.10% <.0001 0.81% 0.0001 
(+10,+30) 410 173:237 -3.40% <.0001 -2.76% 0.0013   1399 667:732 0.03% <.0001 -0.41% 0.272 
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Table 8 (Continued): Event Study Results During Banking and Financial Crises 
 
    
2008-2010 Financial Crisis 
    
Excluding the 2008-2010 Financial Crisis 
(1988-2007) 
Market Adjusted  (using country specific indices)                   
(0,+1) 569 309:259 1.72% <.0001 0.51% 0.0001   1213 696:511 2.76% <.0001 0.43% <.0001 
(-2,+2) 569 317:252 1.37% 0.0002 1.04% 0.0018   1213 688:524 3.48% <.0001 0.84% <.0001 
(-5,+5) 569 305:264 0.63% 0.8322 1.13% 0.0477   1213 687:526 3.31% <.0001 0.99% <.0001 
(-10,+10) 569 278:291 -0.16% 0.4878 -0.58% 0.9676   1213 644:569 2.73% <.0001 0.71% <.0001 
(-30,-10) 569 264:305 -1.90% 0.0004 -0.96% 0.0165   1213 631:582 1.27% <.0001 0.36% 0.0471 
(+10,+30) 569 245:324 -3.75% <.0001 -2.38% <.0001   1213 531:682 -0.52% 0.0142 -1.06% 0.001 
Market Model (using country specific indices)                   
(0,+1) 569 324:245 1.78% <.0001 0.53% 0.0001   1213 719:494 2.84% <.0001 0.53% <.0001 
(-2,+2) 569 319:250 1.48% <.0001 0.93% 0.0031   1213 711:502 3.61% <.0001 0.99% <.0001 
(-5,+5) 569 319:250 1.50% 0.7338 1.40% 0.004   1213 691:522 3.63% <.0001 1.10% <.0001 
(-10,+10) 569 302:267 2.25% <.0001 1.32% 0.0154   1213 681:532 3.39% <.0001 1.26% <.0001 
(-30,-10) 569 274:295 0.12% <.0001 -0.38% 0.9561   1213 638:575 1.78% 0.441 0.66% 0.0035 
(+10,+30) 569 255:314 -2.31% 0.9589 -1.61% 0.0284   1213 577:636 0.10% 0.481 -0.49% 0.1701 
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Table 9: Target Stock Price Reaction to Government Investment Announcements 
The dependent variable is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 5 day (-2, +2) return, as in Table 4. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. Model 1 includes all deals; Model 2 foreign and Model 3 domestic 
deals. The regression parameters are estimated via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West 
adjustment. Year, SIC, target nation, and acquirer nation fixed effects (FE) are included where 
indicated. Coefficients significant at and below the 10% level are in boldface and t-statistics are listed 
underneath in parentheses. 
 
  (1) All (2) Foreign (3) Domestic 
Foreign Deal 0.0309     
  (2.50)     
Gov. Shares Acquired (%) 0.0012 0.0021 0.0006 
  (5.63) (5.20) (2.69) 
Gov. Prior Ownership (%) 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 
  (3.33) (0.46) (2.72) 
Gov.-to-Gov. Deal 0.0215 0.0567 0.0253 
  (1.68) (1.44) (1.86) 
Withdrawn Deal -0.0396 0.0029 -0.0448 
  (-1.53) (0.07) (-1.89) 
Last Year Performance 0.0014 -0.0095 0.0059 
  (0.19) (-0.61) (0.72) 
Cash Deal 0.0089 0.0005 0.0150 
  (1.09) (0.02) (1.51) 
Stock Deal -0.0378 -0.0936 -0.0196 
  (-1.67) (-1.85) (-0.96) 
Bank Crises Dummy -0.0151 -0.0054 -0.0134 
  (-0.98) (-0.21) (-0.60) 
Size -0.0061 -0.0051 -0.0067 
  (-2.71) (-1.09) (-2.47) 
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.69) (-0.55) (-0.15) 
ROA -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 
  (-0.38) (-0.59) (-0.28) 
Tobin's Q -0.0058 -0.0022 -0.0058 
  (-1.81) (-0.37) (-1.70) 
Intercept 0.0465 0.1819 0.0048 
  (0.84) (1.38) (0.09) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
SIC FE Yes Yes Yes 
Target Nation FE Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer P. Nation FE Yes Yes   
Observations 1160 412 748 
R-squared 0.229 0.360 0.184 
Adjusted R-squared 0.152 0.155 0.097 
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Table 10: Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Different Types of Government Investor 
The dependent variable is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 5 day (-2, +2) return, as in Table 4. Variables are defined in Table 1. Model 1 includes all 
deals, Model 2 shows foreign and Model 3 domestic deals. Model 4 includes investments by political, Model 5 by economic, and Model 6 financial arms of 
government. The regression parameters are estimated via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West adjustment. Year, SIC, target nation, and 
acquirer nation fixed effects (FE) are included where indicated. Coefficients significant at and below the 10% level are in boldface and t-statistics are listed 
underneath in parentheses. 
  (1) All (2) Foreign (3) Domestic (4) Political (5) Financial (6) Economic 
Political Gov. Investor -0.0302 -0.0134 -0.0364       
  (-2.23) (-0.29) (-2.45)       
Financial Gov. Investor -0.0025 -0.0001 -0.0052       
  (-0.23) (-0.00) (-0.44)       
Foreign Deal 0.0232     0.0681 -0.0019 0.0176 
  (1.82)     (1.35) (-0.13) (0.90) 
Gov. Shares Acquired (%) 0.0012 0.0021 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0014 0.0010 
  (5.40) (5.07) (2.45) (-2.34) (3.64) (3.70) 
Gov. Prior Ownership (%) 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0006 
  (3.24) (0.45) (2.66) (1.10) (2.09) (1.64) 
Gov.-to-Gov. Deal 0.0223 0.0576 0.0263 0.0879 -0.0009 0.0041 
  (1.75) (1.45) (1.94) (2.78) (-0.04) (0.21) 
Withdrawn Deal -0.0404 0.0012 -0.0448 0.1148 0.0659 -0.0697 
  (-1.56) (0.03) (-1.86) (2.20) (1.19) (-2.58) 
Last Year Performance 0.0013 -0.0096 0.0057 0.0015 -0.0007 0.0047 
  (0.18) (-0.62) (0.72) (0.10) (-0.07) (0.41) 
Cash Deal 0.0083 0.0008 0.0129 0.0198 0.0015 0.0031 
  (1.02) (0.04) (1.30) (1.18) (0.09) (0.20) 
Stock Deal -0.0416 -0.0954 -0.0263   -0.0892 -0.0555 
  (-1.84) (-1.90) (-1.25)   (-1.67) (-1.92) 
Bank Crises Dummy -0.0144 -0.0054 -0.0146 0.0039 -0.0132 -0.0301 
  (-0.94) (-0.21) (-0.66) (0.11) (-0.59) (-1.13) 
Size -0.0055 -0.0050 -0.0057 -0.0072 -0.0020 -0.0075 
  (-2.46) (-1.07) (-2.14) (-1.77) (-0.62) (-1.99) 
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.65) (-0.52) (-0.11) (0.58) (-0.63) (-0.40) 
ROA -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0000 
  (-0.32) (-0.59) (-0.24) (-0.43) (-0.19) (-0.00) 
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Table 10 (Continued): Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Different Types of Government Investor 
 
  (1) All (2) Foreign (3) Domestic (4) Political (5) Financial (6) Economic 
Tobin's Q -0.0054 -0.0021 -0.0052 0.0138 -0.0011 -0.0132 
  (-1.66) (-0.34) (-1.50) (1.20) (-0.30) (-2.97) 
Intercept 0.0504 0.1780 0.0095 0.0536 0.0065 0.1503 
  (0.93) (1.35) (0.19) (0.69) (0.10) (1.57) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Nation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer P. Nation FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1160 412 748 252 455 453 
R-squared 0.232 0.361 0.191 0.167 0.233 0.278 
Adjusted R-squared 0.154 0.149 0.102 0.032 0.107 0.163 
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Table 11: Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Different Types of Government Investor 
The dependent variable is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 5 day (-2, +2) return, as in Table 4. Variables are defined in Table 1. Model 1 (a,b) includes 
all deals, Model 2 (a,b) shows foreign and Model 3 (a,b) domestic deals. The regression parameters are estimated via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the 
Newey-West adjustment. Year, SIC, target nation, and acquirer nation fixed effects (FE) are included where indicated. Coefficients significant at and below the 
10% level are in boldface and t-statistics are listed underneath in parentheses. 
  (1a) All (1b) All (2a) Foreign (2b) Foreign (3a) Domestic (3b) Domestic 
Political_Gov_Local -0.0301 -0.0254 -0.0217 -0.0076 -0.0422 -0.0404 
  (-1.60) (-1.28) (-0.47) (-0.14) (-2.08) (-1.89) 
Political_Gov_National -0.0346 -0.0302 0.0296 0.0303 -0.0454 -0.0427 
  (-1.88) (-1.68) (0.55) (0.59) (-2.70) (-2.59) 
Political_Pension_Fund -0.0457 -0.0349 -0.0035 0.0088 -0.0358 -0.0330 
  (-2.26) (-1.81) (-0.04) (0.11) (-1.64) (-1.56) 
Finanacial_SWF -0.0216   0.0165   0.0021   
  (-1.02)   (0.56)   (0.06)   
Financial_Restate -0.0010   0.0177   -0.0255   
  (-0.02)   (0.27)   (-1.12)   
Financial_Bank -0.0034   0.0014   -0.0090   
  (-0.20)   (0.04)   (-0.40)   
Financial_Develop_Bank 0.0077   -0.0684   0.0163   
  (0.28)   (-1.04)   (0.58)   
Financial_Other -0.0053   -0.0183   -0.0020   
  (-0.44)   (-0.67)   (-0.14)   
Financial_Supranational 0.0229   -0.0123       
  (0.43)   (-0.21)       
SOE_Energy   -0.0102   -0.0366   0.0079 
    (-0.73)   (-1.30)   (0.52) 
SOE_Consumer   0.0151   0.0460   0.0068 
    (0.62)   (0.70)   (0.29) 
SOE_Industrial   0.0147   0.0628   -0.0182 
    (0.91)   (1.61)   (-0.97) 
SOE_Materials   -0.0052   -0.0077   0.0020 
    (-0.23)   (-0.20)   (0.08) 
SOE_Media   -0.0116   -0.0099   -0.0119 
    (-0.50)   (-0.25)   (-0.42) 
SOE_Telecomtech   0.0322   0.0343   0.0293 
    (1.51)   (0.82)   (1.58) 
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Table 11 (Continued): Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Different Types of Government Investor 
 
  (1a) All (1b) All (2a) Foreign (2b) Foreign (3a) Domestic (3b) Domestic 
Foreign Deal 0.0222 0.0223         
  (1.78) (1.87)         
Gov. Shares Acquired (%) 0.0011 0.0011 0.0020 0.0019 0.0006 0.0006 
  (5.20) (5.16) (4.68) (4.63) (2.64) (2.49) 
Gov. Prior Ownership (%) 0.0007 0.0007 0.0002 0.0001 0.0008 0.0008 
  (2.91) (2.81) (0.49) (0.31) (2.79) (2.81) 
Gov.-to-Gov. Deal 0.0258 0.0249 0.0451 0.0324 0.0276 0.0298 
  (2.00) (1.94) (1.41) (1.13) (2.08) (2.26) 
Withdrawn Deal -0.0399 -0.0399 -0.0608 -0.0701 -0.0315 -0.0265 
  (-1.56) (-1.51) (-0.87) (-1.03) (-1.07) (-0.88) 
Last Year Performance 0.0014 0.0009 -0.0102 -0.0080 0.0069 0.0064 
  (0.20) (0.12) (-0.80) (-0.67) (0.92) (0.84) 
Cash Deal 0.0077 0.0077 0.0021 0.0012 0.0114 0.0131 
  (0.95) (0.94) (0.12) (0.07) (1.19) (1.35) 
Stock Deal -0.0467 -0.0532 -0.0967 -0.1235 -0.0365 -0.0394 
  (-2.05) (-2.30) (-2.05) (-2.93) (-1.97) (-2.00) 
Bank Crises Dummy -0.0181 -0.0181 0.0027 0.0009 -0.0250 -0.0271 
  (-1.19) (-1.21) (0.12) (0.04) (-1.36) (-1.52) 
Size -0.0058 -0.0061 -0.0043 -0.0022 -0.0062 -0.0065 
  (-2.50) (-2.64) (-1.14) (-0.61) (-2.29) (-2.41) 
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.44) (-0.55) (-1.05) (-1.24) (-0.19) (-0.05) 
ROA -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.28) (-0.36) (-0.83) (-0.93) (-0.05) (-0.09) 
Tobin's Q -0.0055 -0.0058 -0.0020 -0.0025 -0.0057 -0.0068 
  (-1.71) (-1.67) (-0.37) (-0.46) (-1.64) (-1.91) 
Intercept 0.0564 0.0564 0.1515 0.0959 0.0257 0.0211 
  (1.06) (1.07) (1.63) (1.00) (0.56) (0.46) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Nation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer P. Nation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes     
Observations 1160 1160 412 412 748 748 
R-squared 0.221 0.225 0.292 0.311 0.170 0.173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.145 0.149 0.154 0.177 0.093 0.096 
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Table 12: Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Governments with the High Risk of Expropriation 
The dependent variable is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 5 day (-2, +2) return, as in Table 4. Variables are defined in Table 1. Model 1 includes all 
deals, Model 2 shows foreign and Model 3 domestic deals. Model 4 includes investments by political, Model 5 by economic, and Model 6 financial arms of 
government. The regression parameters are estimated via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West adjustment. Year, SIC, target nation, and 
acquirer nation fixed effects (FE) are included where indicated. Coefficients significant at and below the 10% level are in boldface and t-statistics are listed 
underneath in parentheses. 
 
  (1) All (2) Foreign (3) Domestic (4) Political (5) Financial (6) Economic 
Gov. Expropriation -0.0054 -0.0079 -0.0066 0.0085 -0.0038 -0.0082 
  (-1.98) (-1.22) (-2.23) (1.68) (-0.95) (-1.65) 
Political Gov. Investor -0.0285 -0.0182 -0.0395       
  (-2.10) (-0.39) (-2.78)       
Financial Gov. Investor -0.0017 0.0033 -0.0022       
  (-0.15) (0.11) (-0.19)       
Foreign Deal 0.0218     0.0748 -0.0055 0.0125 
  (1.71)     (1.56) (-0.40) (0.60) 
Gov. Shares Acquired (%) 0.0012 0.0021 0.0006 -0.0013 0.0014 0.0010 
  (5.38) (5.08) (2.56) (-2.21) (3.67) (3.60) 
Gov. Prior Ownership (%) 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 0.0011 0.0008 0.0006 
  (3.22) (0.46) (2.77) (1.30) (2.10) (1.68) 
Gov.-to-Gov. Deal 0.0234 0.0526 0.0291 0.0858 -0.0001 0.0079 
  (1.84) (1.31) (2.21) (2.67) (-0.00) (0.39) 
Withdrawn Deal -0.0386 0.0025 -0.0333 0.0995 0.0667 -0.0684 
  (-1.52) (0.06) (-1.16) (1.87) (1.20) (-2.53) 
Last Year Performance 0.0009 -0.0092 0.0059 0.0013 -0.0010 0.0031 
  (0.12) (-0.59) (0.76) (0.09) (-0.11) (0.26) 
Cash Deal 0.0088 0.0001 0.0125 0.0208 0.0023 0.0013 
  (1.09) (0.00) (1.32) (1.24) (0.15) (0.08) 
Stock Deal -0.0430 -0.1056 -0.0398   -0.0899 -0.0640 
  (-1.89) (-1.99) (-2.03)   (-1.66) (-2.11) 
Bank Crises Dummy -0.0101 0.0025 -0.0217 0.0083 -0.0111 -0.0255 
  (-0.66) (0.09) (-1.16) (0.24) (-0.49) (-0.96) 
Size -0.0054 -0.0049 -0.0067 -0.0062 -0.0022 -0.0073 
  (-2.47) (-1.07) (-2.58) (-1.49) (-0.67) (-1.92) 
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.76) (-0.55) (-0.31) (0.23) (-0.70) (-0.47) 
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Table 12 (Continued): Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Governments with High Risk of Expropriation 
 
  (1) All (2) Foreign (3) Domestic (4) Political (5) Financial (6) Economic 
ROA -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (-0.47) (-0.61) (-0.18) (-0.55) (-0.28) (-0.15) 
Tobin's Q -0.0051 -0.0022 -0.0054 0.0178 -0.0007 -0.0133 
  (-1.56) (-0.37) (-1.56) (1.53) (-0.19) (-3.03) 
Intercept 0.0664 0.1867 0.0572 0.0078 0.0205 0.1754 
  (1.20) (1.41) (1.27) (0.09) (0.33) (1.83) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Nation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer P. Nation FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1159 411 748 252 455 452 
R-squared 0.234 0.363 0.174 0.173 0.234 0.283 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.149 0.103 0.035 0.106 0.167 
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Table 13: Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Left-Wing Governments 
The dependent variable is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 5 day (-2, +2) return, as in Table 4. Variables are defined in Table 1. Model 1 includes all 
deals, Model 2 shows foreign and Model 3 domestic deals. Model 4 includes investments by political, Model 5 by economic, and Model 6 financial arms of 
government. The regression parameters are estimated via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West adjustment. Year, SIC, target nation, and 
acquirer nation fixed effects (FE) are included where indicated. Coefficients significant at and below the 10% level are in boldface and t-statistics are listed 
underneath in parentheses. 
 
  (1) All (2) Foreign (3) Domestic (4) Political (5) Financial (6) Economic 
Left-wing Gov. -0.0214 -0.0391 -0.0250 -0.0631 0.0097 -0.0276 
  (-1.77) (-1.61) (-2.11) (-2.63) (0.62) (-1.30) 
Political Gov. Investor -0.0316 -0.0156 -0.0393       
  (-2.35) (-0.34) (-3.02)       
Financial Gov. Investor -0.0032 0.0002 -0.0033       
  (-0.29) (0.00) (-0.28)       
Foreign Deal 0.0231     0.0593 -0.0008 0.0154 
  (1.81)     (1.19) (-0.05) (0.78) 
Gov. Shares Acquired (%) 0.0012 0.0021 0.0006 -0.0013 0.0014 0.0010 
  (5.42) (5.05) (2.52) (-2.28) (3.66) (3.68) 
Gov. Prior Ownership (%) 0.0008 0.0002 0.0008 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 
  (3.24) (0.44) (2.81) (0.85) (2.07) (1.60) 
Gov.-to-Gov. Deal 0.0212 0.0559 0.0242 0.0845 -0.0001 0.0021 
  (1.66) (1.39) (1.82) (2.97) (-0.00) (0.10) 
Withdrawn Deal -0.0400 -0.0020 -0.0308 0.1233 0.0645 -0.0683 
  (-1.54) (-0.04) (-1.05) (2.49) (1.16) (-2.57) 
Last Year Performance 0.0012 -0.0084 0.0054 -0.0060 -0.0006 0.0034 
  (0.16) (-0.54) (0.69) (-0.43) (-0.06) (0.29) 
Cash Deal 0.0082 0.0002 0.0116 0.0147 0.0013 0.0044 
  (1.01) (0.00) (1.23) (0.88) (0.08) (0.29) 
Stock Deal -0.0437 -0.0965 -0.0418   -0.0862 -0.0555 
  (-1.99) (-1.98) (-2.20)   (-1.59) (-2.02) 
Bank Crises Dummy -0.0176 -0.0081 -0.0286 -0.0056 -0.0117 -0.0293 
  (-1.14) (-0.30) (-1.75) (-0.16) (-0.53) (-1.11) 
Size -0.0054 -0.0047 -0.0065 -0.0069 -0.0020 -0.0079 
  (-2.43) (-1.00) (-2.51) (-1.69) (-0.60) (-2.08) 
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.62) (-0.52) (-0.24) (0.43) (-0.64) (-0.32) 
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Table 13 (Continued): Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Left-Wing Governments 
 
  (1) All (2) Foreign (3) Domestic (4) Political (5) Financial (6) Economic 
ROA -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 
  (-0.19) (-0.49) (0.16) (-0.36) (-0.25) (0.06) 
Tobin's Q -0.0052 -0.0024 -0.0058 0.0164 -0.0011 -0.0136 
  (-1.61) (-0.40) (-1.72) (1.46) (-0.29) (-3.03) 
Intercept 0.0551 0.1926 0.0445 0.0815 0.0008 0.1679 
  (1.02) (1.48) (0.99) (1.10) (0.01) (1.76) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Nation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer P. Nation FE Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1159 411 748 252 455 452 
R-squared 0.234 0.364 0.172 0.189 0.233 0.280 
Adjusted R-squared 0.155 0.151 0.101 0.053 0.105 0.164 
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Table 14: Target Stock Price Reaction to Majority and Minority Government Stake Investment 
The dependent variable is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 5 day (-2, +2) return, as in Table 4. 
Variables are defined in Table 1. Model 1 includes all deals. Model 2 shows deals with majority stake 
purchases of above 50%; Model 3 with stake acquisitions of below 50% and above 10%; Model 4 with 
minority stake investments of below 10%. The regression parameters are estimated via OLS (Ordinary 
Least Squares) with the Newey-West adjustment. Year, SIC, target nation, and acquirer nation fixed 
effects (FE) are included where indicated. Coefficients significant at and below the 10% level are in 
boldface and t-statistics are listed underneath in parentheses. 
  
(1) All (2) Maj. 
Own 
(>=50%) 
(3) 50% > Maj. 
Own >= 10% 
(4) Min. 
Own. 
(<10%) 
Majority Ownership (>50%) 0.0727       
  (5.47)       
Majority Ownership (50%-10%) 0.0220       
  (2.71)       
Political -0.0404 -0.0382 -0.0591 -0.0166 
  (-2.82) (-0.74) (-3.11) (-0.74) 
Financial -0.0094 0.0162 -0.0200 -0.0135 
  (-0.82) (0.48) (-1.11) (-0.76) 
Political * Foreign 0.0076 0.2239 0.0622 0.0694 
  (0.19) (1.53) (0.90) (2.11) 
Financial * Foreign -0.0004 0.0350 -0.0386 0.0606 
  (-0.01) (0.48) (-1.23) (2.44) 
Foreign Deal 0.0255 -0.0272 0.0505 -0.0337 
  (1.43) (-0.65) (1.77) (-1.64) 
Gov.-to-Gov. Deal 0.0250 0.0536 0.0153 0.0005 
  (1.83) (2.17) (0.70) (0.02) 
Withdrawn Deal 0.0106 -0.0682 0.0720 -0.0668 
  (0.42) (-1.83) (1.91) (-1.32) 
Last Year Performance 0.0010 0.0303 -0.0073 0.0000 
  (0.14) (1.30) (-0.78) (-0.00) 
Cash Deal 0.0112 0.0085 0.0078 0.0054 
  (1.34) (0.32) (0.55) (0.46) 
Stock Deal -0.0366 -0.0498 -0.0350   
  (-1.54) (-1.28) (-0.95)   
Bank Crises Dummy -0.0193 -0.0973 -0.0112 0.0101 
  (-1.26) (-2.01) (-0.50) (0.65) 
Size -0.0054 -0.0032 -0.0095 0.0002 
  (-2.45) (-0.47) (-2.45) (0.06) 
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.000004 
  (-0.66) (-0.04) (-0.72) (-1.95) 
ROA -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0007 0.0001 
  (-0.27) (-1.45) (-1.60) (0.31) 
Tobin's Q -0.0045 -0.0215 -0.0006 0.0026 
  (-1.40) (-3.20) (-0.11) (0.82) 
Intercept 0.0430 0.0038 0.1961 0.0581 
  (0.77) (0.02) (2.58) (0.86) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Target Nation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer P. Nation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1183 275 509 399 
R-squared 0.226 0.456 0.230 0.154 
Adjusted R-squared 0.147 0.258 0.091 0.052 
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Table 15: Robustness Checks for Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Different Types of Government Investor 
The dependent variable is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal 5 day (-2, +2) return, as in Table 4. The independent variables are described in Table 1. 
Model 1 includes offer premium, Model 2 examines deals with no offer premium data. Model 3 estimates during banking crises; Model 4 outside of banking 
crises; Model 5 during the 2008-2009 financial crisis and Model 6 outside of the 2008-2009 financial crisis. The regression parameters are estimated via OLS 
(Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West adjustment. Year, SIC, target nation, and acquirer nation fixed effects (FE) are included where indicated. 
Coefficients significant at the 10% level are in boldface and t-statistics is listed below in parentheses. 
 
  
(1) With 
Offer 
Premium 
(2) Without 
Offer 
Premium 
(3) Bank 
Crises 
(4) Outside 
Bank Crises 
(5) 08-09 
Financial 
Crisis 
(6) Outside 08-
09 Financial 
Crisis 
Offer Premium 0.0648           
  (3.16)           
Political Gov. Investor -0.0663 -0.0244 -0.0499 -0.0261 -0.0357 -0.0382 
  (-2.59) (-1.64) (-1.74) (-1.70) (-1.12) (-2.90) 
Financial Gov. Investor -0.0331 0.0051 -0.0343 0.0003 -0.0065 -0.0216 
  (-1.85) (0.39) (-1.21) (0.02) (-0.24) (-2.03) 
Foreign Deal 0.0209 0.0230 0.0434 0.0201 0.0127 0.0251 
  (1.24) (1.89) (1.65) (1.49) (0.48) (2.88) 
Gov. Shares Acquired (%) 0.0009 0.0010 0.0000 0.0013 0.0011 0.0013 
  (2.87) (3.26) (0.01) (5.92) (2.13) (5.32) 
Gov. Prior Ownership (%) 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0001 0.0008 
  (1.42) (0.55) (-0.46) (3.40) (0.14) (3.13) 
Gov.-to-Gov. Deal 0.0462 0.0017 0.0419 0.0184 0.0358 0.0133 
  (2.37) (0.12) (1.23) (1.31) (1.05) (1.05) 
Withdrawn Deal -0.0256 -0.0314   -0.0437 -0.0058 -0.0425 
  (-0.49) (-1.27)   (-1.69) (-0.16) (-1.54) 
Last Year Performance -0.0042 0.0064 -0.0200 0.0063 -0.0271 0.0015 
  (-0.35) (0.83) (-1.54) (0.73) (-1.66) (0.21) 
Cash Deal 0.0113 -0.0039 0.0124 0.0073 0.0117 0.0130 
  (1.00) (-0.33) (0.79) (0.77) (0.84) (1.44) 
Stock Deal -0.0897 0.0071   -0.0497 -0.0053 -0.0649 
  (-3.09) (0.31)   (-2.21) (-0.11) (-2.94) 
Bank Crises Dummy -0.0374 -0.0078     -0.0254 -0.0118 
  (-1.65) (-0.53)     (-1.15) (-0.76) 
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Table 15 (Continued): Robustness Checks for Target Stock Price Reaction to Investment by Different Types of Government Investor 
  
  
(1) With 
Offer 
Premium 
(2) Without 
Offer 
Premium 
(3) Bank 
Crises 
(4) Outside 
Bank Crises 
(5) 08-09 
Financial 
Crisis 
(6) Outside 08-
09 Financial 
Crisis 
Size -0.0025 -0.0065 -0.0076 -0.0041 -0.0070 -0.0037 
  (-0.79) (-2.39) (-2.36) (-1.45) (-2.03) (-1.61) 
Leverage 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
  (-0.27) (-1.48) (-1.67) (-0.24) (-1.72) (-0.19) 
ROA 0.0002 -0.0008 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0003 
  (0.55) (-1.69) (-0.37) (-0.23) (-0.06) (-0.79) 
Tobin's Q -0.0031 -0.0082 -0.0043 -0.0052 -0.0098 -0.0064 
  (-0.57) (-2.79) (-0.15) (-1.47) (-2.03) (-1.87) 
Intercept -0.0014 0.1036 0.1980 0.0340 0.1010 0.0507 
  (-0.01) (1.73) (2.62) (0.57) (1.80) (0.93) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
SIC FE Yes Yes   Yes   Yes 
Target Nation FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 506 654 278 882 356 804 
R-squared 0.320 0.178 0.119 0.255 0.184 0.180 
Adjusted R-squared 0.252 0.084 0.062 0.153 0.125 0.134 
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Table 16: Variable Definitions, Chapter 2 
Ownership data are from the following sources: SDC Platinum; Thomson ONE Banker; entities’ 
websites; press releases; the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data-Gathering, 
Analysis, and Retrieval system (EDGAR); the Canadian Securities Administrators’ System for 
Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR); Privatization Barometer; the World Bank 
privatization database; and Lexis-Nexis. Bond data are obtained from Bloomberg and DataStream. 
Financial data are obtained from the Worldscope database. 
Variable Definition 
Government Ownership Variables 
Govt presence 
Takes a value of 1 if the company currently has some government ownership, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Govt stake (%) Percentage of the company owned by the government.  
Bailed out 
Takes a value of 1 once a company has been publicly rescued by the 
government, and 0 otherwise 
Government Investor Types 
Central govt 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a central government, treasury, or 
ministry, and 0 otherwise. 
Local/regional govt 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a government representing a state, 
city, or region, and 0 otherwise. 
SOE full 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a 100% state-owned enterprise, and 
0 otherwise. 
SOE mixed 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a government-controlled enterprise 
that is now at least partially owned by non-government investors, and 0 
otherwise. 
Govt bank 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is government-owned financial 
institution (e.g., a Central Bank or government development bank), and 0 
otherwise. 
SWF 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a sovereign wealth fund, and 0 
otherwise. 
Pension fund 
Takes a value of 1 if the investing entity is a government-owned public pension 
fund, and 0 otherwise. 
Macroeconomic Variables 
Fin. crisis Takes a value of 1 for the years 2008, 2009, and 2010, and 0 otherwise.  
Banking crisis 
Takes a value of 1 for the years defined as a banking crisis by Laeven and 
Valencia (2010), and 0 otherwise. 
Govt size 
Score between 0 to 10 based on the amount of government involvement in a 
nation’s economy. Higher scores indicate less government involvement.  Based 
on the Economic Freedom of the World Index (Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson, 
2010). 
Political leadership: 
Left 
Takes a value of 1 if the chief executive of a nation is part of a left-wing 
political party, and 0 otherwise. Based on Beck et al. (2001); database updated 
December 2010. 
Bond Variables 
Rating 
The natural log of Standard and Poor’s bond rating, after conversion to an 
ordinal scale. (AAA = 22, AA+ = 21, etc.)  
Age The time since the issue date, in days. 
Maturity The time till maturity, in days. 
Firm Variables 
Leverage (Total assets – Stockholders equity) / Stockholders equity 
Market-to-book (Total shares * Closing share price) / Stockholders equity 
Size The natural log of total assets. 
ROE  Net income / Stockholders equity  
Bank Takes a value of 1 if the target company is a bank, and 0 otherwise. 
Privatized target firm 
Takes a value of 1 if the target company is a formerly state-owned company, 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 17: Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 2 
The sample consists of 5,048 yearly observations from 1,278 bonds issued by 214 firms over 1991-
2010. 3,111 observations relate to firm-years with government ownership. Panel A includes observation 
counts for the entire sample and for the subsample including only firm-years with state ownership. 
Panel B shows observation counts grouped by the nation of the government owner with the largest stake 
for each firm-year. Panels C and D include observation counts by the headquarter nation of sample 
firms and industrial sectors based on one-digit SIC codes, respectively. Panel E lists the distributions of 
binary variables, while Panel F lists the count, mean, median, standard deviation, 25th, and 75th 
percentiles of continuous variables. Variable definitions are provided in Table 16. Credit spreads in the 
top and bottom 1% of all observations are dropped. Bond-years can be associated with more than one 
state investment vehicle type listed in Panel E. 
 
Panel A. Credit spread observations by year     
Year 
All Firms 
  
Firms with Government 
Ownership 
N Proportion   N Proportion 
1991 2 0.04%       
1992 5 0.1% 
   
1993 17 0.3% 
 
10 0.3% 
1994 20 0.4% 
 
10 0.3% 
1995 25 0.5% 
 
12 0.4% 
1996 34 0.7% 
 
18 0.6% 
1997 41 0.8% 
 
18 0.6% 
1998 60 1.2% 
 
29 0.9% 
1999 129 2.6% 
 
79 2.5% 
2000 161 3.2% 
 
105 3.4% 
2001 264 5.2% 
 
163 5.2% 
2002 260 5.2% 
 
158 5.1% 
2003 333 6.6% 
 
186 6.0% 
2004 401 7.9% 
 
236 7.6% 
2005 443 8.8% 
 
265 8.5% 
2006 509 10.1% 
 
317 10.2% 
2007 525 10.4% 
 
249 8.0% 
2008 536 10.6% 
 
300 9.6% 
2009 630 12.5% 
 
377 12.1% 
2010 653 12.9% 
 
579 18.6% 
Totals 5,048 100%   3,111 100% 
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Table 17 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 2 
 
Panel B. Nationalities of government owners   
Rank    Acquirer Nation 
Firms with Government Ownership 
N Proportion 
1 Canada 576 19% 
2 France 414 13% 
3 United States 310 10% 
4 United Kingdom 206 7% 
5 Spain 196 6% 
6 Singapore 140 5% 
7 Germany 134 4% 
8 Belgium 131 4% 
9 Norway 116 4% 
10 Malaysia 108 3% 
 
OTHER 780 25% 
  Totals 3,111 100% 
    Panel C. Nationalities of sample firms 
Rank Target Nation N Proportion 
1 United States 1574 31% 
2 Canada 877 17% 
3 United Kingdom 570 11% 
4 France 459 9% 
5 Germany 151 3% 
6 Spain 143 3% 
7 Netherlands 111 2% 
8 Malasya 100 2% 
9 Australia 98 2% 
10 Hong Kong 86 2% 
 
OTHER 879 17% 
  Totals 5,048 100% 
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Table 17 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 2 
 
Panel D. Industries of sample firms     
Target 
SIC 
Description of Target SIC  N Proportion 
0 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 13 0.3% 
1 Mining, construction 233 5% 
2 Manufacturing (food, fabric, wood, chemical) 401 8% 
3 
Manufacturing (rubber, plastic, glass, metal; boat, rail, air 
equipment) 
254 5% 
4 Transportation, communications, electric, gas, and sanitary service 1,582 31% 
5 Trade (wholesale, retail) 192 4% 
6 Finance, insurance, and real estate 2,337 46% 
7 
Services (hotel, beauty, funeral, computer, car rental & repair, 
movie) 
27 0.5% 
8 Services (doctor's offices, legal, schools, religious, accounting) 9 0.2% 
  Totals 5,048 100% 
 
 
Panel E. Binary Variables 
Binary Variables N Yes (1) No (0) 
Government Variables 
   
   Govt presence 5,048 3,111 1,937 
      Central govt 5,048 562 4,486 
      Local/regional govt 5,048 69 4,979 
      SOE full 5,048 894 4,154 
      SOE mixed 5,048 1,625 3,423 
      Govt bank 5,048 212 4,836 
      SWF 5,048 893 4,155 
      Pension fund 5,048 783 4,265 
   Bailed out 5,048 480 4,568 
   Foreign govt investor 5,048 1,339 3,709 
Macroeconomic Variables 
   
   Fin. crisis 5,048 1,819 3,229 
   Banking crisis 5,048 1,307 3,741 
Firm Variables 
   
  Bank 5,048 1,284 3,764 
 
  
 169 
 
Table 17 (Continued): Descriptive Statistics, Chapter 2 
 
Panel F. Continuous variables 
Continuous Variables Count Mean Median 
Standard 
deviation 
25
th
 
percentile 
75
th
 
percentile 
       
Credit spread 5,048 215.5 135.8 235.1 68.6 273.2 
       
Government 
Variables       
   Govt ownership 5,048 13.50% 2.29% 22.20% 0 14.50% 
   Govt ownership > 0 3,111 21.90% 10.70% 24.80% 3.63% 31.90% 
       
 Bond Variables 
      
   Rating 5,048 15.8 16 3.18 14 18 
   Age (days) 5,048 1650 1317 1376 604 2316 
   Maturity (days) 5,048 2829 1886 3204 971 3266 
       
Firm Variables 
      
   Leverage 5,048 11.2 3.6 13.2 1.62 19.3 
   M_B 5,048 1.86 1.62 1.34 1.09 2.24 
   Size 5,048 10.9 10.6 2.45 9.24 13.2 
   ROE 5,048 7.49% 11.20% 34.00% 5.48% 16.90% 
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Table 18: Mean Difference Tests, Chapter 2 
The following table presents Credit spread means and two-sample t-tests for differences in means. The 
sample covers the period 1991–2010. The p-value shows the significance level of the two-tailed 
difference in means tests, with standard errors clustered at the firm level (as in Skinner, Holt, and 
Smith, 1989). For the comparison of foreign and domestic government ownership, firms are grouped 
based on whether the majority of their government ownership is held by a domestic state entity or a 
foreign one. 
 
Sample All 
Govt 
presence 
No Govt 
presence 
p-
value 
Count 
Full 215.51 225.95 198.74 0.351 5,048 
1991-2007 146.97 167.49 119.26 0.02 3,229 
2008-2010 337.18 312.3 392.71 0.1 1,819 
2008-2010, without bailouts 357.72 343.1 395.43 0.406 1,346 
Junk bonds: 1991-2007 400.17 431.18 313.2 0.009 449 
Junk bonds: 2008-2010, without bailouts 666.35 655.73 696 0.614 254 
            
Sample All 
Govt-
category 
presence 
No Govt-
category 
presence 
p-
value 
Count 
Central govt: 1991-2007 146.97 167.72 145.33 0.578 3,229 
Central govt: 2008-2010, without bailouts 357.72 293.41 362.49 0.33 1,346 
Local/regional govt: 1991-2007 146.97 161.99 146.78 0.654 3,229 
Local/regional govt: 2008-2010, without bailouts 357.72 319.72 358.5 0.693 1,346 
SOE full: 1991-2007 146.97 136.51 149.05 0.647 3,229 
SOE full: 2008-2010, without bailouts 357.72 282.94 382.5 0.04 1,346 
SOE mixed: 1991-2007 146.97 163.86 138.71 0.293 3,229 
SOE mixed: 2008-2010, without bailouts 357.72 294.14 388.39 0.036 1,346 
Govt bank: 1991-2007 146.97 280.89 143.22 0 3,229 
Govt bank: 2008-2010, without bailouts 357.72 241.89 369.47 0.015 1,346 
SWF: 1991-2007 146.97 229.41 141.29 0.099 3,229 
SWF: 2008-2010, without bailouts 357.72 327.09 373.78 0.361 1,346 
Pension fund: 1991-2007 146.97 198.81 135.64 0.088 3,229 
Pension fund: 2008-2010, without bailouts 357.72 411.18 348.17 0.273 1,346 
            
Sample 
All 
Govt 
Foreign 
Govt 
Domestic 
Govt 
p-
value 
Count 
1991-2007 167.49 271.06 147.11 0.032 1,855 
2008-2010, without bailouts 343.1 365.86 326.51 0.525 970 
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Table 19: Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt 
 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit 
+ γ ˆ it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the government 
bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after 
conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆ it), are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16. Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables 
described in Table 16. Observations from bailed-out firms are removed in Models 4-6. Model 7 shows the second-stage results of a treatment effects regression, 
where the first stage is the probit Model 1 in Table 28 and Lambda represents the inverse Mills ratio. Model 8 shows the second-stage results of a two-stage 
least squares instrumental variables regression where Govt stake (%) is instrumented, and the first stage model is Model 1 in Table 29. The data are annual and 
cover the period 1991-2010. The models control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and the nation of the firm. Coefficients are listed below, 
with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
  All observations   Bailouts removed   Heckman IV 
 
Presence Stake (%) Both 
 
Presence Stake (%) Both 
 
Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Govt presence 32.60** 
 
39.58*** 
 
30.33** 
 
39.72*** 
 
32.34** 
 
 
(2.384) 
 
(2.875) 
 
(2.011) 
 
(2.657) 
 
(2.232) 
 
Govt stake (%) 
 
-0.257 -0.625* 
  
-0.680* -1.002*** 
  
-1.568** 
  
(-0.769) (-1.850) 
  
(-1.859) (-2.761) 
  
(-2.301) 
Rating -425.0*** -425.0*** -423.9*** 
 
-413.2*** -410.8*** -410.7*** 
 
-425.0*** -425.0*** 
 
(-6.496) (-6.383) (-6.494) 
 
(-6.196) (-6.057) (-6.186) 
 
(-35.684) (-35.470) 
Age 0.00211 0.00197 0.00247 
 
0.00189 0.00185 0.00239 
 
0.0021 0.00258 
 
(0.67) (0.65) (0.78) 
 
(0.565) (0.585) (0.714) 
 
(1.166) (1.4) 
Maturity 0.00358*** 0.00339*** 0.00362*** 
 
0.00455*** 0.00438*** 0.00458*** 
 
0.00358*** 0.00340*** 
 
(4.062) (3.954) (4.096) 
 
(4.817) (4.814) (4.794) 
 
(4.547) (.279) 
Leverage 0.95 0.945 1.057 
 
0.705 0.668 0.8 
 
0.953*** 1.151*** 
 
(1.466) (1.394) (1.612) 
 
(1.101) (1.015) (1.259) 
 
(2.626) (3.23) 
Bank 45.32* 42.68* 47.95** 
 
4.628 -4.464 5.579 
 
45.29*** 46.64*** 
 
(1.921) (1.704) (2.023) 
 
(0.214) (-0.200) (0.266) 
 
(3.405) (.636) 
Bank * Leverage -3.040*** -2.739** -3.106*** 
 
-1.377 -0.633 -1.271 
 
-3.039*** -2.742*** 
 
(-2.854) (-2.430) (-2.929) 
 
(-1.343) (-0.620) (-1.327) 
 
(-4.433) (-4.638) 
Market-to-book -14.78*** -14.07*** -15.20*** 
 
-12.79*** -11.73** -13.06*** 
 
-14.83*** -14.63*** 
 
(-3.004) (-2.790) (-3.073) 
 
(-2.639) (-2.371) (-2.690) 
 
(-6.574) (-6.565) 
Size -12.43*** -13.79*** -12.73*** 
 
-9.292** -11.21*** -10.02** 
 
-12.45*** -14.93*** 
  (-2.995) (-3.233) (-3.072)   (-2.281) (-2.612) (-2.466)   (-6.927) (-8.110) 
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Table 19 (Continued): Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt 
  All observations   Bailouts removed   Heckman IV 
 
Presence Stake (%) Both 
 
Presence Stake (%) Both 
 
Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
ROE -44.27* -51.27** -44.08* 
 
-37.80* -47.23** -38.89* 
 
-44.27*** -53.79*** 
 
(-1.898) (-2.370) (-1.891) 
 
(-1.786) (-2.388) (-1.838) 
 
(-5.646) (-7.146) 
Lambda 
        
-0.008 
 
         
(-0.001) 
 
Constant 259.6*** 268.9*** 261.2*** 
 
217.3*** 238.1*** 227.2*** 
 
375.5*** 477.1*** 
 
(4.139) (4.23) (4.158) 
 
(3.458) (3.646) (3.604) 
 
(3.282) (3.94) 
Observations 5048 5048 5048 
 
4568 4568 4568 
 
5042 5042 
R-squared 0.542 0.539 0.543 
 
0.548 0.545 0.549 
  
0.6 
Wald χ2                 8474.4   
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Table 20: Government Ownership, Financial Crises and the Cost of Debt 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit 
+ γ
ˆ
it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the government 
bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after 
conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆ it), are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16. Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables 
described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-2010. Govt ownership represents the presence of a state owner expressed as a binary 
variable in Models 1, 3, 5, and 7-8; it represents the percentage owned by the state in Models 2, 4, and 6. Observations from bailed-out firms are removed in 
Models 3 and 4. Models 5 and 8 show the second-stage results of a treatment effects regression, where the first stage regressions are probit Models 2 and 3, 
respectively, in Table 28, and Lambda represents the inverse Mills ratio. Model 6 shows the second-stage results of a two-stage least squares instrumental 
variables regression where Govt stake (%) and Govt stake (%) * Fin. crisis are instrumented, and the first stage models are Models 2 and 3 in Table 29. Models 
7 and 8 use a banking crisis indicator based on Laeven and Valencia (2010). The models control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and the 
nation of the firm, except for Models 7 and 8 where country fixed effects are not used in lieu of the country-level banking crisis variable. Coefficients are listed 
below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% 
level. 
  Financial Crisis   Banking Crises 
 
All observations Bailouts removed Heckman IV 
 
All Heckman 
 
Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
 
Presence Presence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Govt ownership 61.10*** 0.289 52.04*** -0.234 49.17*** 2.121 
 
37.90*** 36.54*** 
 
(4.196) (0.722) (3.302) (-0.576) (3.395) (1.548) 
 
(3.361) (2.869) 
Govt ownership * Fin. crisis 
-79.42*** -1.270** -69.74** -1.184* -82.03*** -8.939*** 
 
  
(-2.850) (-2.246) (-2.007) (-1.888) (-7.798) (-3.220) 
 
  
Fin. crisis 431.5*** 439.7*** 412.8*** 420.8*** 152.6 292.5** 
 
  
 
(3.578) (5.192) (0.878) (3.297) (1.419) (2.266) 
 
  
Govt ownership * Banking crisis       
 
-47.25* -47.13*** 
      
 
(-1.705) (-4.414) 
Banking crisis 
      
 
56.63** 56.79*** 
 
       
(2.386) (5.716) 
Rating -422.9*** -422.6*** -412.2*** -408.6*** -424.0*** -422.3*** 
 
-447.3*** -445.8*** 
 
(-6.523) (-6.337) (-6.228) (-6.015) (-35.739) (-31.600) 
 
(-7.120) (-38.462) 
Age 0.00118 0.00206 0.000849 0.0019 0.00111 0.00316 
 
-0.000106 -0.000131 
 
(0.373) (0.697) (0.253) (0.618) (0.617) (1.534) 
 
(-0.033) (-0.073) 
Maturity 0.00357*** 0.00345*** 0.00455*** 0.00443*** 0.00358*** 0.00388*** 
 
0.00148* 0.00147* 
  (4.099) (-4.11) (4.965) (5.107) (-4.57) (4.328)  (1.732) (1.937) 
  
1
7
4
 
Table 20 (Continued): Government Ownership, Financial Crises and the Cost of Debt 
 
  Financial Crisis   Banking Crises 
 
All observations Bailouts removed Heckman IV 
 
All Heckman 
 
Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
 
Presence Presence 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(7) (8) 
Leverage 1.351** 0.984 0.978 0.634 1.244*** 1.473*** 
 
1.219** 1.182*** 
 
(2.123) (-1.44) (1.513) (-0.97) (3.456) (3.597) 
 
(1.988) (3.443) 
Bank 50.74** 45.76* 13.08 -1.204 46.85*** 69.05*** 
 
69.74*** 69.00*** 
 
(2.153) (1.806) (0.627) (-0.054) (3.552) (4.342) 
 
(2.982) (5.578) 
Bank * Leverage -3.643*** -3.011** -1.786* -0.777 -3.332*** -4.676*** 
 
-3.991*** -3.927*** 
 
(-3.349) (-2.555) (-1.701) (-0.746) (-4.909) (-5.245) 
 
(-3.884) (-6.551) 
Market-to-book -15.16*** -13.46*** -13.03*** -11.01** -14.57*** -10.61*** 
 
-15.96*** -15.42*** 
 
(-3.129) (-2.702) (-2.701) (-2.267) (-6.348) (-3.821) 
 
(-3.392) (-7.380) 
Size -12.90*** -13.57*** -9.766** -11.08*** -13.38*** -13.50*** 
 
-15.94*** -15.85*** 
 
(-3.154) (-3.223) (-2.446) (-2.621) (-7.420) (-6.438) 
 
(-4.521) (-9.905) 
ROE -41.67* -49.30** -38.00* -46.71** -43.75*** -39.49*** 
 
-34.98* -36.64*** 
 
(-1.860) (-2.241) (-1.822) (-2.316) (-5.644) (-4.162) 
 
(-1.770) (-4.731) 
Lambda 
    
8.51 
 
 
 
0.695 
 
0 0 0 0 (0.951) 0 
 
0 (0.085) 
Constant 263.6*** 260.0*** 224.5*** 231.8*** 391.0*** 482.4*** 
 
250.6*** 250.4** 
 
(4.276) (4.119) (3.584) (3.562) (3.435) (3.577) 
 
(5.260) (2.187) 
Observations 5048 5048 4568 4568 5042 5042 
 
5048 5042 
R-squared 0.546 0.541 0.551 0.546 0 0.503 
 
0.59 0 
Wald χ2         8621.7      7840.7 
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Table 21: Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: Non-Investment-Grade Bonds 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ ˆ it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit 
spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the 
government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. 
Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆ it), 
are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16. Bank * Leverage is an interaction of 
the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-2010 in Models 1 
and 2, the years before the 2008 Financial Crisis in Models 3 and 4, and 2008-2010 in Models 5 and 6. 
Only observations using non-investment-grade bonds are used in this table. Govt ownership represents 
the presence of a state owner expressed as a binary variable in Models 1, 3, and 5; it represents the 
percentage owned by the state in Models 2, 4, and 6. Observations from bailed-out firms are removed in 
periods that cover the 2008 Financial Crisis (Models 1-2 and 5-6). The models control for bond 
collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and the nation of the firm. Coefficients are listed below, with 
t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% 
level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2007 1991-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
 
Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Govt ownership 81.10** -0.121 98.09*** 1.111 12.88 -4.187** 
 
(2.574) (-0.153) (2.886) (1.109) (0.229) (-2.421) 
Rating -287.0** -282.3** -328.3*** -318.3*** -348.5** -288.5** 
 
(-2.500) (-2.434) (-2.938) (-2.737) (-2.519) (-2.025) 
Age 0.00872 0.00681 0.015 0.0174 0.0107 0.00675 
 
(0.781) (0.587) (1.088) (1.178) (0.671) (0.439) 
Maturity 0.0031 0.00121 0.00153 -0.000967 0.0104 0.0104 
 
(-0.7) (0.249) (0.265) (-0.149) (1.289) (1.256) 
Leverage 8.110*** 8.646** 11.18*** 12.01*** 0.136 -1.553 
 
(2.664) (-2.54) (3.235) (3.074) (0.011) (-0.137) 
Bank -37.34 -139.2 -88.72 -200.9 633.7** 557.6* 
 
(-0.317) (-1.003) (-0.829) (-1.569) (2.272) (1.992) 
Bank * Leverage -8.989 -5.054 -8.583 -4.643 -104.4*** -99.59*** 
 
(-0.887) (-0.464) (-0.791) (-0.379) (-2.813) (-2.745) 
Market-to-book -45.14*** -45.69*** -66.81*** -68.27*** -37 -34.68 
 
(-3.007) (-2.890) (-3.429) (-3.370) (-0.949) (-0.867) 
Size -13.34 -15.26 -8.863 -13.67 -16.44 -5.101 
 
(-1.342) (-1.599) (-0.940) (-1.312) (-0.580) (-0.180) 
ROE -61.07 -58.65 -102.2 -102.5 81.94 63.89 
 
(-1.273) (-1.150) (-1.647) (-1.524) (0.447) (0.373) 
Constant 628.3*** 757.5*** 643.7*** 232.8 1470*** 1524** 
 
(3.109) (3.474) (3.449) (1.089) (2.808) (2.337) 
Observations 699 699 449 449 254 254 
R-squared 0.476 0.467 0.428 0.408 0.43 0.444 
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Table 22: Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: Highly-Levered Firms 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ ˆ it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, credit 
spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of the 
government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error term. 
Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating ( ˆ it), 
are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16. Bank * Leverage is an interaction of 
the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-2010 in Models 1 
and 2, the years before the 2008 Financial Crisis in Models 3 and 4, and 2008-2010 in Models 5 and 6. 
Only observations from firm-years with leverage values above the sample median are used in this table. 
Govt ownership represents the presence of a state owner expressed as a binary variable in Models 1, 3, 
and 5; it represents the percentage owned by the state in Models 2, 4, and 6. Observations from bailed-
out firms are removed in periods that cover the 2008 Financial Crisis (Models 1-2 and 5-6). The models 
control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and the nation of the firm. Coefficients are 
listed below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2007 1991-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
 
Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Govt ownership 20.5 -1.410*** 49.85** -0.285 -89.24* -1.930** 
 
(0.787) (-2.728) (2.335) (-0.395) (-1.831) (-2.102) 
Rating -483.4*** -478.0*** -483.7*** -490.8*** -455.9*** -449.5** 
 
(-4.986) (-4.921) (-5.448) (-5.135) (-2.658) (-2.644) 
Age -0.00359 -0.00268 0.000764 0.00195 -0.00488 -0.00443 
 
(-0.647) (-0.494) (0.144) (0.364) (-0.637) (-0.529) 
Maturity 0.00316 0.00294 0.0105*** 0.0101*** -0.0147*** -0.0142*** 
 
(-1.43) (1.364) (5.028) (4.787) (-3.711) (-3.488) 
Leverage -0.933 -1.059 -0.305 -0.81 2.097 0.885 
 
(-0.928) (-1.103) (-0.399) (-0.974) (0.716) (0.292) 
Bank -37.07 -49.95 -44.2 -65.31** 98.25 98.22 
 
(-1.131) (-1.545) (-1.632) (-2.154) (1.479) (1.255) 
Bank * Leverage -0.554 0.238 -0.0336 1.13 -7.261* -6.677 
 
(-0.472) (0.196) (-0.038) (1.089) (-1.908) (-1.626) 
Market-to-book -14.71* -14.64* -11.16 -12.26 -17.97 -17.26 
 
(-1.980) (-1.881) (-1.516) (-1.603) (-1.082) (-0.995) 
Size -11.90* -14.99** -16.66*** -18.98*** -4.4 -1.847 
 
(-1.848) (-2.299) (-3.351) (-3.614) (-0.307) (-0.122) 
ROE -63.90** -72.12*** -144.6*** -148.3*** -12.83 -12.59 
 
(-2.211) (-2.787) (-3.254) (-3.498) (-0.299) (-0.287) 
Constant 298.4*** 332.3*** 380.6*** 391.1*** 258.8 242 
 
(3.463) (3.955) (5.749) (5.636) (1.226) (1.111) 
Observations 2064 2064 1518 1518 553 553 
R-squared 0.607 0.609 0.529 0.525 0.57 0.565 
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Table 23: Ownership by Different Government Entities and the Cost of Debt 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ
ˆ
it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, 
credit spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of 
the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error 
term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating  
( ˆ it), are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16. Bank * Leverage is an 
interaction of the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-2010 
in Models 1 and 2, the years before the 2008 Financial Crisis in Models 3 and 4, and 2008-2010 in 
Models 5 and 6. The models compare the effects of government ownership presence (Models 1, 3, and 
5) and amounts (Models 2, 4, and 6) among different state entities. Observations from bailed-out firms 
are removed in periods that cover the 2008 Financial Crisis (Models 1-2 and 5-6). The models control 
for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and the nation of the firm. Coefficients are listed 
below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance 
at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2007 1991-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
  Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Central govt -26.7 -1.268** -6.32 -0.705 -76.67** -1.544*** 
  (-0.971) (-2.050) (-0.226) (-1.111) (-2.354) (-3.501) 
Local/regional 24.79 -0.771 18.15 0.199 -57.21 -1.332* 
 govt (-1.05) (-1.173) (0.601) (0.283) (-1.427) (-1.676) 
SOE full 5.162 -1.829** 30.39* 1.132 -4.187 -3.197** 
  (0.302) (-2.092) (1.745) (1.015) (-0.190) (-2.587) 
SOE mixed 18.26 -1.227** 40.01** -0.291 -78.84** -2.663*** 
  (0.932) (-2.414) (2.456) (-0.631) (-2.432) (-3.366) 
Govt bank 51.32 16.54*** 119.6** 9.697** 128.1*** 21.61*** 
  (1.545) (6.638) (2.023) (2.075) (3.185) (5.137) 
SWF 46.71* 4.704*** 82.74 6.202* 26.11 3.483** 
  (1.749) (3.953) (1.522) (1.968) (1.238) (2.025) 
Pension fund 61.12*** 2.818 20.42 -6.591* 103.4*** 5.637*** 
  (3.668) (1.243) (1.218) (-1.890) (3.214) (4.503) 
Rating -406.2*** -398.8*** -350.4*** -351.3*** -527.3*** -518.6*** 
  (-6.190) (-5.960) (-4.814) (-4.607) (-5.506) (-5.389) 
Age 0.00342 0.00368 0.00397 0.00389 0.00252 0.00123 
  (1.023) (1.198) (1.034) (1.053) (0.672) (0.341) 
Maturity 0.00462*** 0.00460*** 0.00724*** 0.00711*** 0.000731 0.000815 
  (4.972) (5.394) (7.784) (8.096) (0.444) (0.508) 
Leverage 0.598 0.631 1.202* 1.081* 2.964 4.313 
  (0.937) (0.941) (1.949) (1.699) (1.186) (1.642) 
Bank -1.137 -11.02 -7.776 -15.98 124.4** 130.0** 
  (-0.055) (-0.518) (-0.369) (-0.745) (2.332) (2.262) 
Bank * Leverage -1.253 -0.344 -0.725 0.111 -10.16*** -10.16*** 
  (-1.276) (-0.353) (-0.721) (0.118) (-2.836) (-2.775) 
Market-to-book -11.61** -13.77*** -7.986 -8.999* -21.00** -26.57** 
  (-2.338) (-2.756) (-1.582) (-1.778) (-2.142) (-2.450) 
Size -9.656** -13.19*** -10.94*** -13.11*** -8.125 -12.98* 
  (-2.445) (-3.204) (-3.203) (-3.503) (-1.104) (-1.737) 
ROE -36.44* -36.66* -94.99** -96.12** 43.78 62.57 
  (-1.749) (-1.742) (-2.547) (-2.409) (1.045) (1.424) 
Constant 232.5*** 259.5*** 302.5*** 303.5*** -122.7 -111.9 
  (-3.48) (3.928) (4.836) (5.623) (-0.800) (-0.705) 
Observations 4568 4568 3229 3229 1346 1346 
R-squared 0.552 0.554 0.45 0.442 0.552 0.554 
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Table 24: Ownership by Different Government Entities and the Cost of Debt: Non-Investment-
Grade Bonds 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ
ˆ
it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, 
credit spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of 
the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error 
term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating  
( ˆ it), are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16. Bank * Leverage is an 
interaction of the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-2010 
in Models 1 and 2, the years before the 2008 Financial Crisis in Models 3 and 4, and 2008-2010 in 
Models 5 and 6. Only observations using non-investment-grade bonds are used in this table. The models 
compare the effects of government ownership presence (Models 1, 3, and 5) and amounts (Models 2, 4, 
and 6) among different state entities. Observations from bailed-out firms are removed in periods that 
cover the 2008 Financial Crisis (Models 1-2 and 5-6). The models control for bond collateral/instrument 
type, bond currency, and the nation of the firm. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in 
parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * 
denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2007 1991-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
  Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Central govt -181.1*** -3.831*** -238.7*** -4.515*** -33.36 23.75 
  (-4.548) (-4.035) (-4.743) (-3.228) (-0.437) (1.262) 
Local/regional -94.1 13.84 -180.0** -7.932 -493.2*** -6.863 
 govt (-0.855) (0.796) (-2.089) (-0.391) (-4.320) (-0.227) 
SOE full 22.61 -2.915** 36.56 3.440** -1.904 -7.012*** 
  (0.427) (-2.517) (0.717) (2.323) (-0.019) (-2.835) 
SOE mixed 67.41* 1.441 56.65** 1.524 52.22 -6.261 
  (1.985) (1.342) (2.145) (1.505) (-0.58) (-1.279) 
Govt bank 240.7* 26.76 249.4* 43.63** 877.1*** -10.71 
  (1.807) (-1.25) (1.883) (2.158) (3.426) (-0.263) 
SWF 156.0** 2.216 459.9*** 83.99** -8.205 -7.547 
  (2.125) (0.831) (-5.17) (2.318) (-0.118) (-1.204) 
Pension fund 79.24** -0.264 121.3*** 0.0975 130.5 -0.711 
  (2.128) (-0.161) (-3.14) (0.017) (1.319) (-0.326) 
Rating -302.5** -276.8** -379.9*** -356.8** -246.0* -324.3** 
  (-2.447) (-2.291) (-3.347) (-2.617) (-1.921) (-2.195) 
Age 0.00778 0.00167 0.00954 0.0119 0.0139 0.00546 
  (0.727) (0.157) (0.749) (0.845) (0.834) (0.352) 
Maturity 0.00341 0.00248 0.0017 -0.00153 0.0115 0.0102 
  (0.784) (0.529) (0.297) (-0.241) (1.388) (1.231) 
Leverage 8.375*** 8.983** 9.951*** 11.34*** -5.443 -4.806 
  (2.741) (2.556) (3.985) (3.538) (-0.393) (-0.399) 
Bank 44.79 -129.5 39.26 -73.87 619.4** 497.9* 
  (0.422) (-0.944) (-0.41) (-0.614) (2.096) (1.748) 
Bank * Leverage -14.45 -6.774 -10.8 -11.34 -96.33** -95.17** 
  (-1.457) (-0.611) (-1.171) (-0.978) (-2.475) (-2.537) 
Market-to-book -47.68*** -49.67*** -63.05*** -68.87*** -23.33 -24.18 
  (-3.496) (-2.996) (-4.028) (-3.814) (-0.613) (-0.553) 
Size -8.964 -11.8 0.852 -9.069 -23.71 -14.13 
  (-0.844) (-1.216) (0.089) (-0.844) (-0.731) (-0.469) 
ROE -59.44 -62.78 -68.42 -87.38 -16.57 24.76 
  (-1.265) (-1.218) (-1.333) (-1.406) (-0.085) (0.139) 
Constant 854.9*** 925.2*** 273.1* 783.4*** 1889*** 1807*** 
  (4.155) (4.253) (1.828) (4.436) (3.866) (3.833) 
Observations 699 699 449 449 254 254 
R-squared 0.498 0.477 0.526 0.465 0.559 0.459 
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Table 25: Ownership by Government Entity Categories and the Cost of Debt: 'Protectors' and 
'Investors' 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ
ˆ
it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, 
credit spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of 
the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error 
term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating  
( ˆ it), are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16. Bank * Leverage is an 
interaction of the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-2010 
in Models 1 and 2, the years before the 2008 Financial Crisis in Models 3 and 4, and 2008-2010 in 
Models 5 and 6. The models compare the effects of government ownership presence (Models 1, 3, and 
5) and amounts (Models 2, 4, and 6) among two categories of state entities: Govt protector, which 
consists of central and local governments, full and mixed SOEs, and government-owned banks; and 
Govt investor, which consists of SWFs and government-run pension funds. Observations from bailed-
out firms are removed in periods that cover the 2008 Financial Crisis (Models 1-2 and 5-6). The models 
control for bond collateral/instrument type, bond currency, and the nation of the firm. Coefficients are 
listed below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, ** denotes 
significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2007 1991-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
  Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Govt protector 3.843 -1.097*** 49.56*** -0.115 -82.86** -2.282*** 
  (0.209) (-2.869) (-2.81) (-0.264) (-2.418) (-4.190) 
Govt investor 54.74*** 3.884*** 41.45 0.246 57.11*** 4.347*** 
  (-3.52) (3.371) (1.645) (0.131) (2.993) (3.959) 
Rating -408.0*** -402.6*** -353.7*** -357.3*** -525.4*** -512.9*** 
  (-6.228) (-6.003) (-4.935) (-4.704) (-5.698) (-5.371) 
Age 0.00291 0.00282 0.00305 0.00378 0.000453 0.00118 
  (0.869) (0.857) (0.784) (0.992) (0.118) (0.322) 
Maturity 0.00462*** 0.00427*** 0.00731*** 0.00725*** -0.000661 0.000040 
  (-4.9) (-4.51) (7.957) (8.107) (-0.402) (0.024) 
Leverage 0.539 0.655 1.302** 1.024 3.988 4.721* 
  (0.852) (0.985) (2.144) (1.624) (1.586) (1.821) 
Bank -5.58 -8.42 -3.112 -12.89 122.9** 122.8** 
  (-0.268) (-0.390) (-0.162) (-0.616) (2.193) (2.061) 
Bank * Leverage -0.828 -0.352 -1.054 -0.186 -8.811** -9.701*** 
  (-0.834) (-0.353) (-1.110) (-0.193) (-2.515) (-2.615) 
Market-to-book -11.80** -13.43*** -9.278* -8.25 -25.37** -28.92*** 
  (-2.427) (-2.729) (-1.861) (-1.653) (-2.508) (-2.745) 
Size -10.09** -12.28*** -9.656*** -10.54*** -12.05* -13.81* 
  (-2.519) (-2.828) (-3.033) (-2.889) (-1.702) (-1.773) 
ROE -34.87 -38.56* -97.03** -100.2** 65.49 68.89 
  (-1.641) (-1.834) (-2.581) (-2.503) (1.591) (1.592) 
Constant 238.3*** 247.6*** 280.4*** 270.4*** -66.15 -81.39 
  (3.678) (3.782) (5.529) (5.294) (-0.427) (-0.513) 
Observations 4568 4568 3229 3229 1346 1346 
R-squared 0.55 0.549 0.45 0.437 0.544 0.545 
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Table 26: Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ
ˆ
it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, 
credit spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of 
the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error 
term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating (
ˆ
it), are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16. Bank * Leverage is an interaction 
of the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-2010 in Models 1 
and 2, the years before the 2008 Financial Crisis in Models 3 and 4, and 2008-2010 in Models 5 and 6. 
Domestic (Foreign) govt represents the presence of a domestic (foreign) state owner expressed as a 
binary variable in Models 1, 3, and 5; it represents the percentage owned by the domestic (foreign) state 
in Models 2, 4, and 6. Observations from bailed-out firms are removed in periods that cover the 2008 
Financial Crisis (Models 1-2 and 5-6). The models control for bond collateral/instrument type and bond 
currency. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 
1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2007 1991-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
 
Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Domestic govt -13.41 -0.34 -5.498 -0.101 -70.46*** -0.708 
 
(-1.065) (-1.388) (-0.443) (-0.343) (-2.660) (-1.466) 
Foreign govt 55.84*** 2.532*** 73.58*** 3.775*** 50.84** 1.591** 
 
(3.194) (3.314) (3.113) (3.123) (2.124) (2.405) 
Rating -430.2*** -426.3*** -386.9*** -379.4*** -551.9*** -557.4*** 
 
(-6.812) (-6.775) (-5.543) (-5.499) (-5.551) (-5.491) 
Age 0.00009 0.000471 0.00303 0.00275 -0.00294 -0.000913 
 
(0.028) (0.147) (-0.79) (0.737) (-0.751) (-0.232) 
Maturity 0.00249*** 0.00255*** 0.00646*** 0.00627*** -0.0055*** -0.0055*** 
 
(2.956) (-2.93) (7.971) (7.174) (-3.387) (-3.347) 
Leverage 0.556 0.444 0.712 0.389 5.039** 5.282** 
 
(0.793) (0.676) (1.239) (0.743) (2.111) (2.078) 
Bank 17.95 6.72 5.863 -8.933 199.6*** 191.9*** 
 
(0.773) (0.325) (0.252) (-0.459) (3.815) (4.186) 
Bank * Leverage -1.406 -0.988 -0.702 -0.121 -12.24*** -12.00*** 
 
(-1.269) (-1.012) (-0.634) (-0.136) (-4.174) (-3.865) 
Market-to-book -13.41*** -13.12*** -10.70** -9.559** -20.12** -22.57** 
 
(-2.670) (-2.626) (-2.224) (-2.040) (-2.000) (-2.134) 
Size -16.23*** -13.59*** -13.59*** -10.67*** -27.05*** -19.41*** 
 
(-4.608) (-4.065) (-3.524) (-3.378) (-4.103) (-2.725) 
ROE -30.72 -36.34* -88.75** -89.08** 70.24* 63.02 
 
(-1.530) (-1.853) (-2.327) (-2.331) (1.677) (1.407) 
Constant 257.9*** 220.6*** 256.2*** 210.3*** 96.09 -9.249 
 
(-5.42) (4.774) (-5.3) (5.491) (0.905) (-0.096) 
Observations 4568 4568 3229 3229 1346 1346 
R-squared 0.597 0.601 0.515 0.527 0.583 0.578 
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Table 27: Domestic and Foreign Government Ownership and the Cost of Debt: Non-Investment-
Grade Bonds 
Year fixed effects (vt) regression analysis with heteroskedasticity-robust and firm-clustered standard 
errors is performed on the following model: yit = α + θXit + γ
ˆ
it + vt + ηit. The dependent variable, 
credit spread (yit), is the difference between the corporate bond’s current yield to maturity and that of 
the government bond most closely matched by maturity. α represents the intercept, and ηit is the error 
term. Orthogonalized values of the log of the bond’s rating after conversion to an ordinal scale, Rating (
ˆ
it), are used. The variables included in Xit are described in Table 16 1. Bank * Leverage is an 
interaction of the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-2010 
in Models 1 and 2, the years before the 2008 Financial Crisis in Models 3 and 4, and 2008-2010 in 
Models 5 and 6. Only observations using non-investment-grade bonds are used in this table. Domestic 
(Foreign) govt represents the presence of a domestic (foreign) state owner expressed as a binary 
variable in Models 1, 3, and 5; it represents the percentage owned by the domestic (foreign) state in 
Models 2, 4, and 6. Observations from bailed-out firms are removed in periods that cover the 2008 
Financial Crisis (Models 1-2 and 5-6). The models control for bond collateral/instrument type and bond 
currency. Coefficients are listed below, with t-statistics in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 
1% level, ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * denotes significance at the 10% level. 
 
  1991-2010 1991-2010 1991-2007 1991-2007 2008-2010 2008-2010 
 
Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) Presence Stake (%) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Domestic govt -45.5 -1.174 -56.84 -0.0913 -96.16 -2.087** 
 
(-1.219) (-1.600) (-1.647) (-0.099) (-1.469) (-2.226) 
Foreign govt 138.1*** 3.414*** 164.3*** 3.999*** 102.7** 2.287*** 
 
(3.708) (3.746) (4.133) (3.049) (2.269) (3.028) 
Rating -223.9** -245.3*** -199.3** -241.7** -317.9*** -307.4*** 
 
(-2.524) (-2.706) (-2.017) (-2.463) (-2.996) (-2.702) 
Age -0.00405 -0.00424 0.0146 0.0154 -0.0225 -0.0159 
 
(-0.330) (-0.346) (0.864) (0.876) (-1.259) (-0.975) 
Maturity -0.000849 -0.000873 -0.00522 -0.00412 0.00702 0.00617 
 
(-0.169) (-0.167) (-0.862) (-0.637) (0.739) (0.618) 
Leverage 4.264 5.006 6.448** 8.186** -3.019 -9.955 
 
(1.547) (1.567) (2.635) (2.648) (-0.222) (-0.799) 
Bank -132.0* -170.6*** -227.5** -278.4*** 835.3*** 779.3*** 
 
(-1.805) (-3.155) (-2.227) (-2.757) (2.914) (2.755) 
Bank * Leverage 3.494 5.435 7.958 10.57 -100.5** -87.05** 
 
(0.735) (1.043) (0.909) (1.107) (-2.486) (-2.306) 
Market-to-book -36.64*** -32.69** -52.54*** -49.50*** -8.884 4.08 
 
(-3.041) (-2.565) (-3.679) (-3.053) (-0.346) (0.199) 
Size -31.52*** -23.96*** -14.58* -7.833 -74.56*** -62.64** 
 
(-4.069) (-3.262) (-1.842) (-0.909) (-2.860) (-2.313) 
ROE -82.51* -81.54 -114.4* -102.9* -61.83 -131.9 
 
(-1.870) (-1.655) (-1.994) (-1.688) (-0.403) (-0.840) 
Constant 1948*** 1851*** 1610*** 1532*** 3666*** 2247*** 
 
(7.686) (0.074) (0.722) (0.898) (7.896) (6.722) 
Observations 699 699 449 449 254 254 
R-squared 0.502 0.499 0.5 0.482 0.414 0.417 
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Table 28: Factors Associated with Government Presence in a Firm Year: First-Stage Models for 
Treatment Effects Regressions 
The following table shows probit regression results from models describing factors associated with the 
presence of government ownership in a given firm-year. The dependent variable is Govt presence, as 
defined in Table 16. The probit model shown as Model 1 serves as the first-stage regression for the 
treatment effects model (Model 7) in Table 19; Models 2 and 3 do the same for the treatment effects 
models (Models 5 and 8, respectively) in Table 20. The firm- and country-level variables pertain to the 
target firms in our sample. The right-hand side variables are described in Table 16.  Bank * Leverage is 
an interaction of the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover the period 1991-
2010. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Leverage -0.0231*** -0.0237*** -0.0227*** 
 
(-8.432) (-8.541) (-8.221) 
Bank -1.331*** -1.306*** -1.326*** 
 
(-13.184) (-12.959) (-13.098) 
Bank * Leverage 0.0825*** 0.0820*** 0.0822*** 
 
(8.111) (8.041) (7.969) 
Market-to-book 0.131*** 0.181*** 0.127*** 
 
(6.785) (8.831) (6.368) 
Size -0.149*** -0.160*** -0.148*** 
 
(-11.203) (-11.854) (-10.935) 
ROE -0.572*** -0.545*** -0.579*** 
 
(-8.705) (-8.225) (-8.748) 
Privatized target firm 0.724*** 0.742*** 0.720*** 
 
(4.181) (4.456) (4.048) 
Govt size -0.382*** -0.320*** -0.393*** 
 
(-13.621) (-11.292) (-12.902) 
Political leadership: Left 0.958*** 0.948*** 0.968*** 
 
(1.603) (1.269) (1.151) 
Fin. crisis 
 
0.382*** 
 
  
(8.081) 
 
Banking crisis 
  
-0.0496 
   
(-0.891) 
Constant 4.354*** 3.734*** 4.431*** 
 
(16.69) (14.12) (6.069) 
Observations 5042 5042 5042 
Pseudo R-squared 0.23 0.24 0.231 
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Table 29: Factors Associated with Government Stakes in a Firm-Year: First-Stage Models for 
Instrumental Variable Regressions 
The following table shows OLS regression results from models describing factors associated with the 
percentage of shares owned by the government in a given firm-year. The dependent variables are Govt 
stake (%) for Models 1 and 2, and Govt stake (%) * Fin. Crisis for Model 3. Variables are defined in 
Table 16. The OLS model shown as Model 1 serves as the first-stage regression for the instrumental 
variable model (Model 8) in Table 19; Models 2 and 3 do the same for the instrumental variable model 
(Model 6) in Table 20. The firm- and country-level variables pertain to the target firms in our sample. 
Bank * Leverage is an interaction of the variables described in Table 16. The data are annual and cover 
the period 1991-2010. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Rating 1.079 1.081 0.267 
 
(1.056) (1.058) (0.297) 
Age 0.000400*** 0.000400*** 0.000239* 
 
(2.595) (2.595) (1.767) 
Maturity -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00003 
 
(-0.548) (-0.549) (0.569) 
Leverage 0.238*** 0.238*** 0.130*** 
 
(8.133) (8.133) (5.068) 
Bank -0.675 -0.674 2.259** 
 
(-0.615) (-0.615) (2.344) 
Bank * Leverage -0.00355 -0.00354 -0.207*** 
 
(-0.071) (-0.071) (-4.692) 
Market-to-book -0.658*** -0.658*** 0.149 
 
(-3.492) (-3.493) (-0.9) 
Size -1.430*** -1.430*** -0.443*** 
 
(-9.415) (-9.415) (-3.317) 
ROE -1.445** -1.445** 0.895 
 
(-2.295) (-2.295) (1.618) 
Privatized target firm 10.16*** 10.16*** 4.058*** 
 
(6.478) (6.478) (7.491) 
Govt size 0.292 0.295 3.355*** 
 
(0.416) (-0.42) (5.435) 
Political leadership: Left 2.094*** 2.094*** 1.348*** 
 
(4.448) (4.449) (-3.26) 
Fin. crisis 
 
10.02 17.67** 
 
0 (1.086) (-2.18) 
Constant 51.47*** 51.46*** 10.64 
 
(5.115) (5.114) (1.203) 
Observations 5042 5042 5042 
R-squared 0.684 0.684 0.512 
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Table 30: Variable Definitions, Chapter 3 
The data comes from the "EIA WEEKLY PETROLEUM STATUS REPORTS" or is created based on 
variables from the report http://www.eia.gov/oil_gas/petroleum/data_publications/weekly_petroleum 
_status_report/wpsr.html Below are the descriptions of variable levels. In our analysis we mainly use 
changes in these variables.  ∆(variable name) means a change in that variable over the last week 
calculated via first difference. (variable name)(+1) denotes a lead, or the next period value, and 
(variable name)(-1) denotes a lag, for that specific variable. Years from which the data is available and 
used in the analysis, as well as, units of measure are also presented.  The data is weekly and the study 
ends on 7/8/20011. 
 
Variable Description From Units 
∆PDL1-∆PDL4 
Polynomial distributed lag (PDL) change in spread lags 
between the two- and one-month WTI crude futures for 
spread2_1.  Robustness tests include the PDL change in 
spread lags between the two month future and spot 
WTI for spread2_spot (Table 40) and  between three- 
and one-month WTI crude futures for spread 3_1 
(Table 41). 
9/11/1992   
SpreadX_Y 
The spread between the X and Y month out future 
NYMEX WTI crude contract (X,Y = 1,2,3,4).  
Typically, spread2_1, which is the spread between the 
two- and one-month WTI crude futures. 
9/11/1992 
Dollars per 
Barrel 
∆Spread2_1 
The change in spread between the two- and the one-
month WTI crude futures. 
9/11/1992 
Dollars per 
Barrel 
Spot_WTI Cushing, OK NYMEX WTI crude oil spot price FOB 9/11/1992 
Dollars per 
Barrel 
Future_WTI_X 
Cushing, OK WTI NYMEX crude oil future contract X 
(X = 1,2,3,4) 
9/11/1992 
Dollars per 
Barrel 
Stock_US 
Weekly U.S. crude oil inventories (stocks) excluding 
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) 
9/11/1992 
Thousand 
Barrels 
Stock_X 
Weekly crude oil inventories (stocks) excluding SPR 
for PADD_X (X=1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) 
9/11/1992 
Thousand 
Barrels 
Stock_Cushing 
Weekly Cushing, OK crude oil inventories (stocks) 
excluding SPR 
4/9/2004 
Thousand 
Barrels 
Stock_US_non 
Cushing 
Weekly U.S. crude oil inventories (stocks) excluding 
SPR  and excluding Cushing  
4/9/2004 
Thousand 
Barrels 
Stock_2_non 
Cushing 
Weekly crude oil inventories (stocks) for PADD2 
excluding SPR and excluding Cushing  
4/9/2004 
Thousand 
Barrels 
Prod_US Weekly U.S. field production of crude oil  9/11/1992 
Thousand 
Barrels/Day 
Imports_US 
Weekly Net Inflows (Imports Excluding SPR - 
Exports) 
9/11/1992 
Thousand 
Barrels/Day 
ImportsX 
Weekly crude oil imports excluding SPR for PADD_X 
(X=1, 2, 3, 4, or 5)  
9/11/1992 
Thousand 
Barrels/Day 
RefinerInputUS 
Weekly U.S. refiner net input of crude oil (balance 
between crude oil supply and disposition) 
9/11/1992 
Thousand 
Barrels/Day 
RefinerInputX 
Weekly refiner net input of crude oil for PADD_X 
(X=1, 2, 3, 4, or 5) 
9/11/1992 
Thousand 
Barrels/Day 
Jan-Nov Monthly dummies  9/11/1992 1 or 0 
Z1-Z5 
Weekly dummies (Z1 is 1, Z2 is level, Z3 is squared, 
Z4 is cubed, Z5 is to the forth power) that remove 
seasonality in inventory 
9/11/1992   
PADD 1 -- East Coast; PADD 2 --  Midwest;  PADD 3 -- Gulf Coast;  PADD 4 -- Rocky Mountains; 
PADD 5 -- West Coast.
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Figure 1: Cushing Crude Inventory and the Spread Between the Two- and One-Month NYMEX WTI Crude Futures 
This figure plots crude oil inventories in Cushing, OK and the spread between the two- and one-month WTI crude futures between April 9, 2004 and July 8, 
2011. 
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Figure 2: Cushing Crude Oil Inventory Levels and Changes as Predicted by the Seasonal Adjustment from the Z Variables 
This figure plots seasonal pattern at Cushing, OK crude oil inventories as implied by the weekly seasonal Z variables.  Variable definitions are in Table 30.  
Both inventory levels and changes are presented over the 2004-2011 period.  Figure 2(a) shows unadjusted inventory levels in Cushing.  There has been a 
significant increase in capacity in Cushing, OK over 2004-2011as shown by the difference in the starting and ending points of the inventory “level” series. 
Figure 2(b) adjusts for this capacity increase by normalizing the graph scale in Figure 2(a) to start and end at the same level, and shows the seasonal pattern on 
this adjusted scale. 
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Figure 3: U. S. (non-SPR) Crude Oil Inventory Levels and Changes as Predicted by the Seasonal Adjustment from the Z Variables 
This figure plots the U.S. (non-SPR) seasonal pattern in inventories as implied by the weekly seasonal Z variables.  Variable definitions are available in Table 
30. Both inventory levels and changes are presented.  Figure 3(a) covers the 1992-2011 period; Figure 3(b) the 1992-2004 period; and Figure 3(c)  the 2004-
2011 period. Figure 3(b) shows that overall U.S. crude oil storage capacity did not increase significantly over 1992-2004, as the line graphing inventory levels 
converges to its starting point. This differs from Figure 3(c) which shows that capacity increased over the 2004-2011 period. This capacity increase is partially 
attributed to Cushing, as can be seen from Figure 2. 
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Table 31: Description of Variables in Levels and Changes (1st Difference), Chapter 3 
The table describes the number, mean, median and standard deviation (and autocorrelation for changes) for levels and changes (1st difference) of the variables 
used in the analysis.  Years for which the data is available and used in the analysis are also presented.  Variable definitions are in Table 30. 
 
        LEVELS       CHANGES (1st Difference) 
Variables N Years  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.    Mean Median 
 Std. 
Dev. 
AC 1
st
 
order 
AC 
p-
value 
STOCK_US 983 1992-2011 319,097.20 320,634.00 23,355.21   27.56 132.50 3,912.40 0.045 0.161 
STOCK_CUSHING 379 2004-2011 24,741.52 23,157.00 7,866.80   68.71 56.00 979.94 0.100 0.051 
STOCK_US_nonCUSHING 379 2004-2011 304,012.90 304,584.00 17,244.58   90.24 317.00 3,365.87 0.351 0.000 
STOCK2 983 1992-2011 70,007.28 68,376.00 10,320.64   33.49 8.50 1,287.79 0.085 0.007 
STOCK2_nonCUSHING 379 2004-2011 49,980.12 48,074.00 5,370.63   36.87 68.00 1,102.75 -0.054 0.293 
STOCK1 983 1992-2011 14,650.79 14,764.00 1,523.02   -3.19 40.50 1,115.03 -0.362 0.000 
STOCK3 983 1992-2011 162,503.00 162,172.00 13,808.29   9.98 29.50 3,198.50 0.008 0.791 
STOCK4 983 1992-2011 12,989.03 12,680.00 1,609.29   3.73 -1.50 311.82 -0.085 0.007 
STOCK5 983 1992-2011 58,947.08 56,518.00 7,943.24   -16.46 -1.00 2,030.22 -0.281 0.000 
SPREAD2_SPOTWTI 983 1992-2011 0.19 0.11 1.08   0.00 0.00 0.67 -0.344 0.000 
SPREAD2_1 983 1992-2011 0.16 0.10 0.92   0.00 0.01 0.47 -0.261 0.000 
SPOT_WTI 983 1992-2011 41.42 28.86 27.92   0.08 0.10 2.57 -0.022 0.487 
PROD_US 983 1992-2011 5,850.92 5,808.00 615.73   -1.40 1.00 107.50 -0.201 0.000 
REFINERINPUTUS 983 1992-2011 14,708.67 14,793.00 752.25   1.38 15.00 282.95 -0.001 0.978 
REFINERINPUT1 983 1992-2011 1,446.55 1,477.00 181.78   -0.06 -1.00 72.65 -0.101 0.002 
REFINERINPUT2 983 1992-2011 3,253.51 3,260.00 163.98   -0.02 2.00 94.39 -0.064 0.046 
REFINERINPUT3 983 1992-2011 6,976.75 7,076.00 518.09   1.45 9.00 231.14 -0.053 0.097 
REFINERINPUT4 983 1992-2011 508.52 511.00 48.41   0.08 0.00 22.53 -0.151 0.000 
REFINERINPUT5 983 1992-2011 2,523.34 2,538.00 148.75   -0.08 2.00 85.57 -0.160 0.000 
IMPORTS_US 983 1992-2011 8,685.16 8,876.00 1,307.88   2.79 -20.00 779.04 -0.534 0.000 
IMPORTS1 983 1992-2011 1,421.93 1,415.00 272.57   -0.20 -6.00 346.94 -0.568 0.000 
IMPORTS2 983 1992-2011 975.69 979.00 208.23   0.54 4.00 160.72 -0.501 0.000 
IMPORTS3 983 1992-2011 5,400.42 5,502.00 802.97   0.92 -21.00 708.78 -0.488 0.000 
IMPORTS4 983 1992-2011 203.83 205.00 87.65   0.19 0.00 51.94 -0.573 0.000 
IMPORTS5 983 1992-2011 747.10 742.00 370.68   1.27 0.00 253.44 -0.588 0.000 
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∆(STOCK_US) 1
∆(STOCK_CUSHING) .17 1
∆(STOCK_US_nonCUSHING) .96 -.12 1
∆(STOCK2) .28 .59 .12 1
∆(STOCK2_nonCUSHING) .20 -.17 .25 .70 1
∆(STOCK1) .17 -.03 .18 .04 .07 1
∆(STOCK3) .77 -.04 .79 -.14 -.13 -.12 1
∆(STOCK4) .09 -.13 .12 -.06 .04 .03 .05 1
∆(STOCK5) .32 -.03 .33 .01 .03 -.13 -.08 -.07 1
∆(SPREAD 2_1) .04 .16 -.01 .13 .02 .01 -.02 .02 -.01 1
∆(SPOT_WTI) -.02 .04 -.03 .02 -.01 .06 .01 .00 -.11 -.30 1
∆(PROD_US) .17 .09 .14 .15 .09 -.01 .03 .07 .18 .05 -.07 1
∆(REFINERINPUTUS) .08 .09 .05 .09 .02 -.01 .01 -.01 .09 .09 -.02 .45 1
∆(REFINERINPUT1) .02 .09 -.01 .03 -.05 -.03 .03 -.05 -.02 -.02 -.05 .00 .16 1
∆(REFINERINPUT2) -.05 .03 -.06 -.10 -.15 .05 -.04 -.02 .03 .05 -.04 .11 .36 .09 1
∆(REFINERINPUT3) .12 .11 .09 .14 .07 .02 .01 .01 .12 .11 -.01 .46 .89 -.10 .06 1
∆(REFINERINPUT4) .00 -.14 .05 -.10 .01 -.10 .07 -.19 .07 -.01 .01 -.01 .13 .14 .09 .01 1
∆(REFINERINPUT5) -.08 -.09 -.06 -.04 .03 -.09 -.01 .04 -.09 -.07 .05 .02 .24 -.07 .04 -.02 .01 1
∆(IMPORTS_NET_NOSPR) .52 .12 .48 .13 .05 .18 .41 -.07 .11 .01 .03 .09 .31 .07 .10 .29 .06 .02 1
∆(IMPORTS1) .09 .05 .07 .03 -.01 .35 -.05 -.05 .04 .02 .06 -.09 -.05 .11 .10 -.09 -.02 -.07 .20 1
∆(IMPORTS2) .08 .09 .06 .15 .10 -.06 .03 -.03 .04 -.01 .03 -.10 .03 -.07 .13 .01 .05 -.02 .19 -.05 1
∆(IMPORTS3) .42 .10 .39 .09 .02 .04 .45 -.01 -.06 -.02 .05 .14 .29 .01 .02 .30 .06 .04 .76 -.23 -.04 1
∆(IMPORTS4) .06 .05 .05 .02 -.02 .09 .02 .06 .00 .03 .04 .03 .03 -.02 -.02 .03 .10 .03 .04 .04 -.03 .00 1
∆(IMPORTS5) .09 -.05 .11 -.03 .01 -.06 .00 -.08 .31 .04 -.11 .03 .10 .05 .00 .09 -.03 .03 .24 -.13 -.01 -.15 -.15 1
Table 32: Correlation between Variables, Chapter 3 
This table describes correlations between variable changes (1st difference).  Variable definitions are in Table 30.  Data involving Cushing covers the 2004-2011 
period, data for all other variables is for 1992-2011. 
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Table 33: Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) Estimation of the Impact of the Futures Spread 
Changes on Cushing Crude Inventory Changes 
The dependent variable, ∆STOCK, is the change Cushing crude inventories. Variable definitions are in 
Table 30. Any (+1) variables indicate a lead for that specific variable. The regression is run via OLS 
(Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjustment. Data is weekly. Model 1 
estimates over the 4/16/2004 - 7/08/2011 period, has 377 observations. 
 
Panel A.           
 
Model 1   Model 1 winsorized 
  ∆ Cushing stock   ∆ Cushing stock 
  2004-2011   2004-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C -556.14 0.022   -588.92 0.008 
∆(SPOT_WTI) 23.98 0.159   20.11 0.183 
∆(REFINERINPUT2) -0.22 0.703   -0.08 0.883 
∆(REFINERINPUT2)(+1) -0.25 0.673   -0.21 0.715 
∆(PROD_US) 0.55 0.039   0.59 0.021 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) -0.28 0.270   -0.26 0.307 
∆(IMPORTS2) 0.43 0.212   0.37 0.266 
∆(IMPORTS2)(+1) -0.29 0.433   -0.30 0.387 
Z2 185.98 0.002   190.82 0.001 
Z3 -13.45 0.003   -13.80 0.002 
Z4 0.33 0.011   0.34 0.008 
Z5 0.00 0.036   0.00 0.025 
ΔPDL1 167.89 0.000   162.41 0.001 
ΔPDL2 -59.45 0.001   -63.13 0.001 
ΔPDL3 -0.12 0.952   0.30 0.878 
ΔPDL4 1.10 0.070   1.33 0.050 
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4    0.000     0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 15%     16%   
 
Panel B.           
 
   ∆ SPREAD2_1      ∆ SPREAD2_1 
Lags Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
0 282.03 0.000   265.64 0.000 
1 324.29 0.000   319.85 0.000 
2 333.20 0.000   334.89 0.000 
3 315.40 0.000   318.71 0.000 
4 277.50 0.000   279.27 0.000 
5 226.12 0.000   224.52 0.000 
6 167.89 0.000   162.42 0.000 
7 109.42 0.023   100.91 0.028 
8 57.33 0.246   47.95 0.307 
9 18.26 0.698   11.49 0.799 
10 -1.20 0.977   -0.50 0.990 
11 5.60 0.900 
 
19.92 0.692 
12 45.26 0.574  80.70 0.386 
Sum of Lags 2161.08 0.000   2165.76 0.000 
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Table 34: Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) Estimation of the Impact of the Futures Spread 
Changes on the U.S. non-SPR Crude Oil Inventory Changes 
The dependent variable, ∆STOCK, is the change in U.S. non-SPR crude inventories. Variable 
definitions are in Table 30.  Lagged autoregressive error terms are included when needed. Any (+1) 
variables indicate a lead for that specific variable. The regression is run via OLS (Ordinary Least 
Squares) with the Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjustment. Data is weekly. Model 1 estimates over 
12/11/1992 - 7/8/2011, has 969 observations  and is presented with original and 1% winsorized data; 
Model 2, over 12/11/1992 - 4/9/2004, has 591 observations;  Model 3, over 4/23/2004 - 7/8/2011, has 
376 observations;  Model 4, excludes Cushing from U.S. inventories for 4/23/2004 to 7/8/2011, has 377 
observations. 
 
Panel A.           
  Model 1   Model 1 winsorized 
  ∆ U.S. stock   ∆ U.S. stock 
  1992-2011   1992-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C -1984.29 0.000   -1847.15 0.000 
∆(SPOT_WTI) -29.23 0.420   -26.32 0.470 
∆(REFINERINPUTUS) -1.03 0.017   -0.94 0.021 
∆(REFINERINPUTUS)(+1) 1.88 0.000   1.89 0.000 
∆(PROD_US) 4.21 0.000   4.18 0.000 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) 0.61 0.521   0.65 0.494 
∆(IMPORTS_US) 1.37 0.000   1.33 0.000 
∆(IMPORTS_US)(+1) -0.90 0.000   -0.88 0.000 
Z2 1111.54 0.000   1078.12 0.000 
Z3 -96.63 0.000   -94.53 0.000 
Z4 2.81 0.000   2.76 0.000 
Z5 -0.03 0.000   -0.03 0.000 
ΔPDL1 454.26 0.021   444.08 0.023 
ΔPDL2 -68.21 0.152   -63.73 0.182 
ΔPDL3 -7.48 0.274   -6.96 0.304 
ΔPDL4 1.38 0.406   1.27 0.448 
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4    0.017     0.018 
Adjusted R-squared 28%     28%   
 
Panel B.         
     ∆ SPREAD2_1      ∆ SPREAD2_1 
Lags Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
0 295.49 0.157   301.47 0.147 
1 435.43 0.002   429.92 0.002 
2 518.91 0.001   506.33 0.001 
3 554.24 0.002   538.32 0.002 
4 549.70 0.004   533.53 0.005 
5 513.61 0.009   499.58 0.010 
6 454.26 0.021   444.08 0.023 
7 379.96 0.054   374.67 0.057 
8 299.00 0.123   298.96 0.124 
9 219.70 0.224   224.59 0.217 
10 150.34 0.327   159.18 0.302 
11 99.24 0.438   110.35 0.386 
12 74.69 0.670   85.73 0.621 
 Sum of Lags  4544.57 0.005   4506.70 0.005 
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Table 34 (Continued): Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) Estimation of the Impact of the Futures 
Spread Changes on the U.S. non-SPR Crude Oil Inventory Changes 
 
Panel A.               
 
Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
  
∆ U.S. stock 
  
∆ U.S. stock 
  
∆ U.S. non-
Cushing 
   1992-2004   2004-2011   2004-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C -2558.21 0.000   -1557.91 0.066   -1330.06 0.067 
∆(SPOT_WTI) -64.10 0.568   0.46 0.983   -34.02 0.262 
∆(REFINERINPUTUS) -1.70 0.033   -1.30 0.000   -1.30 0.000 
∆(REFINERINPUTUS)(+1) 1.77 0.017   2.23 0.000   2.21 0.000 
∆(PROD_US) 4.02 0.092   3.02 0.000   3.00 0.000 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) -0.22 0.909   -0.32 0.669   0.20 0.788 
∆(IMPORTS_US) 1.16 0.000   1.88 0.000   1.81 0.000 
∆(IMPORTS_US)(+1) -0.71 0.004   -1.72 0.000   -1.54 0.000 
Z2 1164.76 0.000   1160.14 0.000   1025.31 0.000 
Z3 -97.58 0.000   -102.29 0.000   -90.76 0.000 
Z4 2.77 0.000   2.95 0.000   2.64 0.000 
Z5 -0.03 0.000   -0.03 0.000   -0.02 0.000 
ΔPDL1 1147.91 0.001   142.75 0.547   60.72 0.803 
ΔPDL2 -85.05 0.398   -54.83 0.324   -12.94 0.823 
ΔPDL3 -20.09 0.112   -5.31 0.393   -6.60 0.326 
ΔPDL4 -0.28 0.937   1.77 0.211   0.82 0.625 
AR(1) -0.15184 0.000   0.55464 0.000   0.47128 0.000 
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4 0.001      0.584      0.3721 
Adjusted R-squared 21%     69%     61%  
  
Panel B.               
 
   ∆ SPREAD2_1      ∆ SPREAD2_1      ∆ SPREAD2_1 
Lags Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
0 995.87 0.046   -102.14 0.410   -277.19 0.061 
1 1106.14 0.001   62.69 0.687   -142.57 0.364 
2 1184.69 0.000   163.73 0.420   -45.85 0.828 
3 1229.84 0.000   211.62 0.359   17.89 0.942 
4 1239.89 0.000   217.00 0.367   53.61 0.834 
5 1213.15 0.000   190.49 0.428   66.24 0.793 
6 1147.91 0.001   142.75 0.547   60.72 0.802 
7 1042.49 0.002   84.39 0.719   42.00 0.858 
8 895.18 0.008   26.06 0.911   15.02 0.948 
9 704.30 0.036   -21.62 0.923   -15.28 0.945 
10 468.14 0.137   -48.00 0.815   -43.96 0.829 
11 185.01 0.555   -42.44 0.804   -66.08 0.720 
12 -146.78 0.739   5.67 0.969   -76.70 0.700 
 Sum of Lags  11265.80 0.000   890.20 0.667   -412.14 0.848 
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Table 35: Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) Estimation of the Impact of the Futures Spread 
Changes on PADD2 Crude Inventory Changes 
The dependent variable, ∆STOCK, is the weekly change in PADD2 crude inventories. Variable 
definitions are in Table 30. Any (+1) variables indicate a lead for that specific variable. The regression 
is run via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West  adjustment. Data is weekly. Model 1 
estimates over 12/11/1992 - 7/8/2011, has 968 observations and is presented with original and 1% 
winsorized data; Model 2, over 12/11/1992 - 4/9/2004, has 591 observations; Model 3, over 4/16/2004 - 
7/8/2011, has 377 observations; Model 4, excludes Cushing from PADD2 inventories from 4/16/2004 
to 7/8/2011, has 377 observations. 
 
Panel A.           
 
Model 1   Model 1 winsorized 
  ∆ PADD2 stock   ∆ PADD2 stock 
  1992-2011   1992-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C -1020.25 0.000   -1028.80 0.000 
∆(SPOT_WTI) 16.82 0.219   14.43 0.276 
∆(REFINERINPUT2) -1.88 0.000   -1.81 0.000 
∆(REFINERINPUT2)(+1) 0.38 0.360   0.35 0.388 
∆(PROD_US) 0.92 0.021   0.90 0.021 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) 0.58 0.095   0.56 0.103 
∆(IMPORTS2) 0.87 0.002   0.85 0.002 
∆(IMPORTS2)(+1) -0.51 0.099   -0.51 0.087 
Z2 344.50 0.000   341.92 0.000 
Z3 -25.92 0.000   -25.62 0.000 
Z4 0.68 0.000   0.67 0.000 
Z5 -0.01 0.000   -0.01 0.000 
ΔPDL1 289.48 0.000   278.10 0.000 
ΔPDL2 -51.74 0.012   -48.89 0.012 
ΔPDL3 -2.59 0.228   -2.53 0.211 
ΔPDL4 0.72 0.289   0.70 0.269 
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4   0.000     0.000 
Adjusted R-squared 13%     13%  
  
Panel B.            
 
   ∆ SPREAD2_1      ∆ SPREAD2_1 
Lags Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
0 351.06 0.000   330.11 0.000 
1 393.38 0.000   372.35 0.000 
2 408.90 0.000   388.67 0.000 
3 401.94 0.000   383.23 0.000 
4 376.84 0.000   360.20 0.000 
5 337.91 0.000   323.77 0.000 
6 289.48 0.000   278.10 0.000 
7 235.88 0.000   227.38 0.000 
8 181.42 0.002   175.76 0.002 
9 130.44 0.029   127.44 0.028 
10 87.25 0.128   86.57 0.120 
11 56.18 0.316   57.35 0.298 
12 41.55 0.589   43.93 0.564 
 Sum of Lags  3292.21 0.000   3154.85 0.000 
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Table 35 (Continued): Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) Estimation of the Impact of the Futures 
Spread Changes on PADD2 Crude Inventory Changes 
 
Panel A.               
 
Model 2   Model 3   Model 4 
  
∆ PADD2 stock 
  
∆ PADD2 stock 
  
∆ PADD2 non-
Cushing 
   1992-2004   2004-2011   2004-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C -850.00 0.000   -1073.35 0.002   
-
517.21 0.072 
∆(SPOT_WTI) -15.93 0.735   19.03 0.212   -4.95 0.726 
∆(REFINERINPUT2) -1.80 0.000   -2.23 0.001   -2.01 0.001 
∆(REFINERINPUT2)(+1) 0.64 0.225   -0.11 0.868   0.14 0.799 
∆(PROD_US) 0.06 0.897   1.49 0.001   0.95 0.015 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) 0.94 0.156   0.17 0.610   0.45 0.125 
∆(IMPORTS2) 0.71 0.047   1.23 0.004   0.80 0.026 
∆(IMPORTS2)(+1) -0.47 0.238   -0.55 0.221   -0.26 0.499 
Z2 309.33 0.000   383.50 0.000   197.52 0.008 
Z3 -24.00 0.000   -28.71 0.000   -15.26 0.008 
Z4 0.64 0.000   0.74 0.001   0.41 0.016 
Z5 -0.01 0.000   -0.01 0.003   0.00 0.030 
ΔPDL1 602.68 0.000   205.46 0.002   37.57 0.497 
ΔPDL2 -109.90 0.000   -31.27 0.194   28.18 0.154 
ΔPDL3 -5.82 0.223   -2.14 0.429   -2.02 0.426 
ΔPDL4 2.89 0.008   0.03 0.970   -1.07 0.116 
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4 0.000      0.001      0.3416 
Adjusted R-squared 11%     17%     5%   
Panel B               
 
   ∆ SPREAD2_1      ∆ SPREAD2_1      ∆ SPREAD2_1 
Lags Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
0 428.66 0.023   309.69 0.005   27.66 0.784 
1 645.63 0.000   304.65 0.000   -19.63 0.780 
2 764.31 0.000   294.44 0.000   -38.76 0.558 
3 802.02 0.000   279.24 0.000   -36.16 0.595 
4 776.10 0.000   259.22 0.000   -18.28 0.782 
5 703.87 0.000   234.57 0.001   8.45 0.889 
6 602.68 0.000   205.46 0.002   37.57 0.497 
7 489.84 0.000   172.08 0.013   62.67 0.240 
8 382.70 0.001   134.61 0.064   77.28 0.160 
9 298.58 0.007   93.23 0.205   74.97 0.190 
10 254.81 0.017   48.11 0.484   49.31 0.395 
11 268.73 0.020   -0.56 0.993   -6.15 0.922 
12 357.67 0.027   -52.60 0.504   -97.85 0.261 
 Sum of Lags  6775.59 0.000   2282.15 0.000   121.08 0.837 
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Table 36: Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) Estimation of the Impact of the Futures Spread Changes on PADD 1, 3, 4, and 5 Crude Inventory 
Changes 
The dependent variable, ∆STOCK, is the change PADD 1,3,4 and 5 crude inventories.  Variable definitions are in Table 30. Lagged autoregressive and moving 
average error terms are included when needed. Any (+1) variables indicate a lead for that specific variable.  X denotes 1,3,4, and 5 for the PADD 1,3,4 and 5 
equations respectively.  The regression is run via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjustment. The weekly data is from 
12/11/1992 to 7/08/2011 and has 968 observations. 
 
  ∆ PADD1 stock   ∆ PADD3 stock   ∆ PADD4 stock   ∆ PADD5 stock 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C 72.09 0.374   -650.44 0.289   -114.41 0.013   -520.45 0.064 
∆(SPOT_WTI) 1.48 0.803   -13.22 0.702   -0.05 0.989   -26.68 0.156 
∆(REFINERINPUT_X) -0.71 0.109   -0.78 0.070   -2.00 0.000   -2.42 0.001 
∆(REFINERINPUT_X)(+1) 1.59 0.000   1.70 0.001   1.80 0.000   0.59 0.391 
∆(PROD_US) 0.18 0.547   0.95 0.384   0.10 0.222   1.71 0.003 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) 0.13 0.588   1.16 0.212   0.12 0.143   -1.05 0.102 
∆(IMPORTS_X) 0.60 0.000   1.22 0.000   0.20 0.413   1.47 0.000 
∆(IMPORTS_X)(+1) -0.62 0.000   -0.91 0.000   -0.16 0.456   -0.67 0.015 
Z2 7.19 0.723   506.15 0.000   52.65 0.000   253.93 0.000 
Z3 -0.66 0.658   -45.68 0.000   -4.43 0.000   -22.61 0.000 
Z4 0.01 0.740   1.37 0.000   0.13 0.000   0.66 0.000 
Z5 0.00 0.793   -0.01 0.000   0.00 0.000   -0.01 0.000 
ΔPDL1 -4.30 0.830   152.87 0.352   -13.05 0.450   60.97 0.251 
ΔPDL2 16.59 0.154   0.75 0.986   -3.62 0.492   -25.18 0.245 
ΔPDL3 0.38 0.776   -3.93 0.512   0.65 0.347   -3.26 0.182 
ΔPDL4 -0.76 0.108   0.08 0.958   0.13 0.478   0.81 0.288 
AR(1) 0.33 0.000         -0.12 0.002   -0.30 0.000 
AR(2) 0.07 0.036                   
MA(1) -0.921 0.000                   
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4 0.548     0.926     0.784     0.539 
Adjusted R-squared 34%     23%     7%     15%   
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Table 37: Alternative Specification Models of the Impact of the Futures Spread Changes on 
Cushing Crude Inventory Changes. Alternatives Include - Using % Cushing Inventory Change as 
a Dependent Variable, Adding Lagged and Cross-PADD Controls 
The dependent variable, ∆STOCK, is the change in Cushing inventories. In Model 1, it is a percentage 
change * 100; in Models 2 and 3 it is the barrel change in inventories. Variable are defined in Table 30. 
Any (+ 1) variable indicates a lead for that specific variable, while (-1) is a lag. The regression is run 
via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjustment. Data is weekly. 
Models 1-3 estimate over 2004-2011, have 377 observations. Model 1 uses percentage instead of barrel 
∆STOCK, Model 2 adds lagged variables, Model 3 adds cross-PADD controls. 
Panel A.               
  Model 1   
Model2-with lags 
Model 3-with 
PADD3 
   % ∆ Cushing stock ∆ Cushing stock ∆ Cushing stock 
  2004-2011   2004-2011   2004-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C -270.08 0.005   -515.15 0.036   -532.50 0.026 
∆(SPOT_WTI) 12.36 0.095   22.91 0.168   21.55 0.200 
∆(REFINERINPUT_2)(-1)       1.36 0.006       
∆(REFINERINPUT_2) -0.15 0.618   -0.03 0.961   -0.26 0.651 
∆(REFINERINPUT_2)(+1) -0.17 0.577   -0.03 0.954   -0.17 0.774 
∆(PROD_US)(-1)       0.53 0.064       
∆(PROD_US) 0.33 0.014   0.68 0.006   0.37 0.128 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) -0.13 0.363   -0.20 0.385   -0.40 0.118 
∆(IMPORTS_2)(-1)       -0.34 0.393       
∆(IMPORTS_2) 0.25 0.150   0.21 0.573   0.41 0.223 
∆(IMPORTS_2)(+1) -0.09 0.556   -0.45 0.202   -0.43 0.225 
∆(STOCKS_3)             -0.03 0.121 
∆(IMPORTS_3)             0.26 0.001 
Z2 91.97 0.000   178.13 0.004   194.89 0.001 
Z3 -6.64 0.001   -13.24 0.005   -14.59 0.002 
Z4 0.17 0.006   0.34 0.011   0.37 0.006 
Z5 0.00 0.023   0.00 0.029   0.00 0.019 
ΔPDL1 62.55 0.001   164.07 0.001   173.22 0.000 
ΔPDL2 -23.22 0.001   -59.93 0.000   -59.11 0.000 
ΔPDL3 0.11 0.906   0.06 0.977   -0.18 0.924 
ΔPDL4 0.37 0.117   1.14 0.060   1.06 0.077 
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4 0.000     0.000     0.000  
Adjusted R-squared 12%     17%     17%   
Panel B.               
 
   ∆ SPREAD2_1 
 
   ∆ SPREAD2_1      ∆ SPREAD2_1 
Lags Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
0 125.64 0.000   279.69 0.000   292.69 0.000 
1 134.97 0.000   322.77 0.000   331.91 0.000 
2 133.40 0.000   331.80 0.000   339.01 0.000 
3 123.14 0.000   313.61 0.000   320.34 0.000 
4 106.44 0.000   275.04 0.000   282.25 0.000 
5 85.50 0.000   222.92 0.000   231.09 0.000 
6 62.55 0.001   164.07 0.000   173.22 0.000 
7 39.81 0.040   105.34 0.033   114.98 0.015 
8 19.50 0.316   53.56 0.298   62.73 0.197 
9 3.85 0.833   15.54 0.752   22.81 0.621 
10 -4.92 0.760   -1.86 0.965   1.58 0.968 
11 -4.59 0.811   8.18 0.848   5.39 0.901 
12 7.07 0.840   52.49 0.494   40.58 0.607 
 Sum of Lags  832.35 0.000   2143.13 0.000   2218.59 0.000 
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Table 38: Alternative Specification Models of the Impact of the Futures Spread Changes on U.S. Crude Inventory Changes. Alternatives Include - 
Using % U.S. Inventory Change as a Dependent Variable and Adding Lagged Controls 
The dependent variable ∆STOCK, is  the change in U.S. non-SPR inventories. In Models 1 and 2, it is the percentage change *100; in Models 3 and 4 it is the 
barrel change in inventories. Variable are defined in Table 30. Lagged autoregressive and moving average error terms are included when needed. Any (+ 1) 
variable indicates a lead for that specific variable, while (-1) is a lag. The regression is run via Ordinary Least Squares with the Newey-West heteroscedasticity 
adjustment. Data is weekly. Models 1 and 3 estimate over 1992-2011 and have 969 observations; Models 2 and 4 over 2004-2011 and have 377 observations. 
Panel A.                     
  Model 1   Model 2   Model3-with lags   Model4-with lags 
   % ∆ U.S. stock    % ∆ U.S. stock   ∆ U.S. stock   ∆ U.S. stock 
  1992-2011   2004-2011   1992-2011   2004-2011 
  Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
C -61.454 0.000   -71.069 0.003   -2363.15 0.000   -2247.78 0.003 
∆(SPOT_WTI) -1.032 0.366   -0.026 0.966   -25.61 0.451   8.44 0.648 
∆(REFINERINPUTUS)(-1)             -1.45 0.000   -0.55 0.092 
∆(REFINERINPUTUS) -0.031 0.024   -0.040 0.000   -1.61 0.000   -2.16 0.000 
∆(REFINERINPUTUS)(+1) 0.062 0.000   0.065 0.000   1.45 0.000   1.80 0.000 
∆(PROD_US)(-1)             3.77 0.000   2.93 0.000 
∆(PROD_US) 0.142 0.000   0.088 0.000   5.11 0.000   5.03 0.000 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) 0.021 0.502   -0.018 0.409   0.60 0.559   0.28 0.669 
∆(IMPORTS_US)(-1)             0.90 0.000   1.49 0.000 
∆(IMPORTS_US) 0.044 0.000   0.057 0.000   2.05 0.000   3.21 0.000 
∆(IMPORTS_US)(+1) -0.028 0.000   -0.055 0.000   -0.57 0.003   -1.11 0.000 
Z2 34.913 0.000   41.034 0.000   1172.76 0.000   1275.53 0.000 
Z3 -3.040 0.000   -3.519 0.000   -98.63 0.000   -108.28 0.000 
Z4 0.089 0.000   0.101 0.000   2.81 0.000   3.08 0.000 
Z5 -0.001 0.000   -0.001 0.000   -0.03 0.000   -0.03 0.000 
ΔPDL1 14.342 0.014   9.582 0.127   472.80 0.011   238.67 0.278 
ΔPDL2 -2.054 0.166   -1.600 0.331   -67.18 0.155   -84.50 0.084 
ΔPDL3 -0.254 0.220   -0.302 0.060   -9.18 0.146   -6.79 0.220 
ΔPDL4 0.041 0.428   0.061 0.141   1.24 0.447   2.16 0.084 
AR(1)       0.609 0.000         0.57 0.000 
AR(2)       -0.004 0.948             
AR(3)       -0.191 0.001             
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4 0.017     0.097     0.010     0.304 
Adjusted R-squared 28%     70%     31%     76%   
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Table 38 (Continued): Alternative Specification Models of the Impact of the Futures Spread Changes on U.S. Crude Inventory Changes. Alternatives 
Include - Using % U.S. Inventory Change as a Dependent Variable and Adding Lagged Controls 
Panel B.                     
 
∆ SPREAD2_1 
 
∆ SPREAD2_1 
 
∆ SPREAD2_1   ∆ SPREAD2_1 
Lags Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value 
0 8.69 0.186   -4.92 0.120   278.25 0.157   34.78 0.709 
1 13.15 0.003   2.37 0.599   424.62 0.002   221.49 0.085 
2 15.88 0.001   7.23 0.222   515.51 0.000   329.83 0.055 
3 17.12 0.002   10.01 0.131   558.35 0.001   372.76 0.060 
4 17.11 0.003   11.08 0.101   560.56 0.001   363.24 0.085 
5 16.10 0.006   10.82 0.099   529.57 0.004   314.23 0.148 
6 14.34 0.014   9.58 0.127   472.81 0.011   238.67 0.282 
7 12.08 0.037   7.74 0.205   397.68 0.038   149.54 0.509 
8 9.55 0.094   5.66 0.349   311.63 0.106   59.78 0.794 
9 7.00 0.189   3.72 0.531   222.08 0.223   -17.65 0.936 
10 4.69 0.306   2.27 0.680   136.45 0.375   -69.79 0.726 
11 2.85 0.464   1.69 0.719   62.16 0.609   -83.68 0.595 
12 1.73 0.747   2.34 0.560   6.64 0.967   -46.37 0.685 
 Sum of Lags  140.29 0.003   69.60 0.211   4476.30 0.004   1866.82 0.340 
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Table 39: Alternative Specification Models of the Impact of Futures Spread Changes on Cushing 
and U.S. (non-SPR) Crude Inventory Changes. Alternatives Include Using Monthly Seasonal 
Dummies and non-PDL Spread Structure 
The dependent variable, ∆STOCK, is the change in inventories for Cusing in Model 1 and for U.S (non-
SPR) in Models 2 and 3.  These models do not use ∆PDL spread terms and seasonal Z variables, but use 
actual spread lags and monthly dummy variables.   Variable definitions are in Table 30. Lagged 
autoregressive and moving average error terms are included when needed.  Any (+ 1) variables indicate 
a lead for that specific variable.  X denotes PADD 2 data in Model 1 and U.S. data in Models 2 and 3. 
The regression is run via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West heteroscedasticity 
adjustment. Models 1 evaluates Cushing inventory changes from 2004-2001 has 377 observations;  
Model 2 U.S. inventory changes from 1992-2011 has 969 observations; Model 3 U.S. inventory 
changes from 2004-2011, has 377 observations. 
  
Model 1    
(no PDL or Zs)   
Model 2 
(no PDL or Zs)   
Model 3 
    (no PDL or Zs) 
  ∆ Cushing stock   ∆ U.S. stock   ∆ U.S. stock 
  2004-2011   1992-2011   2004-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C 490.84 0.004   -1990.45 0.000   -2020.14 0.010 
∆(SPOT_WTI) 4.86 0.727   -45.39 0.118   3.13 0.876 
∆(REFINERINPUT_X) -0.15 0.817   -1.26 0.005   -1.50 0.000 
∆(REFINERINPUT_X)(+1) -0.41 0.517   1.72 0.000   2.15 0.000 
∆(PROD_US) 0.40 0.139   3.90 0.000   2.77 0.000 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) -0.31 0.275   0.21 0.825   -0.56 0.460 
∆(IMPORTS_X) 0.36 0.322   1.31 0.000   1.83 0.000 
∆(IMPORTS_X)(+1) -0.31 0.405   -0.96 0.000   -1.82 0.000 
JAN -649.41 0.001   2539.72 0.000   3099.97 0.001 
FEB -565.73 0.012   2716.80 0.000   3359.83 0.000 
MAR -31.41 0.890   4205.47 0.000   4017.87 0.000 
APR -231.04 0.249   3486.20 0.000   3828.18 0.000 
MAY -477.90 0.035   2142.67 0.000   2295.30 0.016 
JUN -771.39 0.003   926.52 0.089   982.58 0.284 
JUL -297.25 0.269   1019.91 0.048   1201.85 0.186 
AUG -762.99 0.001   1059.09 0.047   1219.87 0.204 
SEP -934.94 0.000   690.61 0.236   698.94 0.450 
OCT -467.93 0.044   3273.74 0.000   3096.60 0.003 
NOV 33.93 0.879   2187.38 0.000   2396.10 0.010 
∆ Spread2(-1) 90.92 0.328   419.65 0.017   147.96 0.376 
∆ Spread2(-2) 245.56 0.000   342.70 0.114   40.73 0.863 
∆ Spread2(-3) 285.23 0.000   130.71 0.591   -20.67 0.943 
∆ Spread2(-4) 164.99 0.022   419.62 0.068   176.90 0.480 
∆ Spread2(-5) 176.31 0.001   478.21 0.055   483.24 0.030 
∆ Spread2(-6) 97.54 0.097   882.58 0.001   754.19 0.008 
∆ Spread2(-7) 176.81 0.009   565.98 0.069   521.06 0.090 
∆ Spread2(-8) 95.09 0.177   240.18 0.395   168.80 0.600 
∆ Spread2(-9) 6.05 0.907   189.11 0.446   -90.19 0.705 
∆ Spread2(-10) -28.03 0.536   22.72 0.899   -62.01 0.739 
∆ Spread2(-11) -55.49 0.298   -65.46 0.729   -59.92 0.741 
∆ Spread2(-12) 77.16 0.143   220.94 0.318   82.74 0.609 
AR(1)             0.58 0.000 
AR(2)             -0.02 0.732 
AR(3)             -0.13 0.049 
Joint Wald Test ∆ SPRD2   0.000      0.039      0.252  
Adjusted R-squared 15%     28%     70%   
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Table 40: Alternative Specification Models of the Impact of the Futures Spread Changes on 
Cushing and Total U.S. (non-SPR) Inventory Changes. Alternative Spread Definition is the 
Difference Between the Two-Month Future and the Spot WTI Crude Price 
The dependent variable, ∆STOCK, is the change in inventories for Cushing in Model 1 and for U.S 
(non-SPR) in Models 2 and 3.  Variable definitions are in Table 30. Lagged autoregressive and moving 
average error terms are included when needed.  Any (+ 1) variables indicate a lead for that specific 
variable.  X denotes PADD 2 data in Model 1 and U.S. data in Models 2 and 3. The regression is run 
via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjustment. Data is weekly. 
Models 1 evaluates over 2004-2001, has 377 observations; Model 2, over 1992-2011, has 969 
observations; Model 3, over 2004-2011, has 377 observations. 
 
Panel A.               
 
Model 1   Model2   Model 3 
   ∆ Cushing stock   ∆ U.S. stock   ∆ U.S. stock 
  2004-2011   1992-2011   2004-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C -584.66 0.018   -1985.58 0.000   -1516.11 0.073 
∆(SPOT_WTI) 12.74 0.419   -34.42 0.347   3.46 0.876 
∆(REFINERINPUT_X) -0.20 0.739   -1.03 0.017   -1.29 0.000 
∆(REFINERINPUT_X)(+1) -0.27 0.661   1.88 0.000   2.25 0.000 
∆(PROD_US) 0.55 0.040   4.19 0.000   2.97 0.000 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) -0.28 0.279   0.57 0.538   -0.44 0.553 
∆(IMPORTS_X) 0.44 0.203   1.37 0.000   1.89 0.000 
∆(IMPORTS_X)(+1) -0.27 0.464   -0.90 0.000   -1.71 0.000 
Z2 194.54 0.002   1107.82 0.000   1158.45 0.000 
Z3 -14.05 0.003   -96.24 0.000   -102.24 0.000 
Z4 0.35 0.011   2.80 0.000   2.95 0.000 
Z5 0.00 0.036   -0.03 0.000   -0.03 0.000 
ΔPDL1 143.89 0.001   395.21 0.020   94.03 0.633 
ΔPDL2 -55.68 0.001   -57.10 0.111   -70.47 0.081 
ΔPDL3 -1.63 0.228   -7.28 0.142   -4.03 0.436 
ΔPDL4 1.43 0.009   1.24 0.275   1.64 0.122 
AR(1)             0.55 0.000 
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4 0.000     0.039     0.287  
Adjusted R-squared 13%     28%     69%  
  
Panel B.               
 
∆ SPREAD2_SPOT 
 
∆ SPREAD2_SPOT   ∆ SPREAD2_SPOT 
Lags Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
0 111.46 0.043   208.10 0.119   18.07 0.862 
1 203.41 0.000   343.83 0.003   140.95 0.254 
2 249.33 0.000   427.83 0.002   206.64 0.200 
3 257.79 0.000   467.53 0.003   224.97 0.227 
4 237.34 0.000   470.37 0.005   205.76 0.298 
5 196.52 0.000   443.79 0.009   158.83 0.426 
6 143.89 0.000   395.21 0.020   94.03 0.633 
7 88.01 0.042   332.07 0.047   21.18 0.912 
8 37.41 0.422   261.80 0.107   -49.90 0.788 
9 0.66 0.989   191.85 0.205   -109.37 0.528 
10 -13.70 0.731   129.64 0.323   -147.40 0.327 
11 2.89 0.927   82.61 0.445   -154.17 0.175 
12 58.98 0.236   58.20 0.637   -119.84 0.118 
 Sum of Lags  1574.00 0.000   3812.82 0.010   489.74 0.772 
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Table 41: Alternative Specification Models of the Impact of the Futures Spread Changes on 
Cushing and Total U.S. (non-SPR) Inventory Changes. Alternative Spread Definition Is the 
Difference Between the Three- and the One-Month WTI Crude Futures 
The dependent variable, ∆STOCK, is the change in inventories for Cusing in Model 1 and for U.S (non-
SPR) in Models 2 and 3.  Variable definitions are in Table 30. Lagged autoregressive and moving 
average error terms are included when needed.  Any (+ 1) variables indicate a lead for that specific 
variable.  X denotes PADD 2 data in Model 1 and U.S. data in Models 2 and 3. The regression is run 
via OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) with the Newey-West heteroscedasticity adjustment. Data is weekly. 
Models 1 estimates over 2004-2001, has 377 observations; Model 2, over 1992-2011, has 969 
observations; Model 3, over 2004-2011, has 377 observations. 
 
Panel A.               
 
Model 1   Model2   Model 3 
   ∆ Cushing stock   ∆ U.S. stock   ∆ U.S. stock 
  2004-2011   1992-2011   2004-2011 
  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
C -554.72 0.029   -2001.48 0.000   -1656.81 0.053 
∆(SPOT_WTI) 24.64 0.167   -25.83 0.499   1.24 0.955 
∆(REFINERINPUT_X) -0.21 0.724   -1.02 0.018   -1.30 0.000 
∆(REFINERINPUT_X)(+1) -0.27 0.650   1.88 0.000   2.23 0.000 
∆(PROD_US) 0.55 0.037   4.20 0.000   3.02 0.000 
∆(PROD_US)(+1) -0.27 0.271   0.61 0.514   -0.32 0.662 
∆(IMPORTS_X) 0.43 0.208   1.37 0.000   1.89 0.000 
∆(IMPORTS_X)(+1) -0.27 0.452   -0.90 0.000   -1.71 0.000 
Z2 185.02 0.003   1114.38 0.000   1174.50 0.000 
Z3 -13.36 0.005   -96.90 0.000   -103.20 0.000 
Z4 0.33 0.014   2.82 0.000   2.98 0.000 
Z5 0.00 0.041   -0.03 0.000   -0.03 0.000 
ΔPDL1 105.49 0.001   326.70 0.008   146.23 0.340 
ΔPDL2 -38.47 0.003   -43.97 0.184   -22.10 0.554 
ΔPDL3 -0.19 0.886   -5.04 0.260   -4.27 0.313 
ΔPDL4 0.71 0.110   0.93 0.423   0.83 0.402 
AR(1)             0.55 0.000 
Joint Wald Test ΔPDL1-ΔPDL4 0.000     0.008     0.795  
Adjusted R-squared 15%     28%     69%   
 
Panel B.               
 
∆ SPREAD3_1 
 
∆ SPREAD3_1   ∆ SPREAD3_1 
Lags Coeff. p-value  Coeff. p-value   Coeff. p-value 
0 175.92 0.003   207.33 0.157   -53.42 0.587 
1 204.23 0.000   303.79 0.002   46.67 0.657 
2 210.84 0.000   362.15 0.000   113.42 0.391 
3 200.00 0.000   388.02 0.001   151.79 0.310 
4 175.98 0.000   387.00 0.001   166.74 0.284 
5 143.06 0.000   364.69 0.003   163.24 0.293 
6 105.49 0.001   326.70 0.008   146.23 0.340 
7 67.54 0.042   278.63 0.025   120.69 0.428 
8 33.49 0.346   226.08 0.069   91.57 0.546 
9 7.59 0.828   174.65 0.137   63.83 0.665 
10 -5.89 0.845   129.96 0.197   42.44 0.754 
11 -2.68 0.925   97.59 0.257   32.34 0.779 
12 21.48 0.665   83.17 0.498   38.51 0.711 
 Sum of Lags  1337.03 0.000   3329.74 0.001   1124.05 0.403 
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Appendix 1: Polynomial Distributed Lag (PDL) Model 
An example of how we set up a fourth degree PDL model is shown below based on 
the distributed lag model using twelve lags of X, which in our main model is 
ΔSPREAD: 
 1212110 
 tttt XXXY                (A.1) 
 
where βi can be approximated by a fourth degree polynomial: 
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Substituting βi from Equation (A.2) into the distributed lag Equation (A.1), and 
transforming it yields: 
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which can be rewritten as: 
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where the Z variables are constructed using 12 lags of X: 
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